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Introduction
Predicting Visual Input to Prevent Surprise
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The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing
The predictability of our visual world
To experience ‘surprise’ is almost by definition uncommon; however, it happens enough, such
that we all know how it feels. We take a stroll on the beach, when out of nowhere a frisbee
approaches our head; we navigate our car on the highway, and suddenly someone in front of us
hits the brakes; we take a walk in the forest, and unexpectedly we see a beautiful flower grow in
the middle of the path; we will get a call from someone we have not spoken to in such a long
time. The emphasized terms illustrate what causes our ‘surprise’ in these scenarios: they are
occurrences that we had been unable to predict when they occurred.
It is somewhat remarkable – one might even say surprising – that we do not experience this
sensation more often as we perceive the outside world. How come we are able to navigate
and move around – while other objects and people are simultaneously in motion – and yet we
always seem to have a correct expectation of what we will observe? Moreover, we rarely seem
to struggle as we are determining where to look next, even though every gaze shift will radically
alter the visual information that enters our eyes. The reason that we are not more surprised
by the things we see when we open our eyes, shift our gaze, or turn a corner, is that most of
visual information is very predictable. As a consequence, we often know from experience where
to look and what to expect when our gaze gets there. These predictions and expectations might
be based on visual experience that is very recent, or might have been acquired a long time ago.
The present thesis discusses how visual experience, ranging from very recent to very long ago,
impacts our visual behavior.
Much of the predictability in visual information comes from the redundancy of visual information
in the outside world (Shannon, 1951; Attneave, 1954; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009). Imagine, for
example, looking at a digital photo of a bright blue sky on a sunny day. It will be a rather boring
photo, and it will be simple to describe to someone else: every pixel will have approximately
the same shade of blue. However, this changes dramatically when a simple object, such as an
airplane is in the picture. This is believed to be the reason why such an object would immediately
attract any observers attention (Itti & Baldi, 2009; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009).
Visual information is not only redundant in space, but also in time. As I’m writing this, I
am at a desk where most of the visual information around me is identical to what it was two
hours ago. Should I wish to get up and grab a cup of coffee, my mug will be in the same
place where I last put it. There is evidence that visual behavior is tuned to make good use of
such consistency. For example, Hayhoe, Bensinger & Ballard (1998; (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook
& Rao, 1997)) had participants copy an example block pattern by moving puzzle pieces across
a computer screen. Even though research suggests that maintaining the location and color of
one or more blocks is well within the capacity of working memory, all participants chose instead
to excessively move their eyes back and forth between the example pattern and their puzzle
workspace. Since participants knew the visual information was there (and would remain there),
they did not bother taxing their cognitive system by memorizing the items. Of interest though,
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most eye movements that were made would land directly on the relevant location within the
example pattern or the puzzle workspace. So despite the choice not to recruit working memory
and actively remember the information, memory still played a profound role in directing the
eyes and completing the task.
Although much of visual information is redundant across space and across time in stationary
situations such as staring at a clear blue sky or glaring at a computer screen, our daily lives are
often more dynamic than that. For example, we actively move around the house to complete
our morning routines, after which we travel through traffic to get to the office. After a long day
of work we travel home, make a stop at the grocery store, then try to find our pots and pans
in the kitchen to prepare a meal. These tasks all involve a rapidly and dynamically changing
environment, and yet we are not overtaken by a consistent feeling of surprise.
There are many different ways in which previous visual experience saves us from perpetual
surprise, and these all take place at different time scales. First, it is important to note that as
we move across a dynamic environment, we will usually inspect the same locations repeatedly.
When we first see a red car coming from the right, we learn of its existence. To keep track
of it while simultaneously attending the rest of our environment, our gaze will shift back and
forth between the car and other relevant objects. Across gaze shifts, the appearance of the car
will be the same, which aids in finding and identifying it again – a phenomenon referred to as
repetition priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). It has been suggested that such repetition
priming plays a crucial role in maintaining a stable and consistent representation of the world
around us (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a).
Across larger time scales, long-term memory for previous experience aids us as we navigate the
visual world. We tend to follow the same route to work every day, and as a result we have a
strong sense of what we will encounter when we turn a corner. It has often been emphasized that
the core function of memory is to consistently generate predictions for upcoming events (Levy,
1989; Bar, 2009). Note that if we always take a consistent route to work, the visual information
that we take in right before turning a corner will automatically become a very strong retrieval
cue to predict what will be up next (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Mensink & Raaijmakers,
1988; Howard & Kahana, 2002). Several studies have shown that repeated presentations of
sequences of visual scenes and stimuli will gradually cause the brain to expect the upcoming
stimulus, which in turn aids visual performance on tasks such as recognition, identification, and
search (Olson & Chun, 2001; Hindy & Turk-Browne, 2015; Turk-Browne, Simon & Sederberg,
2012).
What if one day, we do not take the exact same route to work? Some days, we might venture into
streets and corridors that we have never experienced before; for example when construction work
blocks our traditional route. Although the risk of surprise is much higher on those occasions, our
memory still can construct predictions to help us deal with unknown territory. This is because
even completely novel scenes and situations are largely governed by the same regularities that we
are used to. “Common sense” dictates that even though we might have turned on a completely
5
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing
unfamiliar street, any cars we will encounter will still be found on the road, and not hovering
in the sky. Our visual behavior while exploring the environment is greatly affected by such
regularities (Navalpakkam & Itti, 2005; Peelen & Kastner, 2014; Chun & Nakayama, 2000). For
example, visual targets in a natural scenes are found, identified or classified much faster when
they occur in ‘sensible’ locations (Wolfe, Vo˜, Evans & Greene, 2011; Neider & Zelinsky, 2006;
Torralba, Oliva, Castelhano & Henderson, 2006).
These examples illustrate some of the various ways in which visual memory and visual experience
can affect the way we explore the visual world and guide our visual attention. This can be as a
heuristic of informing us where to look, or by preparing us for what we will see. Of particular
interest is that the majority of these influences take place almost effortlessly, and without us
realizing it. Sure, you will be aware of the route you take to work, and you would be able to
memorize it when called for. Nevertheless, as you are underway you will be mostly unaware of
how it influences visual behavior. This is of particular interest for the study of visual attention,
as we will discuss in the next section, and underlies the core questions addressed in this thesis.
How should we conceptualize and understand how the effects of visual experience come to be,
if they are not under explicit control? What neural processes and mechanisms underly these
effects? And to what extent do these mechanism differ for the shortest time-scale, such as
repetition priming, compared to the longest timescale of adaptation to statistical regularities?
The remainder of this chapter will first discuss some of the dominant theories of vision and visual
attention, with a special emphasis on how it is studied via visual search. As this discussion will
illustrate, the effects of visual experience and visual memory on attention and perception have
often been acknowledged, and yet their underlying mechanisms often remain poorly character-
ized, without a clear place in most prevalent theories of visual search. Next, an overview will be
presented of several theoretical frameworks to understanding vision that explicitly address the
role that experience plays. This is followed by a brief excursion on how progress in research on
visual attention can greatly benefit computational models over verbal theories. Finally, a brief
summary of the upcoming chapters of this thesis will be given, illustrating how they relate to
the ideas put forward in this chapter.
Visual experience and the study of vision and attention
The task of visual cognition has been poetically described by Neisser (1967) as to “deal with the
process by which a perceived, remembered and thought-about world is brought into being from
an as unpromising beginning as the retinal patterns”. It is hard to overstate the complexity of
this task, given the great amount of ‘retinal patterns’ that make up the visual input. During
active vision, we constantly shift our eyes to inspect the visual world around us, typically
yielding a new visual scene multiple times per second. The field of view – the range from
which light hits our retina when our eyes remain fixated – spans nearly 180◦horizontally, by
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approximately 135◦vertically (Strasburger, Rentschler & Ju¨ttner, 2011). This is somewhat of
an aggrandizement, because the resolution of visual information is not nearly uniform across
the retina – in fact, that is the main reason why we move our eyes so much. Nonetheless, these
numbers give insight into the wealth of visual information that our brains are faced with, and
are to transform into the rich representation referred to by Neisser. Visual attention is the term
used for those mechanisms and processes that our brain employs to select relevant information
from this continuous stream of data. There is an inherent need for visual attention imposed by
the capacity limits of our visual system (Pashler, Johnston & Ruthruff, 2001; Tsotsos, 1990).
A common approach to study the properties, limits, and characteristics of visual attention is
by visual search experiments. In these experiments, observers are presented with trials where
they have to seek out a target in a visual scene, often accompanied by one or multiple distractor
elements. Of interest is the ease by which the observer finds the target, usually measured
by having them respond to a small feature of the target and assessing their response times
(RT). Research on visual attention then addresses what different conditions affect the ease of
the search. This has given rise to different classifications or taxonomies of different types of
attention (Pashler et al., 2001; Chun, Golomb & Turk-Browne, 2011; Jonides, 1981; Posner,
1980). In most attempts to classify attentional mechanism, the primary distinction is one of
top-down visual attention versus bottom-up visual attention.
Top-down visual attention is defined as those effects on attentional selection that are generated
endogenously because of an observers goals and intentions. Commonly, this concerns effects
on attention that are considered under voluntary control. For example, if I am on the beach
I might be looking for a friend who is in a red swimsuit. As I’m scanning the beach to find
her, other people on the beach in red swimwear will attract my attention for further inspection,
until my friend has been found. It is commonly assumed that search in this case is guided by an
‘attentional template’ that prioritizes locations that match the mental image of what I’m looking
for (Wolfe, 1994; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Hamker, 2005; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989).
On the opposite side of the dichotomy, visual search is affected by bottom-up factors. For
example, regardless of the color of swimwear I’m looking for, a suddenly incoming frisbee in the
corner of my eye will most certainly capture my attention. (Theeuwes, 1992). It is commonly
believed that stimuli – other than frisbees promply flying at ones head – can have properties
that makes them inherently conspicuous and prioritized for visual selection (Itti & Koch, 2000;
Li, 2002). Especially in the absence of an explicit goal for visual search, it is believed that
these locations will automatically attract our visual attention and our gaze (Parkhurst, Law &
Niebur, 2002; Itti & Koch, 2001; but see Tatler, Baddeley & Gilchrist, 2005; Anderson, Ort,
Kruijne, Meeter & Donk, 2015; Einha¨user, Spain & Perona, 2008). In visual search, bottom-up
attention is often explored using singleton search tasks, where the target is not defined by an
attentional template, but as being the ‘odd one out’ among various distractor items. A common
observation that suggests that singleton search is performed without much need for effortful
attentional selection is that search is commonly fast, and will remain equally fast when the
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number of distractors increases (Bravo & Nakayama, 1992; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) – because
the target will ‘pop out’ regardless of the number of items in the display.
The dichotomy is useful because it helps outline one of the main dilemmas faced by visual
attention: how to decide whether to prioritize items and locations in the visual scene that are
relevant to the task at hand – people in red swimwear – versus stimuli that are inherently
interesting and that might be threatening to my well-being, like the incoming frisbee. A vast
amount of research has been conducted to investigate this push-pull relationship between top-
down and bottom-up attention, commonly by means of visual search experiments (Theeuwes,
2010; Van der Stigchel, Belopolsky, Peters, Wijnen, Meeter & Theeuwes, 2009; Leber & Egeth,
2006b; Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994).
Where should the effects of visual experience fall within the dichotomy of top-down and bottom-
up attention? There appears to be no clear-cut answer. At a first glance it might seem obvious
that past visual experience can not be considered a bottom-up factor: by definition, it is the
effect of visual information that is no longer present. However, does that render it equivalent
or even similar to top-down effects of attention? As was highlighted in the previous section for
the effects of experience when navigating on our way to work, these effects occur automatically
without the need for explicit control. Similarly, there is no need for a clear attentional template
to efficiently direct our attention as we are turning a corner, and yet our attention will not be
driven by physical salience alone. This has caused several researchers to suggest that the top-
down versus bottom-up dichotomy fails to correctly capture some of the most prevalent factors
affecting our visual attention (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes,
2012; Peelen & Kastner, 2014).
There are many examples of effects of visual experience on visual search that illustrate the
shortcomings of this dichotomy. One example phenomenon that is studied in several chapters
of this thesis, is intertrial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). It is classically studied in
singleton search experiments, where the target is defined for example as either the red item
among green stimuli, or vice versa. Target- and distractor colors might change unpredictably
from trial to trial. Even though this is a bottom-up search task – which the visual system should
be able to resolve ‘as-is’ due to target pop-out – a pronounced effect of the preceding trial was
found. If target and distractor colors repeated, search was greatly facilitated compared to when
they switched. Facilitation exerted by a single trial gradually seems to decay over 5–8 upcoming
trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010; Bichot & Schall, 2002), or over ≈90s in the
absence of any intervening trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000).
Such intertrial priming of pop-out (PoP) was even found when the participants were fully in-
formed of the color of the upcoming target (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Huang, Holcombe
& Pashler, 2004), emphasizing that this it is not to be equated with the effects of a ‘top-down’
attentional template. What mechanisms instead underly these effects is still debated, but most
interpretations of PoP commonly assume that either some lingering selection mechanism or a
memory trace of the past trial changes the weighting of target- and distractor features in the
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bottom-up flow of upcoming visual information.
Intertrial priming does not only occur in singleton search: virtually identical effects have been
shown when the target is defined by a conjunction of features (Hillstrom, 2000; Kristja´nsson,
Wang & Nakayama, 2002; Becker & Horstmann, 2009). It is, however, unclear to what extent
priming effects in a conjunction search tasks are comparable to PoP. It has been argued that
PoP may occur at different levels of processing dependent on the task demands (Kristja´nsson,
2006; Meeter & Olivers, 2006; Lamy, Yashar & Ruderman, 2010). It was already mentioned
above that the task demands of singleton and conjunction search are very different: virtually all
models and theories of attention suggest that unless a search can be resolved on the basis of the
bottom-up local contrast among stimuli a top-down attentional template is needed to assess each
stimulus in a more serial fashion (Wolfe, 1994; Tsotsos, Culhane, Kei Wai, Lai, Davis & Nuflo,
1995; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The difference between priming in singleton- and conjunction
search will be the focus of several chapters in this thesis.
Intertrial priming is an effect of visual experience on future visual attention that is traditionally
only assessed on the short time scale of a single trial. Other phenomena are usually studied
over larger time scales, such as over the course of the experiment. In the Contextual Cueing
paradigm, the spatial layout of a predefined set of visual search display is repeated throughout
the experiment (Chun & Jiang, 1998, 1999). As a consequence, search gradually becomes speeded
on trials with a repeated display versus trials with new layouts. Surprisingly, however, observers
appear to have no conscious experience or memory of the repetition: immediately after the
experiment, participants are unable to distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ displays Contextual Cueing
has been shown to arise in conjunction search and in pop-out singleton search tasks, as well
as in displays where the stimuli dynamically move across the display during the trial (Geyer,
Zehetleitner & Mu¨ller, 2010; Chun & Jiang, 1999). It was shown to persist when participants
completed one session of visual search, then returned after a week for a second session (Chun &
Jiang, 2003) which illustrates the involvement of long-term memory in this effect. Even though
Chun & Jiang have classified the contextual cueing effect as ‘top-down’, the effect is – much like
PoP – clearly different from the volitional and conscious guidance of attention that arises with,
for example, an attentional template.
Other explorations of visual experience on visual search are illustrative of observers’ capabilities
to adapt to the regularities in the experiment. In several studies, targets are presented more
often at a certain location of the screen than others, and performance for targets at that location
is subsequently facilitated (Geng & Behrmann, 2005; Umemoto, Scolari, Vogel & Awh, 2010;
although note that at least to some extent this can be explained as an effect of repetition
priming: Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006; Kabata & Matsumoto, 2012). In a recent cueing study,
it was shown that a probe that can have various colors is more likely to capture attention if
its color is more often predictive of the target location than other colors (Cosman & Vecera,
2014). For search tasks where a target present/absent judgment is required, it was shown that
participants dynamically alter their response criteria as the probability of a target changes over
9
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the course of the experiment (Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010). Critically, for most of these experiments
it is shown that such dynamic adjustments to the statistics of the environment (the experiment)
occurred without any awareness or control of the participant.
Finally, research has shown that the effects of visual experience can be so profound, that they
can even modulate bottom-up attentional capture on the long term. In their studies, Leber
& Egeth (2006a,b) split their participants into two groups who were given a different ‘training
phase’: one group, the singleton group, was presented with a task where observers searched
for a particular, constant target among homogeneous distractors (say, a red stimulus among
gray distractors). The other group, the feature group, were similarly to search for a constant
target, but it was presented among heterogeneous distractors (say, a red target among yellow,
blue and gray distractors). During the critical ‘testing phase’, participants were now to search
for a new (gray) target, and distractors with different colors were presented in such a way
that they would capture attention. It was found that capture by the preceding target color
was equivalent to the amount of capture by other colors in the singleton group, but was more
enhanced for the target color in the feature group. The authors interpreted this result as an
effect of ‘attentional set’ (Bacon & Egeth, 1994): people in the singleton group had acquired
a different strategy (singleton detection mode) than those in the feature group, who had to
explicitly single out a specific feature (feature detection mode). In subsequent experiments,
Leber, Kawahara & Gabari (2009) showed that the effects of acquiring this attentional set were
still found a week later, clearly demonstrating that this was a long-term memory effect. The
effect was interpreted to reflect that top-down strategies and guidance can override the bottom-
up attentional capture by a stimulus. However, in the light of the other findings reported here,
one might wonder whether this effect had really been the result of a chosen strategy. Instead,
these effects might have reflected an automatic and implicit adaptation of the visual system to
the experienced parameters of the preceding task.
As this section illustrates, the classical dichotomy of top-down versus bottom up that governs
the literature on visual search, falls short when the effects of experience are considered. That is
not to say that the effects of experience on visual processing have gone completely unmentioned
in the literature. The following section will discuss several approaches to the study of vision,
mostly outside of the visual search literature, that have emphasized how experience shapes visual
processing.
Theories and insights on the role of visual experience
The visual cortex as a consequence of visual regularities The profound effect visual
experience can have on visual processing is illustrated by the hypothesis that our visual cortex
is organized largely on the basis of the visual information we encounter in our daily lives. This
is particularly true during ‘critical periods’ in the development of a brain. Classical studies
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where test animals have been deprived of a certain type of stimulation in the first months of
their waking lives have demonstrated that a rich sensory experience is critical for the healthy
development; deprivation can result in lifelong impairment of vision (Movshon & Van Sluyters,
1981). A somewhat more lighthearted example of the impact of visual experience is found in
the famous Muller-Lyer illusion, where a line with inward pointing arrowheads at its endpoints
is perceived as longer than a line with outwards pointing arrowheads, even though both lines
are of the same size. The prevalent theory of why this illusion arises is that our daily experience
with straight lines in rooms and buildings causes us to automatically infer one line to be further
away than the other. In support of this idea, it has been shown that observers from different
cultural backgrounds, where straight lines are less prevalent than in western culture, are less
susceptible to this illusion (Segall, Campbell & Herskovits, 1963).
The visual experience thus seems to shape the sensory cortex that encodes it. In this vein, it has
even been argued that “saliency reflects how long-term memory has shaped and modified sensory
processing” (Lamme, 2003). That is, the visual system has gradually acquired knowledge of what
visual properties cause a stimulus to be immediately relevant and should be prioritized in visual
processing. This sentiment resonates in various computational models of visual processing and
salience. When a visual system is designed on the premise that it should efficiently code for
the visual variation in the world around us, the resulting features have response properties that
closely resemble those of neurons found in human visual cortex (Torralba et al., 2006; Rao &
Ballard, 1999; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009; Zhaoping, 2006; Fo¨ldia´k & Young, 1995; Olshausen &
Field, 2004).
Note that such a sparse, efficient representation to encode common visual experience does not
definitively imply that this representation is defined by visual experience alone. It might be
that, to a large extent, such a representation has evolved rather than acquired during a lifetime.
However, research on perceptual learning in adult observers has provided direct evidence that
the visual brain is plastic, and consistently susceptible to training and learning (Fahle & Poggio,
2002; Fahle, 2005; Roelfsema, van Ooyen & Watanabe, 2010). In these studies, the visual
sensitivity of an observer certain stimuli is modulated by training for several hundreds of trials for
multiple days. After training subtle stimulus differences can be detected that the observer could
not detect beforehand, such as subtle changes in local motion, spatial frequency or intensity.
These training effects are usually highly specific to the training task and might be limited to
small, retinotopically confined regions (Ahissar & Hochstein, 1996, 1997).
Adaptations to regularities and experience: predictive coding Luckily, not all changes
to perception and attention induced by visual experience rely on intense training or a lifetime
of experience. Instead, changes in perception can be surprisingly sudden. For example, certain
stimuli might be stripped of just enough sensory information that participants can stare at the
same visual information for seconds onto minutes without being able to figure out what the
stimulus represents. But then, either after a single exposure to the full stimulus or after a very
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fulfilling ‘a-ha!’-moment, their percept of the deprived stimulus becomes much richer and more
meaningful, and will remain so, often for years to come (Ahissar & Hochstein, 2004; Warrington,
1968).
In neuroimaging, the effects of a single visual experience can be observed in the repetition sup-
pression effect (Ringo, 1996; Grill-Spector, Henson & Martin, 2006). This term refers to the
finding that the neural response evoked by a stimuli that is presented for a second time, is the
response to the first presentation. It is often measured using functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI), but similar findings have been obtained using Electro- or Magnetoencephalog-
raphy (EEG/MEG). It is such a robust and widespread phenomenon of cortical responses, that
repetition suppression has become a useful tool to assess neuronal specificity: voxels where ac-
tivity is attenuated when a stimulus is repeated are assumed to encode information specific to
the stimulus. At least in part, repetition suppression seems to stem from the accommodation
of neuronal responses to repeated stimulation (Kaliukhovich & Vogels, 2011; Baene & Vogels,
2010; Sawamura, Orban & Vogels, 2006)
Interestingly, repetition suppression is closely related to (and often confounded with) expectation
suppression (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam & Egner, 2008; Todorovic & de Lange,
2012; Kok, Jehee & de Lange, 2012; Wacongne, Labyt, Wassenhove, Bekinschtein, Naccache &
Dehaene, 2011) – the attenuation of neuronal responses to stimuli that are not per se repeated,
but can be predicted by the observer. Summerfield et al. (2008) studied responses in the fusiform
face area to repeated face stimuli, in blocks were repetition was either common or uncommon.
Although repetition suppression was found in both cases, it was much more pronounced when
the repetition was additionally expected. Follow-up studies (Larsson & Smith, 2012) showed
that expectation suppression (but not repetition suppression) was not found when the repeated
stimulus was not task-relevant. It seemed that without task relevance, no predictions were
generated (see also Turk-Browne, Junge´ & Scholl, 2005, but see Stefanics, Kimura & Czigler,
2011).
The properties of repetition- and expectation suppression are often seen as evidence for the
predictive coding theory of human cortical processing (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005;
Clark, 2013). This theory states that the sensory cortices are not organized to encode the
information in the outside world per se; rather, the cortex is assumed to reflect an optical
mechanism to minimize the amount of unexplained variance in input signals. Consequentially,
the cortex can be seen as a set of hierarchically organized ‘predictors’, and feedforward neural
processing reflects the signaling of prediction error to higher order cortical areas. Visually
salient information, under this assumption, is information that could not have been predicted
given the surrounding sensory input (Itti & Baldi, 2009; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009; see also the
treatment of predictability in the previous section of this chapter). Under this hypothesis,
repetition- and expectation suppression similarly result from the predictability of visual input
in time, across different scales. Repetition suppression might reflect the low-level prediction
that stimulus information is common to repeat or remain constant over a short amount of time,
12
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whereas higher order cortex acquires its predictions over a larger time scale, and learns to expect
switches or omissions of stimuli (Kiebel, Daunizeau & Friston, 2008; Summerfield et al., 2008;
Wacongne et al., 2011; Todorovic & de Lange, 2012).
The predictive coding hypothesis is very general in that it encompasses and accounts for a wide
range of observations in neuroscience, including repetition and expectation suppression, the
hierarchical organization of sensory cortices, the mismatch negativity and P300 event related
potentials. It is of note that the theory seems to be centered around the capability of the
sensory systems to gradually adapt to regularities in the environment, and learns to predict from
these statistical regularities. However, the theory largely seems to bypass another important
mechanism for prediction that has been long known to cognitive psychology: the retrieval of
episodic memories.
A role for memory retrieval Episodic memory refers to the human capability to retrieve
past experiences and ‘mentally travel back in time’ to relive these experiences (Tulving, 1985).
Memory researchers have often emphasized that our ability to relive episodic memories, and to
form analogies between our memories and the present, forms the basis for acquiring declarative
knowledge, and is what allows us to predict what will happen (Bar, 2009; Howard, Shankar &
Jagadisan, 2011; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997).
Research on visual attention and visual search has in various ways alluded to the connection
between episodic memory and attention, on some occasions more explicitly than on others. The
classical work of Schneider & Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) focused on the question
how tasks that rely on visual attention might transform from a controlled and effortful undertak-
ing into a fast and efficient automatic process. Although they did not refer to episodic memory
explicitly, they proposed that automated processes originate from the automatic activation of
learned sequences of events. Logan (1990) explicitly related automaticity for visual search to
memory for individual trials, by showing that the benefit of automatic processing is gradually
acquired as a function of item repetition. Interestingly, he emphasized how such repetition ben-
efits – or the benefits of automaticity – are not merely the result of ‘repetition’ in itself, but
rather depend on the context of the associations between the stimuli and the task (compare
Larsson & Smith, 2012; Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Turk-Browne et al., 2005, discussed above).
At this point it should be noted that Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994), in their pioneering work
on PoP, did explain their results as a consequence of “a memory system”. However, they
stressed that the memory trace underlying priming only encompassed the memory-focusing
feature (the color). In this early work, they found little to no evidence for an effect of response
repetition (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 2000), although this has been reported by others
(Meeter & Olivers, 2006; Tollner, Gramann, Muller, Kiss & Eimer, 2008; Lamy, Bar-Anan &
Egeth, 2008) albeit much smaller than for the target-defining feature. In later work, the same
group acknowledged that priming similarly seemed to occur for other dimensions (target position
repetition, target response repetition), but these were considered to result from independent
13
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memory traces (Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Martini, 2010).
This hypothesis was challenged by Hillstrom (2000) and by Huang et al. (2004). In these studies,
it was found that the priming for the target-defining feature was modulated by priming of the
response feature or another, task-irrelevant feature. It seemed that priming might not reflect
some low-level feature weighting mechanism that independently modulated attention for specific
features. Rather, they argued that priming was the result of the retrieval of episodic memory
traces laid down on each trial. If a trial constituted a repetition, the retrieval of the trial would
facilitate responses. If the trial would not fully match the preceding trial (e.g. its color would
repeat but the response would switch), repetition priming would be attenuated. This has been
called the episodic retrieval hypothesis of intertrial priming.
Whether intertrial priming is best described as a consequence of episodic retrieval or as a conse-
quence of independent feature weighting remains debated (Lee, Mozer & Vecera, 2009; Thomson
& Milliken, 2010). Recently, researchers have began to favor a hybrid account, proposing that
intertrial priming might be a composite effect of both episodic retrieval and feature weighting.
However, since both mechanisms make such similar predictions regarding the effect of a single
trial, there is very little understanding to what extent either mechanism is responsible for prim-
ing, or whether they perhaps operate at different stages of the task (Thomson & Milliken, 2013;
A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011; Lamy et al., 2010).
The involvement of episodic memory retrieval in priming thus remains poorly understood. How-
ever, recent neuroimaging studies have shed new light on the hypothesis that visual search might
be guided by episodic memory. These have began to uncover the role of the hippocampus and
the Medial Temporal lobe (MTL) in guiding visual processing based on visual experience, often
implicitly. In particular, many of these have highlighted how anticipatory effects of predictable
stimuli on visual attention, appear to be driven by the MTL (Turk-Browne et al., 2012; Hindy
& Turk-Browne, 2015).
For example, Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson & Chun (2010) showed that when a stream of pic-
tures of faces and houses contained face-house pairs that were consistently repeated in the same
order, then response times to identifying the second picture of the pair (which was fully pre-
dicted by the first) decreased markedly compared to unpaired stimuli. Participants afterwards
reported that they had been unaware of the stimulus pairings. These performance increases by
implicit anticipation appeared to be driven by the hippocampus, as higher anticipatory activ-
ity in the hippocampus correlated with reduced neural activity evoked in early visual areas –
reminiscent of expectation suppression. Other studies similarly point towards the hippocampus’
involvement in modulating visual activity from long term memory (Bosch, Jehee, Ferna´ndez &
Doeller, 2014). For example, when a (high or low) tone is associated with the visual represen-
tation of an orientation during a training phase, this grating can be decoded from visual areas
upon hearing the tone during the testing phase. In this case, classification accuracy has been
shown to correlate with the activity evoked in the hippocampus.
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Given that these studies highlight hippocampal involvement in modulating visual processing
from memory, and given the well-known involvement of the hippocampus in encoding and re-
trieving episodic memories, this suggests a possible role for episodic memory in, for example,
repetition priming effects. However, note that the episodic retrieval hypothesis has thusfar rarely
been assessed other than at very short time scales of a single trial in the past. One of the main
questions addressed in this thesis is whether intertrial priming effects are indeed only found at
such small time scales, or whether they can trained and are comparable to the long-term implicit
memory effects discussed in this section.
Overview of this thesis
This thesis explores the effects of visual experience on visual attention and visual search, by
means of both experimental research and by computational models. Models are often used to
allow one to investigate a theory or mechanism at a high level of detail. Such a level of detail is
often not reached using only verbal theories and purely empirical research. One example of the
limitations of verbal theories has been given by Zelinsky (2005), when commenting on the use
of the word ‘attention’ in the literature. He stated: “Think back to the last time you have used
the word attention (...) and substituting the word processing. If you find that you can make
this substitution without a significant loss of underlying meaning, your reference to the term
attention probably lacked precision”. This is not to say that experimental research intentionally
or bluntly avoids detailed explanations. However, an explicit computational approach will often
lead to a deepened, better understanding of the problem at hand. There are different ways in
which this can be achieved:
 Computational modeling might help uncover gaps or flaws in the reasoning a particular
proposed mechanism.
 Conversely, computational models might be used to illustrate the feasibility of a new
hypothesis.
 A simulation might be used to generate qualitative or quantitative predictions – some of
which might not have been obvious from a verbal description
Much like with empirical work, there is not just one valid approach to modeling, and this
resonates in the present work. The computational models introduced in this thesis differ greatly
in terms of the topic that is addressed, the questions they intend to answer and the level of
abstraction at which they address these topics and answer these questions.
The studies presented in this thesis all deal with the effects of repetition and visual experience
on the processing of visual information, but do so at very different timescales. The chapters are
coarsely ordered based on the time scales of the effect under study.
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Chapter 1 deals with repetition at the neuronal level within the ≈ 220ms between stimulus
presentation and the generation of a saccade to a visual targets. More specifically, we present
a new explanation for the finding that speeded saccades to target stimuli tend to deviate away
from accompanying distractors in the display. Commonly, such deviation away is assumed to re-
flect spatially focused top-down inhibition of the distractor item, which subsequently averts the
trajectory of the saccade to the target. However, this view has been challenged by neurophysio-
logical and neuroanatomical findings, as well as by computational models of saccade production.
In this chapter, we present a computational model that implements a new explanation, and test
its predictions with an experiment. In the time leading up to the saccade, brainstem neurons
that code for a saccade directed at the distractor stimulus will be stimulated by preparatory
activation before the target has been selected. Once the target has been selected and the sac-
cade is initiated, the neuronal accommodation to this stimulation will result in an imbalance in
subsequent motor output, resulting in a saccade that deviates away from the distractor.
In Chapter 2, visual experience is studied at the trial-to-trial level. A computational model of
intertrial priming is presented, that is integrated in an established model of bottom-up visual
salience. Whereas most studies on priming seem to assume that priming can be seen as the
weighting of a few isolated features relevant to the task, the model suggests that intertrial
priming would affect the entire visual representation, even in the simplest of singleton search
tasks. We suggest ‘feature weighting’ can be implemented in terms of attenuated responses to
repeated stimulation, and boosting of the target features mediated by the inherent reward of
finding the target. This relatively simple approach to visual adaptation can explain a variety of
puzzling priming effects, including effects that have been taken to reflect relational priming and
goal-dependent modulations of priming.
In Chapter 3, we address the time scale of priming of pop-out. Previous research (Martini,
2010) has attempted to quantify the time course of intertrial priming, and proposed a model
where priming is driven by two independent processes: a strong, fast-decaying and a slowly
decaying weaker process. In a subsequent study (Brascamp, Pels & Kristja´nsson, 2011) long-
lasting priming effects were found, which was interpreted to reflect the slow process outlined by
Martini. However, we show that this model actually would not predict any long-term priming
effects in this experimental design. In fact these data were due to a coding error in the original
experiment. We present data from two replication attempts that closely resemble the model
prediction but not the original data. Subsequent quantitative model comparison based on these
data did not support the hypothesis of priming at multiple time scales.
The studies presented in Chapter 4 investigate whether priming only exists at a short time scale
of a few trials as predicted by feature weighting models (Martini, 2010), or whether the effect
is similarly found over longer time scales as was be predicted by an associative memory model
(Raaijmakers, 2003; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988) Data from four experiments is presented
with either singleton- and conjunction search tasks with two possible target colors. In the
experiment, neutral blocks, where the target was either color on 50% of the trials, alternated
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with bias blocks where the target had one bias color on 80% of the trials. We found that in
singleton search, priming only occurred at the intertrial level, and color biases did not have
a prolonged effect. Conversely, for conjunction search, the bias blocks resulted in persistent
facilitation for the biased color, which did not attenuate over the course of 200 neutral trials.
Additionally, we found evidence that such long-term priming was implicit and not driven by a
participants’ awareness of the color bias.
In Chapter 5 the long-term priming effect was replicated in an experiment while eye movements
were recorded. This helped us determine exactly at what stage of a search task long- and short-
term feature priming affected the search process. We found that both short- and long term
priming modulated visual search upon the very first eye movement, initiated within ≈180ms
after display onset. Such a short latency suggests that both long- and short-term priming reflect
anticipatory effects, in place before the search is initiated.
The research in Chapter 6 subsequently investigates the robustness of the long-term priming
effect. We present data that show long-term priming is found across two visual search sessions
separated by a week, akin to work on contextual cueing (Chun & Jiang, 2003) or attentional
set learning (Leber et al., 2009). Additionally, we present an experiment where participants
were fully informed of the color bias they had observed, and were incentivized to prioritize
the unbiased color for the remainder of the experiment. Nevertheless, long-term priming still
facilitated subsequent visual search for the bias color compared to the unbiased color.
Chapter 7 presents a study on contextual cueing and how it relates to theories of memory
retrieval. Theories of memory retrieval commonly assume that retrieval is mediated by the
temporal context, and predict that a change in context impairs retrieval of memory traces
acquired in a different context. In this study, we induce a change in context by changing the
stimuli and task of a visual search experiment halfway. In line with theories of retrieval we found
that facilitation by contextual cueing is attenuated in response to this change, after which it is
reacquired.
17

Chapter 1
Curved saccade trajectories
Adapted from Kruijne, W., Van der Stigchel, S., & Meeter, M.
A model of curved saccade trajectories: Spike rate adaptation in the brainstem as
the cause of deviation away.
Brain and Cognition (2014), 85:259–270
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The trajectory of saccades to a target is often affected whenever there is a distractor
in the visual field. Distractors can cause a saccade to deviate towards their location or
away from it. The oculomotor mechanisms that produce deviation towards distractors
have been thoroughly explored in behavioral, neurophysiological and computational
studies. The mechanisms underlying deviation away, on the other hand, remain unclear.
Behavioral findings suggest a mechanism of spatially focused, top-down inhibition in
a saccade map, and deviation away has become a tool to investigate such inhibition.
However, this inhibition hypothesis has little neuroanatomical or neurophysiological
support, and recent findings go against it. Here, we propose that deviation away results
from an unbalanced saccade drive from the brainstem, caused by spike rate adaptation
in brainstem long-lead burst neurons. Adaptation to stimulation in the direction of
the distractor results in an unbalanced drive away from it. An existing model of the
saccade system was extended with this theory. The resulting model simulates a wide
range of findings on saccade trajectories, including findings that have classically been
interpreted to support inhibition views. Furthermore, the model replicated the effect
of saccade latency on deviation away, but predicted this effect would be absent with
large (400 ms) distractor-target onset asynchrony. This prediction was confirmed in
an experiment, which demonstrates that the theory both explains classical findings on
saccade trajectories and predicts new findings.
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1.1 Introduction
Because of the limited resolution of the retina outside of the fovea, visual perception relies on a
stream of rapid eye movements to fixate locations of interest. These eye movements (saccades)
are intended to bring the fovea from one location to the next, yet almost never follow a straight
line; they are usually curved. Some of this curvature is idiosyncratic to the observer, and some
of it seems to be unsystematic noise (Optican & Robinson, 1980). However, curvature is also
partly influenced by cognitive factors. In particular, saccade deviation from the optimal path
is known to be affected by the presence of non-target elements in the visual scene, so-called
distractors. (Van der Stigchel, 2010; Van der Stigchel, Meeter & Theeuwes, 2006).
1.1.1 Saccade deviation, population coding and inhibition
To study curved saccades, a distractor paradigm (Sheliga, Riggio & Rizzolatti, 1994; Doyle &
Walker, 2001) is often used: observers make a speeded saccade to a predefined target as soon
as it appears, and a distractor (or more rarely, several) appears in the scene simultaneously
with the target. When the distractor appears close to the target (within 20◦; Walker, Deubel,
Schneider & Findlay, 1997), saccades will tend to deviate 1 towards the distractor. This may
result in so-called ‘global-effect’ saccades, where the gaze lands in the middle between target
and distractor. (Coren & Hoenig, 1972; Van der Stigchel & Nijboer, 2011).
In explaining these deviations, it is commonly assumed that the oculomotor system utilizes a
saccade map where spatially organized activity is evoked by stimuli. To determine the saccade
goal, stimuli compete for selection by means of lateral inhibition, where the losing location
is suppressed and the remaining target activity is translated into a motor command. The
oculomotor pathway indeed contains multiple structures that could implement such a visuomotor
map, and of particular interest is the superior colliculus (SC). The SC is a layered midbrain
structure, and its intermediate layers (a) implement a retinotopic map in which activity in
visuomotor neurons corresponds to the current visual input (Robinson, 1972; Marino, Rodgers,
Levy & Munoz, 2008); (b) are known to trigger saccades in response to sufficient stimulation,
directed to the location of receptive visual field at the stimulated location (Robinson, 1972;
Gandhi & Katnani, 2011); (c) integrate dense projections from striate, extrastriate and frontal
areas that all implement retinotopic representations (Munoz & Schall, 2004; Schlag-Rey, Schlag
& Dassonville, 1992; Sommer & Wurtz, 2000); and (d) constitute the primary source of input
for the brainstem burst neurons that drive the eye muscles (Sparks & others, 2002; Scudder,
1Different studies on saccadic behavior have used variable measures and terminology to characterize saccade
trajectories. Throughout this article, ‘deviation’ is used to indicate the angle between the initial direction of
the saccade and a straight line from the starting point to the target. ‘Curvature’ is used whenever we want to
emphasize the trajectory of the saccade, which usually displays a decrease in deviation as the saccade curves
back towards the target mid-flight.
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Kaneko & Fuchs, 2002). The central role of the SC in saccade generation is illustrated in Figure
1.1a.
Deviation towards and the global effect are well explained in terms of population coding in
this map (Lee, Rohrer, Sparks & others, 1988): when distractor activity is not suppressed
completely before the saccade, it contributes to the movement which might then deviate to an
intermediate location, and land there as well. This explanation is supported by the findings
that simultaneous electrical stimulation at two collicular locations results in averaging saccades
(Katnani, van Opstal & Gandhi, 2012; Robinson, 1972), and that SC recordings during visually
evoked averaging saccades are marked by distributed peaks at short latencies, and activity at an
intermediate location for longer latency-saccades (Edelman & Keller, 1998; Glimcher & Sparks,
1993). Various successful computational explorations of this theory have been developed (Arai,
Keller & Edelman, 1994; Trappenberg, Dorris, Munoz & Klein, 2001; Meeter, Van der Stigchel
& Theeuwes, 2010).
In humans, there is also a set of conditions that make saccades consistently deviate away from
distractors. The currently dominant interpretation of deviation away from distractors relies on
extending the population coding view with spatially focused distractor inhibition in the saccade
map. Excessive suppression of the distractor location would ‘deflect’ motor command to the
opposite direction, and cause the saccade to deviate away (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; McSorley,
Haggard & Walker, 2004; Van der Stigchel, 2010; Walker & McSorley, 2008). Evidence for such
spatial inhibition is mostly behavioral, and can be summarized as these effects:
 the latency effect refers to an often found correlation between deviation away and saccadic
latency (McSorley, Haggard & Walker, 2006; Mulckhuyse, Van der Stigchel & Theeuwes,
2009; Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2003), with more deviation away occurring for long-latency
saccades. This is then interpreted as attentional inhibition building up over time, mostly
affecting saccades with long latencies.
 The distractor similarity effect has been reported (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2003; Mulckhuyse
et al., 2009), a finding that distractors similar to the target cause more deviation towards
at short latencies than very dissimilar stimuli, yet at longer latencies similar distractors
evoke more deviation away. The interpretation is that similar distractors require more
and stronger inhibition, but that this inhibition is later than with dissimilar – more easily
dissociable – distractors.
 Distractor location is known to affect deviation, with greater angular target-distractor
distances, or smaller fixation-distractor distances inducing more deviation away (McSorley,
Cruickshank & Inman, 2009; Van der Stigchel, Meeter & Theeuwes, 2007). This position
effect is often explained through the locus of inhibition in the map: in both cases, inhibition
has a larger spatial effect on the initial trajectory of the saccade, resulting in greater
deviation away.
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 Apart from these exogenous manipulations, several endogenous effects have been reported:
merely expecting a stimulus to appear, or maintaining a location in working memory can
result in deviation away without physical distractors (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2004; Van
der Stigchel & Theeuwes, 2006; Theeuwes, Belopolsky & Olivers, 2009). Explanations of
such findings rely on tenets that endogenous processes like attention and working memory
will automatically activate representations in the (oculo)motor system (Rizzolatti, Riggio,
Dascola & Umilta´, 1987; Sheliga et al., 1994; Postle, 2006), which in turn yields similar
suppression effects.
From such findings it is often concluded that saccade deviation can be used to probe inhibi-
tion in the oculomotor system (McSorley et al., 2006; Van der Stigchel et al., 2006; Theeuwes
et al., 2009): the amount and direction of saccadic deviation is taken as a measure of inhibition
produced by attention mechanisms. However, strong neuroanatomical or neurophysiological
evidence for this view is lacking, and to our knowledge no computational model has thus far
successfully incorporated this theory, despite its apparent simplicity. Top-down inhibition has
therefore functioned more or less as a deus ex machina, called upon to explain deviation away
when it occurs, yet remaining unexplained itself. Moreover, an increasing body of findings from
the literature seem to strongly challenge the theory, as reviewed below.
1.1.2 Challenges to spatial top-down inhibition theory
Although the behavioral effects mentioned above seem to converge on a spatial top-down inhibi-
tion view of saccade deviation, there are several reasons to challenge the view. First, extensive
research on the anatomy and connectivity of the oculomotor system and the SC in particular
(White & Munoz, 2011; Munoz & Schall, 2004) has yielded remarkably little evidence for spatial
inhibition. As Figure 1.1a illustrates, projections to the SC are primarily excitatory. Only the
substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) provides inhibition, but this is tonic and globally inhibits
the SC. Saccades are preceded by a temporary release of this inhibition, which is centered around
the target, but note that this spatial code is very coarse, and has a net excitatory effect (Jiang,
Stein, McHaffie & others, 2003; Hikosaka, Takikawa & Kawagoe, 2000). There thus seems to be
no candidate source of spatial inhibition.
Secondly, White, Theeuwes & Munoz (2012) were recently able to evoke deviation away in
macaque monkeys and investigated the associated responses in the SC. In their study, the
irrelevant distractor was presented either 400ms before target onset (i.e. a distractor-target onset
asynchrony; DTOA400ms) or simultaneously (DTOA0ms). The spatial inhibition view would
predict that, in particular with DTOA400ms, the magnitude of deviation away would depend
on inhibition and would be predicted by the amount of activity at the distractor location after
presentation. However, only 30ms before saccade initiation did distractor activity somewhat
predict deviation away, and in the DTOA400ms condition, no correlation was found for the
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critical 400ms interval. This suggests that the distractor location was not being inhibited in this
interval.
Thirdly, it is of note that SC encodes locations rather than the trajectories to get there. This
means that the characteristic ‘curvature’ that follows deviation away can not result from one
command to the brainstem, but must result from a correction signal that affects the trajectory
mid-saccade. In line with this dissociation, the distractor location seems to affect the size of
the initial deviation, but not the point of peak deviation (Van der Stigchel et al., 2007), and
the shape of curvature is relatively unaffected by the initial deviation, even when the distractor
is in the opposite hemifield (Doyle & Walker, 2001) The proposed source for this correction
signal is the cerebellum, receiving inputs from the SC, and manipulating the brainstem activity
in-flight (McSorley et al., 2004; Scudder et al., 2002; Quaia, Lefe`vre & Optican, 1999). This does
however raise the question how the cerebellum can identify the proper target location when the
SC can not. If, for example other oculomotor areas were unaffected by inhibition and underly
this corrective signal (McSorley et al., 2004), the result of this correction, negating inhibition
effects, should be observed in SC as well, as these areas project there more densely (Munoz
& Schall, 2004). Alternatively, the SC itself could complete target selection mid-saccade and
drive correction, but this would suggest that with long latencies, complete selection should occur
before saccade initiation; rather, these saccades are marked by more, rather than less deviation
away.
In summary, it seems difficult to justify the assumption that inhibition accounts for saccade
trajectories deviating away from distractors. To be precise, we do not claim that inhibition does
not play any role in target selection in the oculomotor system, but a mechanism of excessive
spatial inhibition of distractors is clearly at odds with the findings discussed here, as was similarly
inferred by White et al. (2012). Therefore, we propose a novel theory in this article that
suggests that deviation away does not rely on inhibitory signals but originates downstream, in
the vectorial command encoded by the brainstem.
1.1.3 An adaptation theory of deviation away
The SC is often considered the ‘final stage’ of oculomotor competition, and it is where most
retinotopically organized signals converge and are translated into a brainstem command that
controls the eye muscles. This command has a vectorial representation (Figure 1.1b) where
neurons encode horizontal and vertical displacement by a rate code, where firing rates encode
the velocity and length of the saccade (Van Gisbergen, Robinson & Gielen, 1981; Sparkset al. ,
2002). Coarsely, the paramedian pontine reticular formation (PPRF) has neurons that encode
the horizontal component, whereas the rostral interstitial nucleus of the medial longitudinal
fasciculus (riMLF) encodes vertical movement.
For both components similar neurons have been identified that comprise the pathway (Figure
24
Curved saccade trajectories
Figure 1.1: a Schematic representation of the oculomotor system. Markers indicate whether connections are
excitatory (solid triangle: H) or inhibitory (inverted open triangle: M). Only structures and connections in
black are explicitly represented in our model, those in gray are not. See the text for the abbreviations and more
detail. b Detailed excerpt of the projection from SC to LLBN in a, schematically outlining how retinotopically
organized SC-output is decomposed into the vectorial representation maintained in the brainstem. For two
representative neurons in the SC, it is shown how their output is decomposed into directional components
for vertical and horizontal eye movements. For example, the top left SC-neuron represents a location in the
upper right visual field. Activity at this location projects to brainstem neurons that code for upwards and
for rightwards movement. The relative strength of these connections determines the balance between these
two components, so that together they produce a movement vector in the appropriate direction.
1.1a) from the SC to the Motor Neurons (MNs) The SC projects to the long-lead burst neurons
(LLBNs), which after stimulus onset show increased activity leading to a burst some 80-30ms
before the saccade (Scudder, Moschovakis, Karabelas & Highstein, 1996; Rodgers, Munoz, Scott
& Pare´, 2006). The LLBNs then seem to serve as a relay, projecting onto the excitatory and
inhibitory burst neurons (EBNs/IBNs) (Ramat, Leigh, Zee & Optican, 2007; Sparkset al. ,
2002). These are characterized by a burst shortly before saccade onset, and project to MNs in
coordinated fashion: EBNs excite the MNs that tense the muscles in the desired direction, and
simultaneously the opposing MNs are inhibited by IBNs (Van Gisbergen et al., 1981; Ramat
et al., 2007; Sparkset al. , 2002). The EBNs/IBNs are also directly innervated by the SC
(Scudder et al., 2002).
To prevent that all SC-activity will immediately activate this purely excitatory pathway and
evoke an eye movement, the EBNs/IBNs receive tonic inhibition from the omnipause neurons
(OPNs) (Evinger, Kaneko & Fuchs, 1982; Ramat et al., 2007). OPNs are located in the midline
pons and inhibit burst neurons regardless of preferred direction. A saccade onset is marked by a
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sudden pause in OPN activity, which is reinstated once the saccade is terminated. Early findings
suggested a prominent role for the SC, with its fixation neurons in particular, in regulating OPN
activity (Gandhi & Keller, 1997), but more recent evidence suggests other sources may contribute
to the initiation of the OPN-pause that results in saccades (Jantz, Watanabe, Everling & Munoz,
2013; Gandhi & Keller, 1999; Everling, Pare´, Dorris & Munoz, 1998). Although the OPN-pause
seems to mark saccade initiation, they do not seem to terminate saccades (Rodgers et al., 2006;
Rucker, Ying, Moore, Optican, Bu¨ttner-Ennever, Keller, Shapiro & Leigh, 2011).
In general, projections within the SC–MNs pathway seem to be either excitatory or direction-
unspecific, which makes it unlikely that inhibition within this pathway could readily explain
saccadic curvature. Note, however, that the OPNs do not suppress LLBN-activity (Rodgers
et al., 2006; Sparkset al. , 2002; Scudder et al., 2002; Ramat et al., 2007). We thereby infer that
throughout target selection preceding saccade initiation, LLBNs will already respond to SC-
activation evoked by both the distractor and the target. Studies on averaging express saccades
show that the movement vector resulting from activity at these sites will point to an intermediate
location (Edelman & Keller, 1998). It seems reasonable to assume that these initial signals could
induce spike rate adaptation, a general property of the brain where the firing rate of a neuron
decreases after prolonged stimulation (Barlow, 1961). Spike rate adaptation can result from
various different processes, such as accommodation of the postsynaptic membrane, after-spike
hyper-polarization (AHP), or synaptic depletion. We propose, without appointing a specific
underlying mechanism, that adaptation is the primary cause of deviation away.
Figure 1.2: Proposed mechanism producing deviation away, illustrated for a rightward saccade. a With a single
target (circle), LLBN activity (black bars for all four directions) is most prominent to the right but does
involve smaller, balanced components up and down; b when a target and a distractor (diamond) are presented,
both elicit LLBN-activity. The resulting saccade command (involving both large upwards and rightwards
components) points to a location between them (compare to activity in a). c When a saccade is made after
the target has been successfully selected and distractor activity has been inhibited, the saccade command
is similar to a, as there is no more additional stimulation of the upwards component by the distractor.
However, past activity in this component has lead to adaption, which causes these neurons to fire less than
those coding for the downwards component. The resulting unbalanced command leads to deviation away
from the distractor
Consider, for example, the case that a rightward target and a distractor at a 45◦ angle in the
upper hemifield are presented (see Figure 1.2b). Both representations stimulate the LLBN and
a prematurely initiated saccade would deviate toward the distractor. If saccade initiation is
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withheld, howewer, competition eventually selects the target and due to lateral inhibition dis-
tractor activity eventually falls to baseline. Distractor activity would have left a trace however,
in the form of adaptation in the brainstem, rendering the upwards LLBNs less sensitive than the
opposite direction. This results in an unbalanced saccade command biased away from the dis-
tractor (Figure 1.2c). This asymmetry then results in deviation away. Notably, this directional
unbalance is present solely at the brainstem level, and the SC still holds the desired correct
landing position for the saccade. The resulting mismatch between the SC representation and
the LLBN-drive could then determine the corrective signal that steers the saccade back to the
intended target mid-flight, possibly mediated by the cerebellum.
With a somewhat higher-level description, this adaptation theory emphasizes three dissociable
processes in producing a saccade. The process of target selection takes place in the spatially
organized oculomotor pathway converging onto the SC, and are thus largely reflected there
(Ramat et al., 2007). The SC output determines the drive, the vectorial command in the
brainstem relayed through the LLBNs (Sparkset al. , 2002). The third process, correction, is
initiated mid-saccade, and depends on comparing the drive to the selection. This is a process
most likely mediated by the cerebellum (Optican & Robinson, 1980). A notable feature of
the adaptation theory is that it identifies different processes underlying deviation towards and
deviation away: deviation towards is due to unsuccessful selection, and deviation away arises in
the drive. Note, however, that despite this difference, the theory still implies a continuum from
deviation towards to deviation away, as the direction and magnitude of deviation is determined
by the balance between distractor activation at saccade onset and preceding distractor activation.
This is supported by the data from White et al. (2012) where distractor activity was slightly
larger at the moment of saccade initiation for saccades deviating towards than those deviating
away, yet only at the moment of saccade initiation, and not earlier. Recordings in the SC and
frontal eye fields (FEF) have yielded similar findings (McPeek, Han & Keller, 2003; McPeek,
2006).
In understanding how adaptation gives rise to the observed modulatory effects on deviation
away, we stress that independent of the underlying mechanism, two main factors determine the
magnitude of adaptation, namely strength and duration of the preceding stimulation: stronger
and longer stimulation produce larger adaptation effects. However, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that adaptation will saturate and will never render neurons completely unresponsive. In
oculomotor selection, strength and duration of stimulation will rarely be unrelated: as stronger
distractor signals should generally lengthen the selection process yielding more profound adap-
tation. Taken together, this makes that adaptation can well account for effects on deviation
away.
 The latency effect is accounted for in two ways: first, due to incomplete selection with
short-latency saccades, the likelihood of deviation towards distractors is higher with short
latency saccades, whereas with long latency saccades, adaptation effects will likely be larger
than residual distractor activation. Secondly, long latencies are more likely to occur when
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selection is difficult, thus when distractor stimulation was stronger and evoked stronger
adaptation effects.
 the similarity effect is closely related the the latency effect (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2003).
More similar stimuli suggest a longer phase of unresolved competition, which would explain
why similar distractors evoke deviation towards for fast saccades, and stronger deviation
away for long-latency saccades.
 the explanation for the position effect, that larger angular distance between the target
and distractor tends to evoke larger deviation away, is again driven by two factors: with
distractor and target in close proximity, selection is more likely to fall short and evoke a
global effect, plus with an increasingly larger angle, decomposition of distractor activity
has a larger pulse in the direction perpendicular to the target, thereby producing larger
deviation away.
 in explaining the endogenous effects the adaptation theory relies on the same tenets as
inhibition theories, namely that attending or memorizing locations would activate the
oculomotor system in the presaccadic interval similar to how a physical distractor would.
Indeed, SNr and LIP activity during, for example, delayed saccades provides evidence for
such endogenously induced SC activation (Handel & Glimcher, 2000; Brown, Bullock &
Grossberg, 2004; Ferraina, Pare´ & Wurtz, 2002). However, the adaptation theory abolishes
the need for additional inhibition at that location.
The adaptation theory offers an explanation for these well-established effects on deviation away
that can still be reconciled with the challenges faced by inhibition theories. Coincidentally, the
notion that these effects have generally been attributed to inhibition in the selection process
is indicative of the complexity of disentangling the two theories. They differ in the locus of
the source of deviation away, but it seems impossible to stimulate the brainstem drive without
affecting the selection process in the SC in vivo. For example, modulating distractor intensity
could affect adaptation in the brainstem, but such a manipulation will similarly affect timing
and strength of SC responses (Bell, Meredith, Van Opstal & Munoz, 2006). If this were then
shown to affect deviation, the ‘deus ex machina’-nature of inhibition theories would always allow
for an explanation of this effect in terms of stronger evoked inhibition.
However, the adaptation theory makes a specific prediction regarding the latency effect in the
DTOA-paradigm introduced by White et al. (2012). Because the adaptation theory poses that
deviation away depends on past distractor activity, and because this is expected not to vary all
too much between trials during the persistent presence of a stimulus, the theory predicts that
this correlation should be absent or at least much smaller with DTOA400ms than with DTOA0ms.
The inhibition theory, on the other hand, would only be reconcilable with the data from White
et al. (2012) if inhibition were to operate just before saccade initiation, with as a result that the
same inhibition-induced latency effect would be found.
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In this study, we first explore the feasibility of the adaptation theory through simulations with
a neurocomputational model, reimplementing that of Meeter et al. (2010), which already suc-
cessfully simulated saccadic behavior in various paradigms, including latency distributions, the
gap effect, antisaccade behavior, deviation towards distractors and global effect. We simulated
different deviation-effects as well as our prediction for the DTOA-task. Following, we confirm
our prediction experimentally by exploring eye movements from human observers in the DTOA
paradigm.
1.2 Calculation
1.2.1 A neural model of the oculomotor system
In this section, we dissociate brain structures from their modeled counterparts with similar
names by using bold-faced text for model structures. Our model is a reimplementation of
(Meeter et al., 2010), largely maintaining their formalization of the target selection process, but
implementing the drive- and correction processes conform the adaptation theory outlined above.
This section is largely descriptive and more detail is provided in the suppletal material 1.A at
the end of this chapter.
Selection: SC input and the saccade map The selection process was implemented by
abstracting the neural pathway from visual input through the cortex converging onto the SC
and competition within the SC itself. Literature on involved connections is relatively extensive
and consistent (White & Munoz, 2011; Munoz & Schall, 2004; Munoz, 2002; Lui, Gregory,
Blanks & Giolli, 1995), and identifies three distinct sources of SC-input (see also Figure 1.1a):
(1) The retina and V1 project to SC both directly and via its superficial layers. This evokes
in a swiftly decaying visual pulse. (2) The cortical pathway from striate cortex to frontal areas
receives input from these early areas as well and provides a delayed, more persistent input to
the SC following stimulus presentation A key structure in this pathway seems to be the FEF, a
structure that also implements topographically organized stimulus representations that compete
for selection (Sommer & Wurtz, 2000), and projects densely onto the SC. An important difference
between the two maps is that FEF not only integrates exogenous signals from visual areas, but
also endogenous excitatory and inhibitory signals from other areas including the Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) (Munoz, 2002) and the Lateral Intraparietal area (LIP) (Kusunoki,
Gottlieb & Goldberg, 2000) (These structures also project to the SC, yet strictly excitatory;
Ferraina et al., 2002; Johnston & Everling, 2006).
(3) The SNr in the basal ganglia circuitry modulates SC-activity through tonic inhibition. Upon
target selection this inhibition is released, allowing competition within the SC (Basso & Wurtz,
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2002). Its projections are spatially relatively coarsely coded (Jiang et al., 2003; Hikosaka et al.,
2000).
The abstraction of exogenous input involved a V1-structure with separate input units for every
stimulus on the display. Unit behavior was defined as a brief intense pulse following stimulus
onset, persistent activity during stimulus presence, and slow exponential decay following offset
(cf. Gawne & Martin, 2002). Endogenous influences were implemented similarly by DLPFC
input structure. The endogenous signal would trail V1-activity by 30ms, rise linearly and
would decay more slowly upon stimulus offsets (cf. Tinsley & Everling, 2002). Endogenous and
exogenous inputs were integrated by an FEF-structure, which modeled unit activity by leaky
integrate-and-fire units (LIF) with continuous firing rates. Endogenous distractor input was
inhibitory, and lateral inhibition in FEF facilitated target selection. Deviating from the original
implementation but in line with our theory, input to the SC was only excitatory, integrating
inputs from V1 and FEF.
The SC was implemented as two sheets of LIF-units, and grid positions were mapped to visual
space through the coordinate system of Van Gisbergen, Van Opstal & Tax (1987). SC-inputs had
Gaussian projections centered around the corresponding stimulus location, and lateral inhibition
(Munoz & Istvan, 1998) was implemented by each node inhibiting all others. Parameters for
the Gaussian projection and lateral inhibition were chosen to match estimates of the visual field
size from SC-neurophysiology (Trappenberg et al., 2001; Dorris, Olivier & Munoz, 2007).
Drive and correction: LLBN and cerebellum We’ve outlined that in the brainstem, a
vectorial displacement command directs the saccade, primarily controlled by distributed SC-
activity (Sparkset al. , 2002). There is ongoing debate regarding how exactly SC-activity is
decomposed into this command (Katnani et al., 2012; Gandhi & Katnani, 2011). In the model
we chose a transformation based on simple vector summation: every node in the SC activates
the brainstem, and the contribution of each node in each direction is determined by node output
and the position of the corresponding visual field location. The resulting directional code was
summarized by four values for the cardinal directions (up, down, left and right). Linear scaling
of this decomposition determined the initiation, drive and the correction processes in a saccade.
The involvement of the SC in saccade initiation has often been shown, but it is still unclear
to what extent other regions, including even downstream LLBNs might have a modulatory role
in determining the OPN-pause (Jantz et al., 2013; Rodgers et al., 2006; Ramat et al., 2007).
For simplicity, we implemented a straightforward fixed-threshold implementation (in line with
Meeter et al., 2010) where a saccade was assumed to be initiated once the summed decomposed
SC activity, opposing directions counteracting, crossed a certain value. Note that this also
implied that similar stimulation at larger eccentricities would be faster to evoke saccades, which
is at best only partially true and dependent on factors such as stimulus size, color and intensity
(Dick, Ostendorf, Kraft & Ploner, 2004; Kalesnykas & Hallett, 1994). Therefore all stimuli in
our simulations (discussed below) had the same eccentricity.
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Figure 1.3: Schematic representation of cerebellar correction during two saccades deviating away from a distrac-
tor in the upper visual field (not shown). F indicates the starting point, T indicates the target. The open
circle marked SC indicates the saccade goal, as it is (correctly) represented in the SC. a The early phase of
a deviating saccade (solid black line). The extrapolated landing position (Ex) of the saccade, if it went on
uncorrected, is the result of adding the LLBN-based drive (LLBN) – scaled up – to the eye position estimated
with an efferent delay, indicated by the filled dot on the saccade trajectory. The error between Ex and SC
evokes a corresponding – scaled down – corrective signal (Cer), curving the trajectory back towards the goal.
b The same computation at a later stage of a similarly deviating saccade. Here, a larger discrepancy between
Ex and SC is found, both in direction and in eccentricity. The resulting cerebellar signal therefore produces
curvature back to the target, but also corrects for the too large eccentricity of Ex and thereby slows down
the saccade.
In line with the relatively straightforward pathway from the SC to the MNs the decomposed
SC-output directly determined the drive of the saccade conveyed by the brainstem. However,
as the proposed locus of firing rate adaptation, four LLBN-units were modeled to relay the
decomposed SC activity in the cardinal directions. To model adaptation, unit output v, was
modulated by an accommodation factor u, where u was a moving average of the neuron’s past
activity v (Meeter, Myers & Gluck, 2005; Izhikevich, 2003). During a saccade, LLBN-output v
in all directions defined the drive.
The adaptation theory assumes SC-activity during the saccade reflects the intended displacement
of the saccade, which is compared to the drive to determine the corrective signal. Most likely this
is mediated by the cerebellum. The model shows how this correction signal can be determined
from a simple computation (see Figure 1.3) based on the current uncorrected drive and an
efferent copy of the current eye position. The latter can be determined by integrating the
burst neuron output. In the model, this was implemented by scaling the LLBN output vector
and adding it to the eye position several time steps back (an efferent delay). The resulting
extrapolated landing position was compared to the desired displacement from the SC, and the
difference, scaled down, defined an appropriate corrective pulse. Notably, the resulting corrective
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signal not only gives rise to saccadic curvature, but also to the characteristic velocity profiles
(Van Opstal & Goossens, 2008), as correction gradually slows down the saccade as well. Once
the effective velocity drops to a prespecified low value, the saccade is considered terminated in
the model. The resulting duration was approximately 35ms for targets at 10◦.
1.2.2 Model Simulations
Saccades in several paradigms were simulated, all to a target located horizontally to the right at
10◦. First, the compatibility of the reimplementation with the original model from Meeter et al.
(2010) was explored by simulating the gap effect: a simple saccade to a single target stimulus,
with fixation offset at t = 0 and a gap condition with offset at t = −200 (all times are reported
with respect to target onset). The gap condition is expected to yield faster reaction times than
the no-gap condition. To investigate the position effect, the distractor paradigm was modeled
with the distractor at either 17◦, 45◦ or 60◦ angular distance in the upper visual field; the first
position was expected to result primarily in deviation towards, whereas further distances should
produce increasingly large deviation away. The latency effect was explored for distractors at 17◦
and 45◦. Finally, to test our predictions regarding the DTOA-paradigm, these distances were
also simulated with the distractor at t = −400.
To study these effects, the latency effect in particular, a population of saccades with plausible
internal variance in latency is needed. This was generated by varying the five model parameters
that represented endogenous and exogenous input strength in V1 (target, distractor and fixa-
tion) and DLPFC (target and distractor) for each simulated paradigm. These parameters had
the same normal distribution in each modeled paradigm. The range of values for each parameter
resulted in 12150 parameter combinations, and probabilities of each parameter combination were
assigned according to their distribution (See 1.B for distribution parameters). Each parameter
combination resulted in a saccade trajectory and latency. Much like in behavioral experiments,
trials were discarded if the saccades they produced either (1) were initiated too early to be
evoked by the target, i.e. within 80ms from target onset or earlier; (2) deviated too far from
the target and did not land within 3◦ from it; or (3) were not evoked within the simulation time
(400ms from target onset).
Of the remaining trials, the associated likelihoods were used to determine expected values for
latency and deviation, and determine their weighted correlation. The position effect was tested
qualitatively, by comparing saccade trajectories for all distractor positions with the five most
likely parameter combinations.
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1.3 Materials and methods
To test our predictions for in the DTOA-paradigm, regarding the latency effect in particular,
we conducted an experiment with human observers. One difficulty in the experimental design is
that with 400ms DTOA, distractor onset consistently predicts the timing of target onset, which
can be used as a warning signal and speed up latencies compared to DTOA0ms. To produce
comparable latencies to study its effect on deviation, our DTOA0ms condition therefore included
a warning stimulus at fixation with the same timing.
1.3.1 Participants
Sixteen participants (18 to 27 years old, mean 22; 6 male), all naive to the purpose of the study,
participated in the experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed
consent was obtained prior to the study, which was done in accordance with the guidelines of
the Helsinki Declaration.
1.3.2 Apparatus
Participants performed the experiment in a sound-attenuated setting, viewing a display monitor
from a distance of 68cm. Eye movements were recorded by an Eyelink II system (SR Research
Ltd, Canada), an infrared video-based eye tracker that has a 500Hz temporal resolution , a
spatial resolution of 0.01◦ and an accuracy < 0.5◦. One participant was recorded with 250Hz,
but her data was in all regards similar to that of others so we did not exclude her. The
participants’ heads were stabilized with a chin rest, and an infrared remote tracking system
compensated for any residual head motion. The left eye was monitored. An eye movement
was considered a saccade when either eye velocity exceeded 35◦/s or eye acceleration exceeded
9500◦/s2.
1.3.3 Stimuli and design
All stimuli (fixation, target, distractor) were gray (85.63cd/m2) on a black background (1.15cd/m2).
Each trial started with the presentation of a ‘+’ character (1.0◦×1.0◦) in the center of the screen
as the fixation stimulus.
In The DTOA0ms-block, the fixation stimulus was replaced by a green (31.61 cd/m
2) fixation
stimulus after 350ms. After another 400ms the target (a solid circle with 1.4◦ diameter) ap-
peared at 8.4◦ eccentricity, either above, below, right or left from fixation. In one-fifth of the
33
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing Chapter 1
Figure 1.4: (Caption on the next page)
trials, the target was the only element presented. In the remaining trials, a diamond-shaped
distractor (sides measuring 1.1◦ × 1.1◦) appeared simultaneously, in one of the four quadrants,
at 6.0◦ eccentricity. Both stimuli were presented for 1500ms. In the DTOA400ms-block, fixation
remained gray but a distractor was always presented, 350ms from fixation onset, followed by
a target 400ms later. Participants were instructed to fixate on the center of the screen, and
make a single, accurate saccade to the target stimulus when it appeared, in both tasks. The
DTOA0ms-block consisted of a training session of 20 trials followed by 600 experimental trials;
the DTOA400ms-block had 16 practice-trials and 480 experimental trials. The trial sequence was
randomized and block order was counterbalanced across participants.
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Figure 1.4: Model LLBN-activity for a rightwards saccade deviating away from a distractor in the upper hemifield
(−1.46◦, latency= 279ms). The dashed line marks LLBN-activity at saccade initiation. Top: right- and
leftwards activity. Bottom: upwards and downwards activity. The distractor initially evokes upwards activity,
which decays after the distractor loses competition. Due to adaptation, downwards activity consecutively
surpasses upward activity at saccade initiation. (shaded area). The inset shows the same pattern at a larger
scale. ‘Time’ in this figure reflects time since stimulus onset, assuming a 70ms time difference between
stimulus onset and LLBN-innervation, and another 30ms to traverse the brainstem pathway from LLBNs to
motor neurons.
1.3.4 Data analysis
Saccade latency was measured as the interval between target onset and saccade initiation. Trials
were excluded when latencies were under 80ms or over 600ms, if no saccade was detected, or if
the first saccade was too small (< 3◦). Trials were classified as errors and not analyzed if the
saccade started more than 1.5◦ from the center of the fixation cross, or landed over 3◦ from the
center of the target. For the remaining trials saccade deviation was defined by the mean angle
of the trajectory compared to a straight line from the starting point of the saccade to the target,
during the first 10ms of the saccade (Van der Stigchel et al., 2006). Deviation was then compared
to idiosyncratic deviation, measured from the trials without a distractor. Deviations were signed
so that positive values indicate deviation towards, negative values away. A mean deviation of
zero thus indicates no difference between the no-distractor and the distractor condition.
1.4 Results and Discussion
1.4.1 Model results
Table 1.1 gives expected values for latency and deviation computed from the population of
simulated saccades. Results for latencies indicate that the model produces realistically timed
saccades and yields a clear gap effect of 50ms much like the original model (Meeter et al., 2010).
Of note, the latencies in the No Gap condition are relatively large compared to the 17◦ distrac-
tor condition. The literature indeed suggests that small distractor-target distances may speed
saccades, (McSorley et al., 2009; McSorley, Haggard & Walker, 2009), but others have reported
comparable latencies for these two conditions (Walker et al., 1997). Likely, simultaneously pre-
sented stimuli compete throughout the visual cortex, which is not embedded in the model and
could explain this difference. Nevertheless, the simulated latencies seem sufficiently realistic.
Saccade deviations were of main interest. The results in Table 1.1 are in line with our theory:
the 17◦ distractor conditions yield deviation towards, whereas deviation away was found in the
45◦ distractor configuration. The difference between those conditions, however, is notable: the
magnitude of deviation away is much smaller than that of deviation towards. Such a difference
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has been shown in the literature (McSorley et al., 2009). The discrepancy is more accentuated in
the model because the size of deviation away in the model is relatively small. This might simply
be the result of our LLBN-implementation, which was kept simple to focus on the core principles
of adaptation theory. Moreover, too little data exists on these neurons to support more complex
models. Trial models with more LLBN-units, more sophisticated projection mechanisms or
broader SC-responses have yielded larger deviation away.
Unit behavior in the SC and upstream structure was much like that of Meeter et al. (2010)
and implemented the selection process. Presaccadic activity in SC units was marked by a
relatively small but early visual activity peak, followed by a more gradual rise after ≈ 70ms. This
second phase marked competition, where activity initially rose for both target- and distractor
representation, but would then decay for the distractor while steeply increasing for the target.
The resulting drive, modeled as LLBN-output, clearly reflects this pattern. Figure 1.4 depicts
activity during an illustrative trial with deviation away. Activity in the ‘rightwards’-node evolves
in three phases: (1) the visual pulse in the SC evokes an early visual pulse in our simulated
LLBN (t = 70ms). Visual responses have been observed in the LLBNs, albeit relatively small
(compare Munoz, Dorris, Pare & Everling, 2000; Kaneko, 2006). Our model produces relatively
large visual responses as it does not dissociate purely visual from visuomotor responses in the SC
(Rodgers et al., 2006). (2) at about 100ms before saccade initiation both target and distractor
innervate the rightwards LLBN. Once distractor activity decays, there’s a brief drop in right-
wards activity, followed by (3) a steady increase of the response as the target representation rises
in activity and governs the drive. Leftwards activity, on the other hand, remains negligible. The
two vertical components illustrate the adaptation effect: although both components are activate
at saccade initiation, due to the distributed target representation, they are unbalanced. The
upwards response evoked by the distractor in the preceding 100ms has rendered this component
less sensitive through adaptation (as in Figure 1.2c).
Figure 1.5 plots five model saccade trajectories for each of the three distractor positions (17◦, 45◦, 60◦;
DTOA0ms). These saccades were those resulting from the parameter value combinations with
the highest probability. These results clearly illustrate the position effect: deviation away is
Condition Latency Deviation
No Gap 243.3 -
Gap200ms 192.8 -
45◦ distractor, DTOA0ms 263.9 -0.26
17◦ distractor, DTOA0ms 208.3 7.5
45◦ distractor, DTOA400ms 260.1 -0.11
17◦ distractor, DTOA400ms 232.1 5.4
Table 1.1: Expected saccade latency and deviation in the model (i.e., mean value weighted by probability) in
all simulated conditions
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Figure 1.5: Model trajectories in the DTOA0ms condition to a target at (10,0), illustrating the position effect.
Five trajectories are depicted for each of the three distractor positions: close to the target (17◦) and far away
from the target (45◦ and 60◦). Each distrator lies in the upper hemifield, and the parameter combinations
are equal. The 17◦ distractor results in deviation towards and global effect, whereas both far distractor
conditions yield deviation away, which is larger with a distractor at 60◦ than at 45◦. Mind the different
scales on the three axes.
consistently larger with a distractor at 60◦ compared to 45◦. The close distractor condition
produces saccades that deviate towards the distractor and land in the same direction. Note that
the trajectories have the curved shape that is typically observed in the distractor paradigm,
with initially strong deviation followed by an in-flight correction that decreases as the saccade
progresses.
To investigate the latency effect, the correlation between latency and deviation was computed for
the saccade populations generated with a 45◦ distractor paradigm. Figure 1.6 illustrates these
individual trial distributions. The correlation between latency and deviation was relatively
strong (r = -0.697) in the DTOA0ms condition. Curiously, the latency effect seems to ‘flatten
out’ for the longest latencies (> 300ms). In the model, this is the result of saturation of
adaptation. Interestingly, this pattern was also found in earlier studies on the latency effect,
but has never been explicitly addressed. (Mulckhuyse et al., 2009; Van der Stigchel & Theeuwes,
2005; McSorley et al., 2009). The correlation between latency and deviation was less prominent
in the in the DTOA400ms condition (r = -0.433), showing that our model indeed predicts that
the latency effect is reduced with the DTOA400ms.
In their study, White et al. (2012) split trials based the direction of deviation, which allows for
further comparison with our model. They found that saccades deviating towards did so much
less with a DTOA400ms. Our model shows a comparable effect for the 17
◦-distractor simulation.
For saccades deviating away, they also found that these were smaller with DTOA400ms deviations
were smaller, which resulted on average in similar overall deviation with 0 versus 400ms DTOA.
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Figure 1.6: Latency and deviation in both DTOA conditions with a 45◦ distractor, for 25% the parameter
combinations with the highest combined probability. The shading and the relative size of data points indicates
the likelihood for each trial, to visualize the distribution of the outcomes. The line represents the best-fitting
regression line. The correlation (r) in the DTOA0ms condition is much stronger than in the DTOA400ms
condition.
Our simulations showed on average less deviation away with a DTOA400ms. This is largely due
to different proportions of saccades deviating towards or away from the distractor: in (White
et al., 2012) the two types of saccades were approximately equal in number, so that the overall
deviation balanced out in the average; in the model, saccades deviating away were much more
numerous and the decreased deviation away dominated the average. Another factor might again
be competition in the early visual pathway. When the distractor is presented in isolation 400ms
before target onset, it is likely to evoke a stronger response than when it has to compete with
a simultaneously presented target. Indeed, model variations with stronger distractor activity in
the DTOA400ms condition yielded deviation away comparable to the DTOA0ms condition, while
still yielding a decreased latency effect.
1.4.2 Experimental results
On average 27% of all the trials with a distractor were excluded from the analysis. The primary
reason for exclusion were saccades that did not land on the target (17% for DTOA0ms trials, and
8% for DTOA400ms). Further analysis of these errors revealed that for DTOA0ms, they consisted
of trials that landed on the distractor (6.9%) or in between target and distractor (1.3%), trials
that landed elsewhere (4.0%) and erroneously recorded trials where the measured trajectory
made a large (> 2.5◦) jump between samples (9.6%). The proportion of misdirected saccades
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DTOA0ms DTOA400ms
Deviation Latency Deviation Latency
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Overall 0.22 1.7 221.2 23.1 -2.1 1.5 217.2 40.8
45◦ 1.54 2.4 214.3 23.3 -2.33 1.8 223.1 37.7
135◦ -0.96 1.2 227.6 23.5 -1.85 1.3 211.3 44.5
Table 1.2: Saccade deviation (in degrees) and latency (in ms) in both DTOA conditions for the two distances
between target and distractor.
was much lower with DTOA400ms: 0.04% to the distractor, 0.2% global effect trials, 2.3% directed
elsewhere (and 5.6% erroneously recorded). This difference can be readily explained from the
activity profile of visual input in the model, as persistent distractor activity will be less disruptive
than the transient pulse at its onset.
The primary goal of the experiment was to compare the latency effects between DTOA condi-
tions, so producing comparable latencies was crucial. Table 1.2 gives an overview of latency-
and deviation data. A paired sample t-test indeed indicated no difference between both DTOA
conditions (t(15) = 0.43, p = 0.67), suggesting that the warning signal manipulation was effec-
tive.
To visualize the latency effect, trials were split into five latency bins per condition per partic-
ipant. Figure 1.7 shows mean latency and mean deviation for each bin, averaged over partici-
pants. In the DTOA0ms condition, average deviation tended to be towards, (similar to McSor-
ley et al., 2009). Saccades deviated away and towards in equal proportions (proportion away,
M = 52%, SD = 6%, t(15) = 1.59, p = 0.132), but deviation towards was generally larger than
away. Note that our criteria did not exclude potential turn-around saccades, in which deviation
could be up to 45◦ if they were initially directed to the distractor. Analysis per bin showed
that slow-latency saccades, in the last two bins, did produce reliable deviation away (One sided
t-tests: for bin 4 M = −0.74, SD = 1.87, t(15) = −1.59, p = 0.066; for bin 5 M = −1.73, SD =
1.87, t(15) = −3.7, p = 0.0011). The simulation results presented earlier match the trend in the
data, with later saccades deviating more strongly away from the distractor, although our model
produces far fewer fast saccades deviating towards the distractor. This discrepancy might be
caused by the warning signal in the experiment. The DTOA400ms condition produced deviation
away on average (M = −2.09, SD = 1.51, t(15) = −5.56, p < 0.001), with more trials deviating
away than towards (proportion away, M = 60%, SD = 5.6%, t(15) = 7.1, p < 0.001).
The latency effects in both conditions were compared by computing correlation coefficients
(Pearson’s r) between latency and deviation for every participant. The average correlation in
the DTOA0ms condition was small (mean r = −0.1289, SD = 0.084) but siginificantly lower
than zero (t(15) = −6.16, p < 0.001). With DTOA400ms the correlation was not reliably smaller
than zero (M = 0.002, SD = 0.068, t(15) = 0.11, p = 0.54). A paired samples t-test between
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Figure 1.7: Mean latency versus mean deviation within bins, averaged over all participants. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals. Bin data from the DTOA0ms condition clearly shows the effect of latency on
deviation, whereas the DTOA400ms condition indicates no difference in deviation between bins.
conditions showed that the correlation was stronger with 0ms DTOA that with 400ms DTOA
(t(15) = −5.5, p < 0.001), confirming the prediction of the adaptation theory.
As indicated, with DTOA0ms only long-latency saccades produced reliable deviation away.
Therefore, the found latency effect might be explained by decreasing deviation towards, rather
than increasing deviation away as in the model. Testing this explanation, we also compared the
latency effect for only those saccades that deviated away. Again, this analysis confirmed our
prediction: with DTOA0ms correlations (mean r = −0.052, SD = 0.099) were significantly lower
than zero (t(15) = −2.11, p = 0.026) whereas for DTOA400ms (mean r = 0.018, SD = 0.119)
they were not (t(15) = 0.6, p = 0.723), and again correlations were lower with 0ms DTOA that
with 400ms DTOA (t(15) = −1.96, p = 0.034).
In the experiment, the distractor could appear at four possible locations, at 45◦ or 135◦ an-
gular distance from the target, to prevent observers from using the distractor as a spatial
cue with DTOA400ms. Data from trials where the distractor was at 45
◦ and at 135◦ were
collapsed in the analyses above. We also explored results for these positions separately (Ta-
ble 1.2), and conducted two two-way within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA’s to evalu-
ate the effects of distractor position (45◦ or 135◦) and DTOA (0ms or 400ms) on deviation
and latency. Saccades deviated away more with 135◦ distractors than with 45◦ distractors
(F (1, 15) = 19.68, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.567), and more with DTOA400ms than with DTOA0ms
40
Curved saccade trajectories
(F (1, 15) = 11.9, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.443). Distractor position and DTOA also interacted
(F (1, 15) = 30.9, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.673). Paired sample t-tests revealed that the interac-
tion was caused by more deviation away for the 135◦ distractor than 45◦ with DTOA0ms
(t(15) = 5.75, p < 0.001), whereas the reversed pattern approached significance with DTOA400ms
(t(15) = −2.00, p = 0.064). For latencies, only the interaction DTOA × distractor position was
significant (F (1, 15) = 39.03, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.722; both main effects F < 1). Here, paired t-
tests revealed that the interaction was due to shorter latencies with a 45◦ distractor for DTOA0ms
(t(15) = −8.03, p < 0.001), and the opposite pattern for DTOA400ms (t(15) = 3.65, p = 0.002).
The differences between 45◦- and 135◦ distractors can be largely explained in terms of facilitation
by the 45◦-distractor, as we found in simulations with a 17◦ distractor. With DTOA0ms, saccades
are relatively fast and tend to deviate towards; with DTOA400ms they are slower and effects of
deviation towards are no longer seen (compare the results of the model with 17◦ distractors).
In contrast, 135◦ distractors exert no facilitating effect: with DTOA0ms saccades are slower and
deviate away more. With DTOA400ms, competition is be resolved quickly and deviation towards
the distractor is rare, which results in more deviation away overall.
1.4.3 General discussion
Saccade deviation away from irrelevant distractors is commonly explained by assuming a form
of top-down inhibition focused at the distractor representation. However, recent findings con-
trovert rather than support this assumption. The adaptation theory presented here offers a
new perspective on how saccade deviation arises. The theory is consistent with critical find-
ings that have given rise to the inhibition view, as well as findings disputing it. In this study,
we integrated the theory into a neurocomputational model of saccade production. The model
produced saccades that deviate away and towards under the conditions known from the liter-
ature and curved back towards the target as in reality. The model reproduces latency- and
position effects. Moreover, the model produced a straightforward prediction: the latency effect
would be absent in a DTOA400ms–paradigm. This prediction was subsequently confirmed by
our experiment.
Underlying the adaptation theory of deviation away is the assumption that presaccadic distractor
activity during target selection results in an unbalanced translation of the saccade command
into a motor drive in the brainstem. We proposed that this takes place in the the LLBNs, based
on their connectivity (Ramat et al., 2007; White & Munoz, 2011) and because their ‘long-lead’
is readily explained by such presaccadic stimulation. One could argue that the connectivity of
the LLBNs is not as clear as this view suggests: for example Scudder et al. (2002) suggested that
the SC directly projects to the EBNs/IBNs, without clear LLBN-involvement. Note, that this
would only contradict our specific implementation, and not the adaptation theory as a whole.
Faulty translation of the saccade command could, for example, be caused similarily through
synaptic depletion in the SC-EBNs/IBNs projection.
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To our knowledge, the only other other theory of saccade deviation that does not rely on spatial
inhibition of distractors was proposed in a recent modeling study (Wang, Kruijne & Theeuwes,
2012). In their model, lateral interactions within the SC, defined by a Mexican-hat shaped
kernel (cf. Trappenberg et al., 2001) caused distractor- and target activity to compete in a
push-pull manner. As a result, distractor activity at the appropriate collicular distance will
‘push’ the target representation away. Although this theory does not require spatial inhibition,
several issues arise in this scheme. First, much like inhibition theories, the lateral interaction
view assumes an erroneous target representation, leaving it unanswered how corrective curvature
arises in-flight. Most importantly, however, their model assumes a winner-take-all scheme to
decode the SC command, neglecting the strong evidence for a distributed vector summation or
averaging scheme (Goossens & Van Opstal, 2006; Gandhi & Katnani, 2011; Katnani et al., 2012;
Badler & Keller, 2002; Lee et al., 1988). It is debatable whether distributed activity – not just
the shifted peak – could evoke deviation away in their simulations. Sub-threshold stimulation
of the SC or FEF at a location corresponding to a 90◦ distractor is known to result in deviation
towards this location rather than away (McPeek et al., 2003; McPeek, 2006), whereas the lateral
inhibition model should predict deviation away.
We highlight these model shortcomings because they are illustrative of a remarkable dissociation
that has arisen in the literature on saccade generation. One class of studies, including most
research on deviation away, seems to focus on target selection as controlled by the SC and
upstream structures projecting to it (Wang et al., 2012; Trappenberg et al., 2001; McSorley et al.,
2009; McPeek et al., 2003), whereas another class focuses on saccade trajectories, kinematics
and landing positions – associated with the downstream SC-MNs pathway in the brainstem
(Robinson, 1975; Quaia et al., 1999; Katnani & Gandhi, 2011). Various issues with upstream
theories highlighted in this article are largely related to their tacit assumption that the saccade is
fully determined at the stage of the SC. Conversely, Katnani et al. (2012) recently investigated a
specific model of SC-decoding. They failed to find conclusive support for this downstream model,
and discussed that critical factors missing from the model were intracollicular interactions and
influences from SNr or FEF – typically considered in upstream studies. The shortcomings of
both classes illustrate the need for an integrated view on saccade generation. We believe our
model makes a significant step towards a unified understanding of target selection and saccade
production, from visual input to saccade termination. Moreover, using this integrated approach,
we show that deviation away does not need to be interpreted as a sign of top down inhibition,
and thereby banish one more deus ex machina from the oculomotor system.
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Supplemental Material
1.A Implementation details of the model
Input to the SC: V1, FEF, DLPFC V1-activity reflects exogenous stimulation, with one
node for each stimulus (target, fixation or distractor). Unit activity rv(t) is described by:
rv(t) =

Svb
(
e
−(t−ton)
τ1 − e−(t−ton)τ2
)
, following onset
Sv , persistent stimulation
Sve
−(t−toff)τd , following offset;
(1.A.1)
where Sv is the strength of the stimulus (section 1.2.2 and 1.B); ton and toff are the time of
stimulus onset and offset; time constants {τ1 = 5ms; τ2 = 6ms; τd = 25ms} shape the fast visual
onset pulse and slower decay; and scaling constant b = 100
(
τ2−τ1
τ1τ2
)
. The DLPFC modeled
excitatory and inhibitory input for target and distractor, respectively. The persistent- and
offset phases were defined as in Equation 1.A.1, using Sd instead of Sv and τd = 150ms, and
with an assumed delayed response (tdl=30ms). DLPFC signal onset was no pulse, but a gradual
increase over 50ms:
rdlpfc(t) = Sd
t− (ton + tdl)
50
(1.A.2)
FEF integrated the inputs, and the strength of excitatory projections between structures were
mapped to the [0, 1] domain using a sigmoid function:
enet = 1− exp
(∑
k
wkek/c
)−1
(1.A.3)
where k = {V 1, DLPFC}, w = {1, 1}, c = 0.5. FEF consisted of a single unit per stimulus,
whose activity v evolved over time using:
∆v =
(
−(v0 − v) + enet· (ve − v)
+inet· (vi − v) + ilat· (vi − v)
)/
τ
(1.A.4)
where {v0, ve, vi} reflect reversal potentials of the leak current, Na+ and Cl− (-75mV, +30mV,
-90mV rescaled to {0, 7,−1} respectively). and lateral inhibition (see below); time constant
τ = 50ms. enet And inet reflected excitatory and inhibitory input, and lateral inhibition ilat
within FEF was computed for every node j by:
ilat,j(t) = sl
n∑
i 6=j
ri(t− d) (1.A.5)
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Where delay d = 3 and scaling factor sl = −1. Node output r(t) was activity v(t) thresholded
at −67.5mV (i.e. θ = 0.5).
The SC The SC structure modeled two collicular slices as two 101× 85 grids of nodes. This
complies with an estimated 6mm×5mm area. Nodes related to a location in visual space through
the coordinate transformation of Van Gisbergen et al. (1987). Where this transformation pro-
duced locations outside of the visual field (eccentricities over 90◦ or locations in the ipsilateral
visual field) nodes were not implemented. SC input from FEF trailed input from V1 by 10ms.
Again, inputs were transformed to the [0, 1] domain using Equation 1.A.3, but with different
input parameters k = {V 1, FEF}, w = {0.85, 2}, and c = 0.25. Inputs innervated the corre-
sponding SC-location via gaussian-weighted projections, for every SC-node i:
Wi = exp
(−∆x2
2σ2
)
(1.A.6)
Where ∆x is node distance in mm and σ = 0.245. The shape of the projection matched earlier
estimates of movement- and visual field sizes (Trappenberg et al., 2001; Dorris et al., 2007).
SC unit behavior evolved like FEF, via Equations 1.A.4 and 1.A.5 but with τ = 25ms and
sl = 0.03).
Distributed output activity was decomposed through vector summation (section 1.2.1).Every
node i in SC had a movement vector ~vi corresponding to the associated location in visual space.
Four activity values encoding four directions were computed via:
ax(t) =
∑
i∈SC
Max(||ri(t)~vi · ~hx||, 0) (1.A.7)
where x = {up,down, left, right}, and ax(t) ≥ 0.
The brainstem model: OPN, LLBN and the Cerebellum Saccade initiation was de-
termined by a simple thresholding procedure applied to the total motion command, without an
explicit OPN model:
|aup − adown|+ |aright − aleft| > θsacc (1.A.8)
where θsacc = 245.0.
Four model LLBN units determined the drive. Their behavior was computed using activity v
and the internal accommodation u:
vx(t) = τ1vx(t− 1) + ix(t) · (1− τ1) · (1− ux(t))
ux(t) = max(τ2ux(t− 1) + cvx(t− 1), β) (1.A.9)
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Where every input ix(t) =
ax(t)
100 ; temporal parameters τ1 = 0.8 and τ2 = 0.99 modeled the
effect of past activity; scaling factor c = 0.06; and β = 0.65 modeled saturation. The resulting
LLBN-activity was in the range [0, 1.5]. The saccade goal ~dsc was computed as the scaled sum
SC-output values:
~dsc(t) = c
∑
x
ax(t) ~hx (1.A.10)
where c = 0.04 implements scaling, and activity in opposing directions counteracts due to ~hx.
After initiation, two pulses ~pllbn and ~pcer determined saccade movement:
∆~s(t) = ~pllbn(t) + ~pcer(t) (1.A.11)
~pllbn(t) is LLBN-output vx(t), summed cf. Equation 1.A.10 but with a = 0.7. ~pcer(t) Was given
by the difference between ~dsc and an extrapolated displacement with uncorrected LLBN-pulses
~dex, as in Figure 1.3:
~dex(t) = ~s(t− teff) + c ~pllbn(t)
~pcer(t) = z(t)
~dsc(t)− ~dex(t)
c
(1.A.12)
where teff = 5ms is the efferent delay, ~s(t) is eye position. z(t) Models how cerebellar correction
is not instant, but rises from 0 to 1 in 10ms. c = 30 And as a result ~dex indicates the endpoint
of an uncorrected saccade after 30ms, starting at ~s(t − teff). The saccade terminated when
∆~s(t) < 0.05◦/ms.
1.B Parameters of the saccade population
The parameters for the probability distribution described in section 1.2.2 are detailed in Table
1.B.1. The probabilities assigned to each parameter step were defined by the normal cumulative
distribution function over that step, defined by µ and σ for that parameter.
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Variable Minumum Maximum Step (µ, σ)
V 1F 0.5 0.7 0.05 (0.45, 0.3)
V 1T 0.8 1.2 0.05 (1.1, 0.4)
V 1D 0.8 1.2 0.05 (1.1, 0.4)
DLPFCT 0.5 0.9 0.1 (0.8, 0.25)
DLPFCD -0.5 -0.1 0.1 (-0.45, 0.20)
Table 1.B.1: Model parameters that were varied. V 1x or DLPFCx mark input strengths from V1 and DLPFC,
where x = {F, T,D} indicates fixation, target or distractor node respectively. Note the absence of DLPFC-
projections to fixation.
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Priming of Pop-Out Modifies
Visual Processing
Adapted from
Kruijne, W. & Meeter, M.
You Prime What You Code: The fAIM Model of Priming of Pop-Out
Under revision for PLoS ONE
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Our visual brain makes use of recent experience to interact with the visual world,
and efficiently select relevant information. This is exemplified by speeded search when
target- and distractor features repeat across trials versus when they switch, a phe-
nomenon referred to as intertrial priming. Here, we present fAIM, a computational
model that demonstrates how priming can be explained by a simple feature-weighting
mechanism integrated into an established model of bottom-up vision. In fAIM, such
modulations in feature gains are widespread and not just restricted to one or a few
features. Consequentially, priming effects result from the overall tuning of visual fea-
tures to the task at hand. Such tuning allows the model to reproduce priming for
different types of stimuli, including for typical stimulus dimensions such as ‘color’ and
for less obvious dimensions such as ‘spikiness’ of shapes. Moreover, the model explains
some puzzling findings from the literature: it shows how priming can be found for
target-distractor stimulus relations rather than for their absolute stimulus values per
se, without an explicit representation of relations. Similarly, it simulates effects that
have been taken to reflect a modulation of priming by an observers’ goals – without
any representation of goals in the model. We conclude that priming is best considered
as a consequence of a general adaptation of the brain to visual input, and not as a
peculiarity of visual search.
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2.1 Introduction
Because our human visual system has a limited capacity, it constantly selects only a subset
of visual input at the expense of other information in the visual scene. This occurs by means
of visual attention (Chun et al., 2011, for a review) . Ideally, visual attention would always
select information that is currently most relevant to us, but for a great number of reasons
this is not straightforward. For example, in many situations we will not know beforehand what
aspects of visual information will be relevant, and even when we do, selection is far from optimal
(Theeuwes, 1992).
Because of this, selecting what we selected before can be a useful heuristic. For example, if we
are in traffic and have just spotted a red car approaching from the right, the next time we will
look in that direction the car is very likely to still be red. If the car were to change color to
green while our gaze was averted, it would probably take longer to process the next time we
looked for it, compared to a situation where its visual properties remained constant. Because of
the usual regularity in visual input – cars and most other objects do not suddenly change color
– our recent experience is often an effective guide for visual attention. Experiments on visual
attention and selection have illustrated that the visual system is indeed strongly modulated by
past experience, both on the short- (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Kristja´nsson & Driver, 2008;
Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) and longer time scales (Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Kruijne & Meeter,
2015; Chun & Jiang, 1999; Summerfield et al., 2008).
One phenomenon that clearly demonstrates the effects of recent experience is intertrial priming
of pop-out (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). In experiments investigating this phenomenon,
participants are typically presented with a search display where a target stimulus has one of two
colors (classically red and green), and a set of distractor stimuli the other color. Despite that
participants do not know in advance what the color of the target will be, this is still an easy
search task. Since the target ‘pops out’ from the rest of the items it can be found through a
‘bottom-up’ search, based on local contrasts in visual input (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe,
1994; Chun et al., 2011). Nevertheless, performance on this task is strongly affected by whether
the colors of the target and distractor switch from trial to trial, or whether they stay the same.
It thus seems that already early on, low-level processing of a visual scene is affected by recent
visual experience (see also Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013; Bichot & Schall, 2002).
Many studies have concluded that such intertrial priming automatically changes the ‘weights’
of different visual features in the task (Lee et al., 2009; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Lamy,
Antebi, Aviani & Carmel, 2008; Martini, 2010; Kruijne, Brascamp, Kristja´nsson & Meeter,
2015). This claim gives rise to several questions. Most prominently, what is actually being
weighted in feature weighting? And how does this affect future attentional deployments?
An intuitive answer would be that priming modulates the responsiveness or baseline activity
of visual neurons coding for observed target- and distractor feature values. Recent findings
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on priming of pop-out, however, suggest that it may not be so straightforward. Several stud-
ies supported the idea that perhaps not the value of targets and distractors is primed in visual
search, but rather their relation. One illustrative experiment (Becker, 2010) involved a singleton
search where stimulus colors are either yellow, orange or red (as illustrated in Figure 2.4A). It
was found that repetition priming not only occurred for straight repetitions of target-distractor
stimuli, but also for displays with different stimuli where the relation between target and dis-
tractors remained constant. So for example: an orange target among yellow distractors would
be primed by a preceding red target among orange distractors, because the target remained the
‘reddest’ item in the display. Note that in this case, priming was found even though the the
preceding distractor color (orange) became the new target color. Conversely, a repeated orange
target among yellow distractors would be harder to find after an ‘orange target-red distractor’
trial, even though target color remained constant. In this case, the relation reversed: the target
was the yellowest element in the display, and became the reddest.
Such relational priming has been observed across various dimensions: colors of different palettes,
size, luminance (Becker, 2008, 2010; Meeter & Olivers, 2014), and even higher-order shape
features such as ‘spikiness’ of star-shaped stimuli, and the ‘complexity’ of visual shapes (Becker,
2013). These results suggest that intertrial priming does not act upon the features in the scene
per se, but rather on some representation of the relation between the target and the distractors.
However, no proposal has been made for what such a representation would look like.
Another puzzling finding is that priming may depend on the task that is to be performed on
the next trial. In one pop-out visual search experiment (Fecteau, 2007) search displays always
contained two separate singleton items: a color singleton (red versus green) and a shape singleton
(circle versus rectangle). Before each trial, a cue would instruct the participant whether to search
for (and respond to) the color singleton or the shape singleton. It was found that repetition
of the singleton only affected search for the dimension that was relevant to the current goals,
resulting in goal-dependent priming. Remarkably, this effect was independent of what had been
the task on the previous trial. It seemed as if priming of either color or shape was associated
with its dimension. If that dimension then turned out to be irrelevant, no priming would be
observed.
Relational- and goal-dependent priming seem to contradict the idea of priming as automatic
weighting of target- and distractor features. However, because there is very little clarity on
what ‘feature weighting’ actually is, it is hard to determine whether these findings truly warrant
a different explanation of priming. For the case of relational priming, it has indeed been argued
that the finding is consistent with a theory of absolute feature weighting (Meeter & Olivers,
2014). Similarly, the extent to which goal-directed effects on visual attention should be at-
tributed to automatic, (goal-independent) priming is strongly debated. (Theeuwes, 2013; Lamy
& Kristjansson, 2013). However, we feel these debates will remain unresolved and vulnerable to
much ambiguity until we construct a more detailed hypothesis of how priming effects arise in
the brain.
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To bring theoretical clarity, we set out to provide the first comprehensive, explicit, computational
account of intertrial priming. We aimed to develop a model that is as simple and as general as
possible, and that is consistent with current views on how visual search is performed.
These considerations led us to use the AIM model (Attention by Information Maximization
(Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009; Bruce, 2005) ) of bottom-up visual processing as a basis. AIM is a
salience model, devised to describe how certain locations in a visual scene come to be more
conspicuous than others. Crucially, the model does not use a hand-crafted feature base (in
contrast to most salience models: Rao, Zelinsky, Hayhoe & Ballard, 2002; Itti, Koch & Niebur,
1998; Itti & Baldi, 2009, see Borji & Itti, 2013 for a review). Instead, it learns a sparse visual
representation from the statistical regularities in visual input. This is approach ensured that we
did not unconsciously rely on custom-built representations that had been chosen or modified to
explain the priming phenomena of interest. Although AIM was primarily derived from compu-
tational principles, its computations are highly consistent with the organization of the human
visual system.
We present fAIM (feature-weighted AIM), which is essentially AIM extended with a single
computational step in which the ‘gain’ of visual feature channels is modulated. We propose that
this modulation is based on two principles: accommodation to recent visual experience, and an
upregulation of those features associated with detecting the target stimulus. Here, we show that
this minimal approach to priming can account for a surprisingly wide range of effects, including
classical priming effects and their time course, relational priming in various dimensions, and
task-dependent priming.
2.2 Analysis
2.2.1 The AIM model of bottom-up visual processing
The AIM model consists of two distinct phases: (1) the computation of sparse feature base
to represent visual information, and (2) the computation of salience maps. Here, we will give
a conceptual outline of both. For more implementation detail, we refer to the Supporting
Information 2.A, or the original publications on AIM (Bruce, 2005; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009).
Visual Features The feature basis used in AIM repersents a sparse code for visual informa-
tion. This representation is not hand-coded, but is instead derived from the natural statistics
of typical visual input. To this end, a large number of small RGB image patches is extracted
from a collection of images (we have used the SUN Database; Xiao, Hays, Ehinger, Oliva & Tor-
ralba, 2010). Then, Independent Component Analysis is performed on these patches to derive a
sparse spatiochromatic basis that defines the features. All simulations in this study utilized the
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same component analysis, which yielded 54 features that explained at least 95% of the variance
in visual input. These components make up the visual features that are used in the salience
computation.
Interestingly, these features have response profiles that resemble those of neurons in early visual
areas, suggesting that our visual system indeed implements such a sparse visual representation.
(See Attneave, 1954; Fo¨ldia´k & Young, 1995; Olshausen & Field, 2004; Zhaoping, 2006 for a
more extensive argument for such a sparse visual code in the brain, and see Torralba et al., 2006;
Oliva & Torralba, 2006; Rao & Ballard, 1999 for other successful applications using similarly
derived visual representations.)
Self-information and visual pop-out AIM defines salience as the ‘uniqueness’ of a location
in the visual scene with respect to its surround. From an information theoretic viewpoint, such
uniqueness is measured by the amount of self-information (Shannon, 1948), which is a function
of how likely the visual input at that location is. AIM computes the likelihood at a location by
constructing image histograms for the values of each feature at every location in the surround.
These histograms are used to estimate the joint probability of the combination of feature values
found at a location.
In the simplest implementation of AIM, the ‘surround’ is defined by the entire image. Thus,
the same feature density governs the salience computation at every location of the visual scene.
This is an oversimplification, as it renders the model insensitive to local variations in feature
frequency. As was noted in earlier work on the model (Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009), the effects of
spatial distance on salience can be relatively easily incorporated into AIM by computing different
feature histograms at every location. However, this comes at a large computational cost and
was shown to yield very little improvement of performance. Therefore, we will here also adopt
the simpler implementation.
AIM can take any input image and produce a salience map. As is common for salience map
models, its performance has been validated by comparing these maps to fixation data of human
observers (for example cf: Tatler et al., 2005). It has been shown that the model successfully
outperforms other salience models (Itti et al., 1998; Itti & Baldi, 2009). For the present simula-
tions of human performance on search, we evaluate the salience maps by means of a measure of
visual distinctiveness, or ‘pop-out’. We define this measure as the extent by which the average
salience value of the target differs from the average salience value of all stimuli in the image.
2.2.2 The fAIM model
In the computation of salience in AIM, each feature contributes equally, and total salience is
determined by the sum of self-information within each feature channel. fAIM generalizes this
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Figure 2.1: A The features that are used in AIM and fAIM are derived from the statistics of visual input.
By means of an Independent Component Analysis (ICA) performed on a large image database, features are
obtained that have response properties similar to those of neurons in low-level visual areas. B In AIM, the
response of each of these features is used to generate one ‘salience map’ for each feature channel, based on
the principle of self-information. The sum of these maps across all channels yields the overall salience at each
location. C fAIM additionally assigns a gain to each feature channel that weights the feature’s contribution
to the overall salience. The channel gains are adjusted on every trial, as a function of target- and distractor
salience values within a channel.
model and assumes all feature channels have a dynamic weight or ‘gain’ gf that determines their
contribution to overall salience. At initialization, all gains are equal.
We assume that the process of ‘priming’ is defined through two modulations of gain. First, all
features that have yielded high salience values in the previous trial have a discounted gain on the
subsequent trial. This reflects the fact that repeated presentation of a visual stimulus will reduce
its salience (Itti & Baldi, 2009; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009), which is characterized by attenuated
responses in the brain (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Kristja´nsson, Vuilleumier, Schwartz, Macaluso
& Driver, 2007; Gotts, Chow & Martin, 2012). Second, features that evoked high salience in
the target will have a positive gain change. Here, we propose that this gain-modulation might
reflect a strengthening of synapses triggered by the inherent reward in finding a target. This
process can be described by the equation:
∆gf = weS¯
T
f − wiS¯Af
Where Sf refers to the salience within a feature channel, and T and A refer to ‘Target’- and
‘All’ stimuli respectively.
Note that the computation of the gain change is similar to the computation of overall target
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pop-out, introduced above: they are both computed as the difference of the same salience values.
Thus, the resulting net change in gain is closely related to the amount of pop-out within a feature
channel: One interpretation of this observation is that priming will increase the gain of those
channels with the highest signal-to-noise ratio (Scolari & Serences, 2010; Navalpakkam & Itti,
2007).
The contributions of accommodation and target boosting are weighted by parameters we, wi.
In all simulations that follow, these two parameters had the same value and reflect in effect a
single scaling parameter. They are nevertheless separated because of evidence in the literature
for dissociable strengthening- and discounting-effects (Lamy et al., 2008), based on individual
variation across observers.
It would be implausible to assume that effective gain changes in the brain would occur linearly
and unbounded. This would, after sufficient repetition, render the brain wholly unresponsive to
certain visual input. We therefore constrained the gains in our model between a lower bound of
0, and an upper bound of twice their starting value. These limits were enforced via a sigmoid
function, which rendered gain changes incrementally smaller as they approached these bounds.
2.2.3 Comparing fAIM to intertrial priming experiments
We compared model performance in simulations of several key experiments of priming in visual
search. Images resembling the visual displays from these experiments were used as input, and the
model produced a measure of pop-out (P , in the manner discussed above) that is susceptible to
the preceding trial through priming. More detail on the stimulus displays is given as supporting
information 2.B.
Experiments generally assess whether different feature combinations affect the amount of priming
observed for a given pair of trials. Here, we isolate this priming effect from the model output
by comparing the amount of pop-out in a trial without priming (with equal gain for all feature
channels) to that after the gains have been modulated through priming. The models priming
effect is quantified by this difference, labeled ∆P .
The comparison of the models priming effects to those found in experiments will be qualitative,
because the simulated experiments use very different dependent measures to assess priming of
pop-out (e.g. response time, but also the amount of first fixations on a target item), and it is
beyond the scope of this work to assess how these are quantitatively related. However, we assume
that the models measure of priming (∆P ) monotonically maps onto priming effects found in
experiments, expressed reported as RT or as proportion of eye movements. This means that the
model should be able to account for the presence or absence of priming in a given condition,
and to some extent the size of effects in different conditions within one experiment.
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Figure 2.2: A The change in salience of the target (top left stimulus) and distractors, averaged across repetition
and switch trial pairs. Priming enhances the salience of both targets and distractors relative to baseline, but
for repetition trials this increment is higher for targets than for distractors. After a switch, their difference has
decreased. B As a result, priming only enhances target pop-out for those trial combinations that constitute a
repetition. The effects of repetition or switches for opposite trial combinations are not necessarily identical in
magnitude. In this and all subsequent figures, red colors are used to either indicate a switch trial, a decrease
in gain, or a decrease in target-pop-out whereas the color blue is used for repetitions and increases in pop-out.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Feature priming of pop-out with two stimuli
Our first simulations assess fAIM in a ‘standard’ priming of pop-out paradigm, with two possible
stimuli. Each input image contained either a green target circle among red distractor circles, or
vice versa.
Figure 2.2A illustrates the effect of both repetition- and switch conditions on the output salience
values of the four different stimuli (∆S). The repetition effect is visible in this figure as increased
salience (lighter hue) for the upper left target in the case of a repetition relative to a switch.
It is clear from this figure that priming more strongly affects the salience of the edges of the
stimuli than the center. This is because the majority of the features are variable types of edge
detectors, and an increase in their gain will thus have less effect on the center of the stimulus. It
may seem surprising that the change in salience is positive at both the target and the distractor
locations in both conditions, and that priming thus enhances the salience of both in fAIM. The
reason for this is that since the target is a unique singleton, it will likely ‘pop-out’ to some
extent in most feature channels. As a result, the gain change will be positive for most feature
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Figure 2.3: (Caption on the next page)
channels, resulting in an increase in total gain. However, critical to the ease of the search (or:
the amount of pop-out P ), ∆S differs for the target and the distractor, resulting in a larger
difference in salience between the two when the target repeats, and a smaller difference when
the target switches.
This has been summarized for the four possible color combinations in Figure 2.2B. This figure
also illustrates that amount of priming is not necessarily symmetric between the two colors:
increases and decreases in pop-out are somewhat more pronounced for trial pairs had a red
target on the preceding trial. This is the consequence of an asymmetry in the baseline red-green
and green-red salience in AIM 1.
1We have observed such a color asymmetry ourselves in the RT data of several psychophysical experiments,
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Figure 2.3: A Priming, measured as the change in target pop-out, throughout a trial sequence simulated with
fAIM (y-axis inverted). At the start of a sequence, both repetition and switch trials tend to increase target
pop-out compared to baseline. Once the weights are in a stable regimen, the pattern of repetition and switch-
trials resembles that of RTs in typical priming of pop-out experiments (Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a).
B The gain change relative to baseline (white shading) for all feature channels. Most gains incrase relative
to baseline (blue shading), but the magnitude and direction of gain changes varies across features (decreases
in red). The observed priming effects result from this concert of gain modulations. C Priming effects as a
function of whether the target k trials in the past repeats or switches on the current trial. Simulated Priming
decays over 5-8 trials, as is commonly found in the literature
Note that the intertrial ‘distractor enhancement’ that is shown in Figure 2.2A only occurs for
the first few trials in a sequence. Figure 2.3A illustrates priming throughout a random sequence
of 60 trials, relative to the amount of pop-out in the baseline salience map. The first trials show
an overall increase in pop-out for both repetition and switch-trials, i.e. nonspecific facilitation
of the search. This is not unlike the first trials in a visual search experiment, where observers
quickly adapt to the task parameters (although such startup effects probably also reflect learning
processes other than priming – such as general task acquisition and response preparation). Once
the gains are in a range that is appropriate for the task, repetitions and switches strengthen and
decrease the ease of the search, respectively, in a manner that is commonly observed during a
pop-out visual search.
The evolution of gains for the sequence shown in Figure 2.3A is depicted in Figure 2.3B. In
this figure, blue shading indicates an increase of the gains relative to baseline, and red indicates
a decrease. As was explained above, the gains predominantly increase, although some gains
become smaller. Importantly, this figure also highlights that in fAIM, priming is not determined
by one, or a few features alone. Rather, the majority of visual features will modulate their gains
in response to the visual input, which together gives rise to priming.
The sequential effects that arise in such a trial sequence are summarized in Figure 2.3c, which
depicts the amount of pop-out P given that the target is either a repetition or switch compared
to the target n trials in the past (cf. Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, Figure 7). As has often
been found, priming decays over some 5-8 trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010;
Kruijne et al., in press).
In further simulations, we will only measure priming as the change in target pop-out ∆P relative
to the baseline level, as shown Figure 2.2B.
although they are rarely of primary interest and tend to vary across participants. Often, RTs are found to be
faster for red targets than for green targets.
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Figure 2.4: (Caption on the next page)
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Figure 2.4: A Typical data for relational priming measured as the change in RT (in ms) compared to the
average across all conditions. Full repetitions (FR) and switches (FS) of target-and distractor roles yield
repetition benefits and switch costs, respectively. Similar priming is observed for combinations where the
target-distractor relation repeats (RR) or switches (RS) (Data from Meeter & Olivers, 2014). B-G Simulation
results in all possible trial combinations in six different feature dimensions: two separate color gradients,
luminance, size, spikedness of a star and sides on a polygon. The x- and y-axis mark all possible display
combinations for trial n − 1 and n, respectively. Axes are sorted based on the target-distractor feature
distance. As a result, RR combinations appear in the lower left and upper right quadrant, RS in the upper
left and lower right quadrants, and FR and FS on the diagonals. Bar graphs plot average priming for these
conditions. All dimensions yield relative priming, with increased pop-out when the relation remains identical,
but decreases when the relation reverses.
2.3.2 Relative priming in various stimulus dimensions
To investigate relational priming, we defined six different stimulus dimensions, modeled after
stimuli that have been used in experiments to elicit relational priming: two color gradients
(blue to green and yellow to red); luminance (darker to brighter); size (small to larger); and
two more abstract shape dimensions: stars with an increasing number of spikes; and regular
polygons with an increasing number of edges (Becker, 2010; Meeter & Olivers, 2014; Becker,
2013). By defining four stimulus values in each dimension, we generated 4 × 3 = 12 displays,
one for each possible target-distractor combinations. This meant that there were 122 = 144
possible intertrial combinations for which priming was computed. Each display contained one
target stimulus, and three distractor stimuli.
Figure 2.4 depicts the resulting priming effects for every possible trial combination. For this
figure, displays were sorted based on the ‘feature distance’ between target- and distractor values.
The x-axis corresponds to the display index on trial n − 1, and the the y-axis to the index on
trial n. The colors of the tiles mark the resulting change in pop-out, with blue shading marking
an increase in pop-out, and red shading a decrease. Note that because of the way the x-
and y-axes are sorted, the bottom-left and top-right quadrants group trial combinations with
a relation repetition (RR), and the top-left and bottom right those combinations where the
relation switches (RS); The values on the diagonals correspond to Full Repetitions (FR) and
full switches (FS) of targets and distractors. Each plot is accompanied by a bar chart summarize
relational priming as the average pop-out change in FR trials, RR trials (excluding FR), RS
trials (excluding FS), and FS trials.
The figures show that fAIM gives rise to relational priming: The overall change in pop-out
is clearly different for RR and RS trials. Increases and decreases in pop-out, marked by blue
and red shading, are clustered and coarsely confined to RR and RS trials, respectively. For
some dimensions clustering is particularly clear, such as for the blue-green color dimension or
the luminance dimensions. The accompanying bar chart shows there is approximately equal
priming for FR and RR trials, and equal switch costs for FS and RS trials. In other dimensions,
such as for the polygons, positive and negative priming effects are somewhat less well confined
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to stimulus relations. From their bar charts it can be observed that priming is larger for full
repetitions and switches than for merely relational repetitions and switches. This has similarly
been observed empirically (Meeter & Olivers, 2014).
Taken together, these simulations convincingly show that relational priming can arise in a model
without an explicit relational code.
2.3.3 Relative priming of complex shapes
In the preceding simulations, the relational effects were less clear for the polygon search displays
than for the other stimuli. This could be due to several mismatches between our simulations
and the exact experiment. For example, the orientation of the stimuli was always the same in
our simulation, whereas stimuli were randomly rotated in the experiment (Becker, 2013). The
following simulation was designed to very closely simulate the design of the original experiments
on relational priming in shapes.
In the original experiment, relational priming was studied in a blocked design, with two display
types in a block, each consisting of a different Target-Distractor stimulus combinations. These
would repeat or switch unpredictably. Every display contained one target and seven distractors,
evenly distributed on a circle. Each stimulus in a display had a random orientation. Performance
was then quantified by the proportion of trials where the first eye movement landed on the target
singleton. Relational priming was assessed in a block, by whether performance on a repeated
display type differed from a switch.
The precise display types that were used in different blocks are summarized in Table 2.1, where
the numbers correspond to either the number of spikes on the stars or the number of sides on
the polygons. Asterisks mark intertrial combinations where the target remained constant. 2. In
each pair, the first digit refers to the value of the targets, the second of the distractors.
For our simulations we generated fifteen trials for each condition in each block, with randomly
rotated stimuli. Priming was computed for all possible trial combinations, excluding the rep-
etitions of identical displays (as display repetitions with identically rotated stimuli would not
have occurred in the original experiment). The resulting priming was then averaged across trial
combinations where the display type stayed the same, compared to when it switched.
The results for the three simulated experiments are summarized in Figure 2.5A. The mean
empirical data are plotted in 2.5B for comparison. To facilitate this comparison, a constant
baseline (c = .1) was added to all results, to yield visually similar graphs.
2The original study also reports results from an experiment with stimuli of increasing ‘complexity’. However,
as was acknowledged in that study, complexity increases were confounded with increases in size. Our simulations
already showed strong relational effects of size, so we omitted that experiment from our simulations. All stimuli
used in these simulations have an identical surface area.
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Condition Label Stars (A) Stars (B) Polygons
Full Switch FS 5–7, 7–5 7–9, 9–7
Relation Switch RS 5–7, 9–7 3–6, 4–3
Relation Repeat RR 5–9, 7–9 5–7, 7–9 3–4, 4–8
Relation Switch* RS* 7–5, 7–9 5–3, 5–10
Relation Repeat* RR* 3–5, 3–10
Table 2.1: Stimulus combinations to assess relational priming in shapes.
In the empirical data, the repetition of a display type was statistically different from non-
repetitions only in those blocks with a relation switch (RS) or a full switch (FS) of target and
distractor roles. For those blocks where the different display types had the same relation (RR)
no significant difference was found. In fAIM, these effects are revealed as a difference in the
amount of priming exerted by display type repetitions versus switches. As is is clear in these
figures, this difference is strongly attenuated or completely absent in those blocks where the
stimulus relation remains the same across display types.
To a large extent, the model also captures the relative magnitude of this difference across the
different blocks that do produce priming effects. For example, in both ‘star’-experiments, the
relative priming effect is greater in the FS-condition than in the RS-condition. For the ‘polygon’-
experiment the priming effect is smaller in the relation-switch-block where the target remained
the same throughout (RS*) than where it did not (RS).
2.3.4 Relative and absolute attentional capture
Relational feature guidance is not only found for singletons in intertrial priming experiments.
Similar relational effects have been reported in studies using an attentional capture paradigm
where the target and distractor features remained constant throughout a block, or throughout
the experiment (Becker, Folk & Remington, 2013). Surprisingly, one experiment showed that
such relational attentional capture could be modulated, and that attention could be ‘trained’
to be driven by absolute rather than relative feature values (Becker, Harris, Venini & Retell,
2014).
To gain more insight into these findings, we simulated this experiment (Becker et al., 2014, Expt
3). In the singleton search condition of that experiment, participants consistently searched for
an orange target among three yellow distractors, each randomly positioned on one of four fixed
locations3 . Either on the left or on the right of these stimuli, an additional distractor item
3In the original study, the experiment additionally contained a block with a reversed relation, where the
target was orange among red. This condition yielded conceptually identical results, and the same held for our
simulations of this condition. These results are therefore not reported here.
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Figure 2.5: Relative priming of ‘higher level’ shape representations is found both empirically (right) and with
fAIM (left). Stimuli are described in Table 2.1. In the simulations, priming is quantified by the change in
pop-out (∆P ), and a single constant has been added to these scores. The resulting values are proportional
to the measure used in the empirical data: the mean percentage of first fixations on the target, reported
in (Becker, 2013). Critically, priming of display type is only observed in blocks where switches result in a
relational switch (with repetition of the target stimulus, RS* or without, RS) or a full switch (FS), and not
for blocks where the relation only repeats (RR* and RR)
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was presented that was never the target and had one of five colors that ranged from yellow to
red. Of interest was the amount of capture by this additional item, which was assessed as the
percentage of first fixations that went to this distractor item. Capture was found to be relative:
redder items captured the eyes more often that yellower items did. Of note, even though the
target was consistently orange, the redder distractors would capture the eyes more often than
an orange distractor.
Critically, a subset of participants engaged in a feature search task in the first half of the
experiment, before they performed the singleton search task. During the feature search the
target was also orange, but it was on each display accompanied by four or six distractors, half
more yellow and half more red than the target. Strikingly, observers who first engaged in feature
search were found to show absolute capture in addition to relative capture during the singleton
search task. That is, red items still captured the eyes more often than yellow items did, but
orange items captured the eyes more often than red items did. This effect was robust, as it did
not seem to attenuate over the course of the singleton search trials.
To explore these results with fAIM, we computed a salience map for singleton search displays
modeled after those used in the experiment, and computed the amount of pop-out of the addi-
tional distractor item for each of its five possible color values. The result, plotted as ‘baseline’
in Figure 2.6A, is an approximately linearly increasing salience across stimulus values ranging
from yellow to red. This is very similar to the experimental data pattern plotted in Figure 2.6B
. What this result suggests is that relative capture in singleton search does not necessarily reflect
relative feature ‘guidance’ caused by the search parameters: AIM (and thus fAIM) predicts a
similar pattern of results purely based on the physical salience within the display.
We then sought to explain the nature of the long-term absolute feature guidance that arose when
participants engaged in feature search first. To this end, we let fAIM process a sequence of 25
feature search trials. After every trial, we separately assessed how this gain modulation affected
the salience of each possible distractor stimulus in the singleton display, relative to baseline.
This yielded ‘priming’ exerted on each possible distractor value at each point in the sequence.
The average priming effect across all trials is depicted in Figure 2.6A as ‘Average priming’.
The Average Priming curve shows that throughout the feature search block, priming exerted by
feature search trials enhance the salience of the orange stimulus, and attenuate the salience of
both red and yellow distractors. If this effect is scaled (multiplied by a constant, 8.0), and then
added to the baseline salience of these stimuli in the singleton display, the resulting stimulus
salience is very similar to the empirically observed amount of capture across stimuli (compare
Figure 2.6AB, curve labeled: ‘after training’).
This simulation illustrates how intertrial priming in singleton search and absolute feature guid-
ance after feature search are related. However, the empirical data and their simulation emphasize
their obvious difference: feature search can give rise to long-lasting, persistent modulations of
attention, whereas priming in singleton search is only short-lived (see also Becker et al., 2014;
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Figure 2.6: Relative and absolute attentional capture by an additional distractor, as simulated by fAIM (A)
and as found empirically (Becker et al., 2014)(B), using the design illustrated in C. In the singleton search
display, the target is always orange (disk labeled 3), the distractors always yellow (disk labeled 1), and the
additional singleton has a value anywhere from yellow to red (1-5). In the singleton search display, without
any top-down modulation or priming effect, the salience of the additional singleton almost linearly as it
becomes more red (baseline, light blue curve). The average priming effect elicited in a block of absolute
feature search boosts the salience of orange, and attenuates the salience of yellow and red items (red curve).
If a scaled version of this priming effect is added to the baseline curve, it gives rise to absolute, rather than
relative capture.
Kruijne & Meeter, 2015; Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Leber et al., 2009). This point is addressed
further in the Discussion.
2.3.5 Is priming modulated by the relevance of the dimension?
Here, we re-examine the experiment that gave rise to the goal-dependent priming hypothesis
(Fecteau, 2007) by simulating it with fAIM. The goal-dependent priming hypothesis is supported
by the observation that target feature repetitions or switches in the task-irrelevant dimension are
smaller than what would be expected if priming results from absolute feature weighting. This
has been investigated by presenting participants with displays with two singletons on each trial:
one shape- and one color singleton. Participants were instructed which singleton to respond to,
which rendered one dimension relevant and the other task-irrelevant. Priming through repetition
of irrelevant target features was so small as to be statistically insignificant. However, priming
was only taken as a function of repeated or switched features of the singleton considered in
isolation. We therefore assessed priming for this experimental design as predicted by fAIM,
which takes the whole image into account, to uncover whether an absolute priming account
would truly predict a different result than what was found.
For all possible trial pairs that could occur in the experiment, fAIM was run to compute priming.
To make model output comparable to the RTs in the empirical data, model output was trans-
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formed by subtracting the predicted change in target pop-out from a preset constant baseline
(c−∆P ; with c = .4 for the color task and c = 1.0 for the shape task, to reflect their difference
in overall difficulty). Subsequently, scores were aggregated for trial combinations in which the
task relevant or irrelevant feature repeated or not, separately for color- and shape tasks. Our
simulation results are depicted in Figure 2.7, alongside the mean RTs observed in the study.
Much like the empirical data, repetition effects are strongly attenuated for target repetitions
and switches in the task-irrelevant dimension.
How can fAIM produce goal-dependent priming effects if it has no representation of its goal?
The answer can be found in the intertrial contingencies embedded in the experiment. Consider,
for example, the scenario where trial n is a ‘color-trial’:
 If the target on trial n−1 was also defined by its color, then features that helped dissociate
this target based on its color were boosted. On trial n, the target is again defined by color.
Therefore, repetitions or switches of the irrelevant dimension – the shape – can either be
accompanied by a repetition or by a switch in the relevant dimension. The net result then
is that shape repetitions or switches produce little to no priming.
 If a target on trial n−1 was defined by its shape, then features that helped dissociate this
target based on its shape will be boosted. On trial n, the target is now defined by color.
If the target’s shape repeats, the homogeneous non-targets necessarily will have the same
shape as the target, and priming will yield little benefit. Similarly, if the shape switches,
this would negatively affect the salience of both the target and the non-targets, and the
priming effects would be limited.
A similar argument can be made for the opposite scenario, where trial n is a ‘shape trial’.
The simulations with fAIM thus reveal that neither a representation of goal, nor any goal-
dependent modulation of priming are necessary to give rise to these findings. We therefore
conclude that goal-dependent priming is likely to reflect an epiphenomenon caused by intertrial
contingencies in the experiment, rather than a true modulation of priming by the current goals
of the observer.
2.4 Discussion
In this study we have presented fAIM, a computational model of intertrial priming in bottom-
up driven visual search. The model shows how visual search trials give rise to modulations
of the gains of different visual features, which causes the visual system to tune to the task at
hand. fAIM was constructed with minimal assumptions and designed by implementing a priming
mechanism within an established model of bottom-up visual salience. The model implements
65
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing Chapter 2
Figure 2.7: A Goal-dependent priming simulated with fAIM. Bars represent the change in target pop-out,
subtracted from a baseline c. A different baseline was assumed for the color task (c = 0.4) than for the
shape task (c = 1.0), reflecting the apparent difference in difficulty. Priming is strongly attenuated in the
task-irrelevant dimension. B Empirical data from (Fecteau, 2007). C Two example displays used in the
simulations. Every display has two separate singleton stimuli, either a color singleton or a shape singleton.
priming as a result of feature weighting, which has often been proposed to underlie priming
(Lee et al., 2009; Becker & Horstmann, 2009; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010;
Kristja´nsson & Nakayama, 2003; Meeter & Olivers, 2006), sometimes in the form of dimension
weighting (Zehetleitner, Krummenacher, Geyer, Hegenloh & Mu¨ller, 2011). What makes fAIM
different is that it offers an in-depth perspective of what feature weighting entails for bottom-up
visual processing. Our simulations with fAIM led to the following results:
 Priming of Pop-out can be successfully simulated with fAIM. It is found for classic stimulus
properties such as colors, but also for less obvious ones such as ‘spikiness’ of star-shapes.
 Priming in fAIM is not restricted to a single feature that is boosted or inhibited, but
results from patterns of change over all features.
 Thus, priming is part of a general adaptation to the task as a whole, and not just to target-
and distractor features in isolation.
 Relational priming effects can emerge through the absolute weighting of independent fea-
tures, without a representation of stimulus relation.
 Results suggestive of goal-dependent priming can emerge through the stimulus interactions
within a display, without any representation of the current goal.
Much like most empirical work on priming, other computational models of priming (Maljkovic
& Martini, 2005; Mozer, Shettel & Vecera, 2005) only consider whether target- and distractor
features repeat or switch roles across trials (Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Mozer et al., 2005) fAIM,
on the other hand, models how visual experience impacts the entire visual representation, and
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how this in turn results in priming. Consequentially, repetition effects are not limited to the pre-
cise stimulus values that caused it, which explains how the model naturally produces relational
priming and goal-dependent priming. These successes simultaneously provide new evidence that
a visual representation as proposed by AIM is a reasonable model of visual processing.
Interestingly, one way to interpret the workings of fAIM is that the multivariate representation
of salience inherently gives rise to a ‘relational code’. That is, those features that respond
strongly to orange-red stimulus contrast are similarly involved in yellow-orange contrast, and
are different from those involved in orange-yellow contrast. As such, the model demonstrates
how a relational code can emerge from absolute feature weighting, which is a mechanism that
previous treatments of relational guidance of attention (Becker, 2008, 2013; Becker et al., 2014;
Meeter & Olivers, 2014; Navalpakkam & Itti, 2007) never have put forward.
While the idea of feature weighting is widespread in the intertrial priming literature, it remains
unclear what would cause up- and downregulation of feature gains. Although our simulations are
consistent with various possible mechanisms, we have suggested that two processes underlie gain
modulation: accommodation to visual input, and reward-based learning through the intrinsic
reward of finding a target. The idea that the up- and down-weighting of features result from
dissociable processes has received some empirical support (Lamy et al., 2008; Meeter & Van der
Stigchel, 2013; Geyer, Mu¨ller & Krummenacher, 2006), and both processes have been alluded
to in the literature. Priming has previously been linked to Repetition Attenuation, decrease in
neural activity in response to stimulus repetition, which has been observed throughout the brain
in neural imaging studies (Kristja´nsson et al., 2007; Gotts et al., 2012). Many computational
models of salience already incorporate the idea that repetition of features in time reduces their
salience (Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009; Itti & Baldi, 2009; Friston, 2005) . Likewise, the idea that
target boosting is caused by the intrinsic reward of finding a target is supported by studies
that show increased priming for targets associated with reward (Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes,
2010a,b, 2011; Kristja´nsson, Sigurjo´nsdo´ttir & Driver, 2010).
A major advantage of expressing feature modulation in terms of accommodation to input and
reward-mediated boosting is that it allows us to approach priming as a natural consequence
of known processes, rather than a separate mechanism introduced to explain priming effects.
Therefore, fAIM has consequences beyond intertrial priming. The same gain modulation that is
used to explain priming may be used in other modulations of visual information. For example,
similar modulations may underlie feature based attention (Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Theeuwes,
2013), and they could be used to define the ‘attentional set’ that is acquired after training on
a visual task (Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Turk-Browne et al., 2005; Cosman & Vecera, 2014) More
generally, the model predicts that visual experience will always have an effect on subsequent
visual processing. This implies, for example, that search tasks will have carryover effects on
other search tasks that can be predicted from fAIM. This is an avenue for further research.
There are also limitations to fAIM. First, the output of the model is a salience map, and how
this output maps onto either reaction time or proportions of eye movements must be further
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developed. Second, our work does not cover response- and position priming that usually co-
occurs with feature priming. However, this does not invalidate the present results as these
different forms of priming have usually been found to be independent (Gokce, Geyer, Finke,
Muller & Tollner, 2014; Tollner et al., 2008; Lamy et al., 2010; Meeter & Olivers, 2006). Third,
fAIM constructs its salience map at a single spatial scale, ignoring the hierarchical organization
of the visual pathway. One can imagine a hierarchical visual representation based on similar
principles, where higher order maps encode regularities in the low-level output (Rao & Ballard,
1999; Friston, 2005). This might allow for interactions between stimuli across larger spatial
distances that are currently neglected in fAIM.
The fourth limitation merits more extensive discussion. We have used fAIM to simulate priming
that lasts a few trials, and the fact that each gain modulation overwrites the previous modu-
lations means that it would have difficulty predicting anything else than short-term priming.
However, there are also priming effects that do not seem to disappear quickly. We have previ-
ously reported about long-term priming in conjunction search (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015) that
caused persistent attentional biases towards targets that were presented more often. No such
pattern was found for singleton search. The absolute feature guidance experiment that we sim-
ulated in this study can be interpreted in similar vein: priming was driven by relative stimulus
values throughout a singleton search block with a constant target. However, a block with an
absolute feature search had persistent effects on future visual salience (comparable to (Leber
& Egeth, 2006a)). This suggests that there are fundamental differences between how priming
operates in singleton search, versus how it operates in conjunction and feature search. Our
model only addresses the former, and future work will have to elucidate what forms of learning
play a role in long-term priming.
2.5 Conclusion
We conclude that fAIM offers new insight into visual priming by emphasizing the wealth of
information in the visual representation. The model describes how this wealth can be used
by the brain to adapt our senses to the stimuli it will likely have to deal with in the future.
This highlights how priming is more than just a peculiarity arising in visual search experiments.
Instead, it is an expression of an adapting brain in a dynamic environment.
68
Priming of Pop-Out Modifies Visual Processing
Supplemental Material
2.A Implementation details of the model
The main text only gives a description of AIM and fAIM that is largely conceptual, and various
technical details were omitted. These details are listed in the following paragraphs. Note that
the basis of our model, the implementation of AIM, was mostly a reimplementation of the code
for AIM available from the homepage of N. B. Bruce.
Visual Features The visual features were derived from 40,000 image patches of 31 × 31 ×
RGB generated by extracting 5 patches from 8,000 images. The images were drawn from the
SUN database (Xiao et al., 2010), but we excluded images that were black and white, were less
than 300 px wide or tall, or that were labeled ‘’outliers’ in the dataset.
Features were computed by running JADE independent component analysis (Cardoso, 1999)
(ICA), after the data had been whitened by a principal component analysis that left only those
components to account for at least 95% of the variance in the data. Different runs with newly
sampled image patches resulted in highly corresponding features, though the number of features
varied around 54±3. In the simulations used here, a single feature space of 54 features was used.
Self-information and visual pop-out Input images were decomposed into 31×31 patches.
To correct for edge artifacts, images were reflected at the edges, although the stimuli in our
images were placed at sufficient distance from this boundary not to be affected. Convolution of
the image with the ICA unmixing matrix yields the response of each feature at each location.
These responses across images were summarized into a histogram of 1,000 bins for each feature
channel. The histogram was smoothed by convolution with a Gaussian filter, which had a σ of
.05s, where s is the standard deviation computed across the bins in the histogram. The resulting
bin values were then normalized to sum to 1.
The resulting bin values were used to determine the probability pf (x) of all stimulus values at
every location x. These were transformed into salience values, or self information, via Sf (x) =
−log(pf (x)).
Insight that the salience value in AIM is composed of the independent contribution of all feature
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channels is clear when the salience computation is rewritten as:
S(x) = −log(p(x))
=
∑
f
−log(pf (x)) =
∑
f
Sf (x) (2.A.1)
where f refers to each feature channel; x refers to any location in the image, and is omitted
from the upcoming equations.
The fAIM model fAIM generalizes this model and assumes all feature channels have a
dynamic weight or ‘gain’ gf that determines their contribution to overall salience:
S =
∑
f
gfSf = g · S (2.A.2)
After a salience map has been computed, and the level of pop-out in each feature channel has
been determined, the weights of the model are constrained via a sigmoid function, cf:
gn+1 = σ(gn + ∆gn)
with σ(g) =
u
1 + e−k(g−m)
(2.A.3)
The parameters used in all simulations were: wi = we = 1; k = 100;m =
1 /54;u =
2 /54. The
resulting sigmoid results in near-linear gain changes at the edged, then dampens gain changes
more and more as gains approach either 0 or u
2.B Simulated stimuli and displays
To reduce aliasing artifacts of drawing, stimuli were initially constructed as 301× 301 patches,
then resized to 76×76 via bilinear interpolation. The following paragraphs describe how patches
were constructed for each stimulus type.
Stimuli Color and luminance stimuli were circles, with a diameter spanning the full patch
width. Colors were generated from color maps integrated in the matplotlib plotting library.
For the yellow-red stimuli we used the YlOrRd color map, for Blue-Green stimuli the BuGn map
was used.
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Colors were drawn as four evenly spaced points on this map from 20% – 80%. For the absolute
and relative priming simulations, five values were drawn from the same range. In the initial
red-green color priming, the two colors at 10% and 90% of the RdYlGn map were drawn. All
colors were rendered isoluminant to the model by normalizing the color vectors.
The luminance stimulus set consisted of four gray stimuli with 35%–80% intensity. Size stimuli
were white circles, with diameters at 30% - 90% of the patch width. These values were chosen
to match the relative luminance and sizes values reported for the corresponding experiments
(Becker, 2010).
Star- and polygon stimuli were constructed by connecting evenly spaced points on a circle.
Polygon shapes were constructing by connecting the desired number of adjacent points. As a
baseline, triangle shapes were constructed by connecting three points on a circle with a patch-
size diameter. Higher order polygons were constructed in the same fashion, but then scaled to
match in surface area.
Star-stimuli were defined by connecting an odd number (p) of points on a circle, in such a way
that every point is connected to a point q steps away, with q = bp/2c away (integer division). In
constructing the relative priming matrix priming simulations, stimuli were with p = {5, 7, 9, 11}.
In goal-dependent priming, stimuli were either red or green, defined like before. In the original
experiment, stimuli were landolt-C’s and landolt-squares. We mimicked that appearance by
drawing filled circles and squares, then leaving the center 60% of the surface blank.
Display configurations The ‘basic displays’ that were used in most simulations were 4 stim-
ulus patches placed in a grid, the center of a 376×376 image, on a black background. The
spacing between them was 76px, identical to the patch size.
The simulations of the relative-shape priming experiments used displays of 376×413, with seven
stimuli placed equidistantly on a circle with a 152 px radius. The simulations to study goal-
dependent priming used similar displays but contained only six display items.
The simulations of absolute and relative attentional used singleton displays of 376×466 px, with
the displays identical to the grids used in the basic displays but with an additional stimulus on
the right at the same horizontal distance. The feature search displays had an identical layout
as the shape displays described above.
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Chapter 3
Priming of Pop-Out has a Single,
Short Time Scale
Adapted from
Kruijne, W., Brascamp, J., Kristja´nsson, A´., & Meeter, M.
Can a single short-term mechanism account for priming of pop-out?
Vision Research (2015), 115:17-22)
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Trial-to-trial feature repetition speeds response times in pop-out visual search tasks.
These priming effects are often ascribed to a short-term memory system. Recently,
however, it has been reported that a ‘build-up’ sequence of repetitions could facilitate
responses over 16 trials later – well beyond twice the typically reported time course
(Vision Research, 2011, 51, 1972–1978). Here, we first report two replication attempts
that yielded little to no support for such long-term priming of pop-out. The results
instead fell in line with the predictions of a previously proposed computational model
that describes the priming as short-lived facilitation that decays over approximately
eight trials (Vision Research, 2010, 50, 2110–2115). In the second part of this study,
we show that these data are consistent with a simple formulation of decay with a single
timescale, and that there is no significant priming beyond eight trials.
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3.1 Introduction
Whenever we explore our visual environment or search for a particular target, we are driven
both by the visual input, and by what our search goal is, i.e. what we are looking for. The
question how these two classes of influences drive visual attention and visual search, as well as
how they interact has been hotly debated for decades (Van der Stigchel et al., 2009). However,
there is a third class of factors that appears to affect our visual attention and behavior, namely
preceding searches. An increasing body of evidence highlights a very important role for the
effects of history in visual search, and various authors have suggested that this deserves to be
acknowledged as such, and that ‘history’ deserves its own separate spot alongside the typical
dichotomy of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ factors (Chun & Nakayama, 2000; Awh et al., 2012).
The extent of the influence history can have on visual search performance is perhaps most clearly
demonstrated by research on intertrial priming. This term denotes the finding that trial to trial
repetition of features of the target or distractors speeds reaction times. An early exploration
of such effects demonstrated that priming occurs in pop-out search tasks, which are believed to
be largely driven by bottom-up processes independently of the participants conscious control
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). Later studies revealed that such priming of pop-out affects
the direction and latency of eye movements (McPeek, Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1999; Bichot &
Schall, 1999), and does not only facilitate responses to certain features but also establishes a
bias for them (Brascamp, Blake & Kristja´nsson, 2011).
In most studies intertrial priming is merely measured as the immediate effect of feature repeti-
tion versus feature switches from one trial to the next. However Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994)
already noted that priming effects tend to persist for multiple trials. They reported that repeat-
ing the target color of trials up to about seven trials in the past yielded speeded RTs compared
to color switches. This finding has contributed to a conceptualization of priming as resulting
from a short-term memory system (Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a; Maljkovic & Martini, 2005;
Chun & Nakayama, 2000; Kristja´nsson & Nakayama, 2003) the amount of priming on a trial is
a cumulative effect of the facilitation caused by previous trials, with the facilitation caused by
any trial dissipating over the course of 5-8 subsequent trials as their memory fades.
Since priming effects persist for multiple trials, a natural question that arises is exactly how
and why these effects fade away. Few studies have systematically explored this time course of
intertrial priming of pop-out. Martini (2010) collected data from 50 participants in a standard
priming of pop-out task (cf. Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) where target- and distractor colors
randomly switched between red and green. The resulting data were formalized by extracting
the priming exerted by each trial on every future trial with the same target color (see also
Maljkovic & Martini, 2005). These data yielded a model where every trial independently facil-
itated future repetitions, and this facilitation decayed over trials. This decay was described by
two exponentials: one relatively strong but short-lived, and one much weaker but longer-lasting.
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Brascamp et al. (2011) probed the decay of priming via an experimental design where target-
and distractor roles reversed with systematic patterns, producing periods that consisted of a
‘build-up’ sequence of one target color, followed by an ‘intervening’ sequence of the opposite
target color, and then ‘test’ trials on which potential priming effects of these sequences could
be tested. Their first reported experiment showed how longer build-up sequences, compared to
shorter ones, produced stronger priming and subsequently required longer intervening sequences
to fully decay. In the second experiment, which is the focus of the present study, build-up
sequences always lasted for twelve trials, followed by four intervening trials of the opposite
color. After that, a ‘test-sequence’ followed where target colors alternated between the build-up
and intervening color Critically, they found that early in the test sequence, the intervening color-
trials appeared primed with facilitated RTs, but later in the test sequence this pattern reversed,
with shorter RTs for the trials with the build-up color (Figure 3.1, inset). Their explanation of
this finding was that the intervening sequence yielded only short-lived priming observed early
in the sequence, but that the build-up sequence had established a long-term priming effect that
became apparent after the strong short-term priming-effect had decayed. This was interpreted
to be in line with the model of Martini (2010), because this model assumes two components to
priming, one with a short time scale of decay, and one with a longer time scale.
However, a simulation of this paradigm using the model yields a different prediction (Figure 3.1).
During the test sequence, the model predicts no appreciable consequence of the build-up se-
quence. This is the case because for the priming of color, the contribution of the longer-term
component in the model is actually much weaker than that of the short-term component, so
that feature priming is largely driven by short-term priming alone 1 Therefore, under this model
the RTs of the alternating trials in the test sequence are predicted to differ only early in the se-
quence: near the end of the sequence they converge, as the recent history will be nearly identical
for both colors.
Here, we performed two experiments aimed at studying the putative role of longer-term effects
in priming of pop-out, and at investigating what could account for the discrepancy between
Brascamp et al. (2011)’s data and the predictions of the model by Martini (2010). The first
experiment investigated whether factors independent of long-term priming could have accounted
for the crossover effect found by Brascamp et al.. In particular, we explored whether the pre-
dictability of the sequences in the original study might have affected the results, and attempted
to replicate the original findings in an experiment with less predictable sequences (Experiment
1). To preview the results, this experiment suggested that the build-up sequence did not lead
to any facilitatory effect for that particular target color during the test sequence, contrary to
the original report.
When carefully examining the differences between Experiment 1 and the original experiment,
1In his study, Martini sought to isolate the effects of repetition in different dimensions, i.e. for the target
location, the trial response, and the target selection feature. The effects of repetition in these dimensions were
described by two exponentials with different timescales. However, for the selection feature, which shows the
strongest repetition effects, the relative contribution of the longer-term component is rather small.
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Figure 3.1: Predicted outcome of Brascamp et al. (2011, experiment 2) according to the Martini (2010) model
(dashed lines), compared to the outcome reported by Brascamp and colleagues (inset). Sequences consisted
of twelve build-up trials, four intervening trials, then fourteen test trials with alternating target colors. Red
data points denote trials in which the target has the ‘build-up’ color, green data points the ‘intervening’ color.
Build-up and intervening colors swapped roles throughout the experiment.The model only predicts relative
response times, and the y-axis has no unit. The inset has arbitrary vertical placement and shows normalized
reaction times. Of interest here is the qualitative difference between the course of the individual curves at
the end of the test sequence.
we identified a coding error in the original experiment file that might account for the crossover
effect found in Brascamp et al. (2011), which we’ll further address in the Discussion section
below. To verify this possibility, we ran another experiment, virtually identical to the original
experiment. In line with Experiment 1 and in conflict with the original study, no detectable
long-term priming effect was observed in this experiment. These results are consistent with a
scenario in which priming of pop-out relies overwhelmingly on a relatively short-term effect.
The second part of the study formally addresses whether the results support a dual or single-
timescale account of priming of pop-out, by examining our data in the context of the model of
Martini (2010) These analyses demonstrate that the results are consistent with the time course
for priming of pop-out proposed by Martini (2010), despite differences in experimental designs.
This suggests that the Martini-model may very well generalize to other priming of pop-out tasks.
By extension, these data support the view that priming of pop-out is dominated by short-term
facilitation. In fact, the results indicate that priming of pop-out is well described as decaying
with a single time scale.
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3.2 Materials and Methods
As both experiments were intended to replicate (Brascamp et al., 2011, experiment 2), they
were highly similar and their methods and results will be presented together. Any differences
are specifically noted below.
3.2.1 Participants
Six students from the Vrije Universiteit participated in Experiment 1, aged 19–26 (M=21.8).
Four were female, and all reported normal or corrected-to normal vision. The experiment was
conducted in accordance with the local ethics committee of the Vrije Universiteit, Faculty of
Psychology and Education.
Six observers participated in Experiment 2, five of whom were female students from Utrecht
University and the remaining one was an author (JB). Their age range was 22–35 years (M=26.2),
and all observers reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Experiments were performed
in accordance with the local ethics guidelines of Utrecht University.
Informed consent was obtained prior to the experiments and both experiments were conducted in
accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki).
3.2.2 Stimuli
For both experiments, the task and stimuli were modeled after the diamond pop-out task com-
mon in studies on intertrial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010). Each
trial started with a fixation display, followed by a search display with three diamonds (sized
2.4◦ × 2.4◦) at an eccentricity of 4.05◦. Two of the diamonds were red (12.8cd/m2) and one
green (13.3cd/m2) or vice versa. Each diamond had a notch at the top or the bottom, and par-
ticipants were instructed to indicate the notch of the singleton colored diamond by pressing a
corresponding key on a keyboard. All stimuli were presented on a dark background (0.5cd/m2).
Experiment 1 was programmed using the OpenSesame Experiment builder (Mathoˆt, Schreij &
Theeuwes, 2012). Stimuli were placed at three locations randomly chosen from twelve predefined
equidistant positions surrounding fixation, though never at immediately adjacent positions. Ex-
periment 2 was programmed in MatLab using the Psychtoolbox functions (Brainard, 1997). On
every trial the three stimuli were assigned to three positions equally spaced on an imaginary
circle around fixation but otherwise random.
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3.2.3 Procedure
In both experiments, target colors on each trial (red or green) switched in systematic patterns
to constitute build-up-, intervening- and test-sequences. Build-up and intervening sequences
always had lengths 12 and 4, respectively. By definition, the test sequences always started
with the build-up color, after which colors alternated. In the original study – and similarly
in Experiment 2 – test sequences always had an even length (that is 10, 12 or 14) with equal
probability. As a result, the sequence always ended with the intervening color. After each test-
sequence, the roles of build-up and intervening color switched: the final test trial was followed
by 11 repetitions of the same color, constituting a new build-up sequence. In every sequence,
the final test trial thus served a ‘double-role’ as a subsequent build-up trial.
In Experiment 1, sequences were implemented slightly differently to reduce their predictability.
Test sequences could have any length from 10–14 with equal probability, which yielded no
constraints on the final color in the test-sequence. The test sequence was then always followed
by 12 build-up trials, which could have either color (counterbalanced across the experiment).
Note that this means that the resulting build-up sequence could be effectively 13 trials long.
To present data that are nevertheless comparable across experiments we adhere to the following
standards during the analyses: (1) whenever the first build-up trial is a color switch trial, it is
interpreted as the last test-trial; (2) the first repetition following a test-sequence is considered
the build-up trial with index 2; (3) only build-up trials 2-12 are reported, and any 13th build-up
trials were ignored.
In Experiment 1, participants completed two sessions, one of 2240 trials and one of 1960 trials
(based on 80 and 70 full sequences, respectively), preceded by 10 and 5 practice trials. Both
sessions were held at the same day with at least 30 minutes of rest in between. In Experiment 2,
every participant completed 12 sessions of on average 542.6 trials (based on 20 full sequences),
spread out over multiple days to their convenience.
3.2.4 Trial Inclusion and preprocessing procedures
Both datasets were processed identically. First, incorrect trials were discarded (M=5.1%,
SD=2% trials in Experiment 1; M=6.5%, SD=7.4% in Experiment 2). After discarding incorrect
trials, outlier trials were defined separately per subject using a procedure similar to Brascamp
et al. (2011): a modified z-score for every RT was computed, defined as M = 0.6745 (x−x¯)MAD , where
x¯ was the sample median, and MAD is the Median Absolute Deviation. Trials with a modified
z > 3.5 were considered outliers and excluded from further analysis (M=1.1%, SD=0.3% of
trials for Experiment 1, M=1.0%, SD=0.8% of trials for Experiment 2).
Apart from analyzing regular RTs, we computed normalized RTs and z-scored RTs. Normalized
RTs were computed to compare the current results to those of the original study, and were
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Figure 3.2: (Caption on the next page)
defined for every participant by dividing RTs by the mean of RTs of trials in the Test sequence.
z-scored RTs were computed for our follow-up analyses to compare the results to those of Martini
(2010), by subtracting each participant’s mean RT from each individual RT and dividing this
by the standard deviation, both defined over all trials (i.e. Build-up-, Intervening- and Test-
trials).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Response Times in the sequence
The results of the full sequence are plotted for both experiments in Figure 3.2. As expected, the
pattern of response times in the build-up and intervening sequences is in line with the predictions
made by the model (in Figure 3.1). Crucially, this was also the case for the pattern of results
during the test sequence. Early on in this sequence, build-up-colored trials have slightly higher
RTs than trials of the intervening color, but this effect quickly fades. Throughout the rest of
the test sequence, both colors elicit similar response times. There appears to be no evidence
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Figure 3.2: Results of Experiment 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). Ribbons reflect the sample standard error of each
data point. The pattern of results of both experiments qualitatively matches the pattern predicted by Martini
(2010): cumulative priming effects are observed in the build-up and intervening sequences, and these result
in a brief benefit for intervening trials in the beginning of the Test-sequence. However, this benefit quickly
disappears and no differences are found between both colors as the test sequence progresses. The insets depict
the log10 Bayes Factor from Bayesian t-tests at each index, to assess whether build-up- and intervening colors
differed (see text for details). Values greater than zero indicate evidence for a difference, those below zero for
the null-hypothesis. The shaded region indicates Bayes Factors that are considered inconclusive (BF < 3),
and borders at 1 and -1 indicate strong evidence for either hypothesis (BF = 10).
RT Normalized RT
H1 t(5) p t(5) p
Experiment 1 early B > I 4.164 0.004 4.497 0.003
late B < I 0.200 0.575 0.108 0.541
Experiment 2 early B > I 2.037 0.049 2.207 0.039
late B < I 0.442 0.662 0.450 0.664
Table 3.1: Results of one-sided t-tests, assessing whether build-up colored trials and intervening colored trials
differed, both early and late in the sequence. Tests were performed on both raw RTs and normalized RTs
(see text for details)
for long-term facilitation at the end of the sequence – build-up colored trials do not seem to be
primed more than intervening colored trials.
In line with Brascamp et al. (2011), we first assessed these observations through paired t-tests
on the average of the first three points of each curve, as well as on the last three points on each
curve. For both datasets, one-sided tests supported that trials of the build-up color had higher
RTs early on in the sequence than those of the intervening color. At the end of the sequence,
no evidence for a difference was found (see Table 3.1).
In addition to the statistical tests done in the original study, we also quantified the evidence
for a difference in priming between build-up and intervening colors at every trial index. To
this end, we compared the normalized RT at each test trial to the average of the preceding
and subsequent trial using Bayesian t-tests (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009).
The only exceptions were the first and fourteenth trial, which were compared to the second
and thirteenth trial, respectively. We tested whether responses on intervening color trials were
faster than on build-up color trials for indices 1–7, and vice versa for indices 8–14. The resulting
Bayes Factors are plotted in Figure 3.2, after taking the log10 for clearer interpretation. In this
graph, positive values indicate evidence for a difference, and negative values indicate evidence
for no difference. Although these results are mostly inconclusive due to the conservative nature
of Bayesian statistics, they again illustrate how the start and end of the sequence differ: whereas
early in the sequence evidence is found for a difference between these colors, later in the sequence
the evidence predominantly suggests that both colors yielded similar response times.
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Somewhat curiously, regarding the intervening-colored test trials in Experiment 1, it may seem
from the graph that response times were greater at index 2 than at index 4, whereas the model
predicted a subtle difference in the opposite direction. However, a one-sided t-test, uncorrected
for multiple comparisons, did not indicate a difference between these two data points ( t(5) =
−1.85 ).
3.3.2 The memory kernel of priming of pop-out
The results of neither experiment replicate the original results of Brascamp et al. (2011, experi-
ment 2): throughout the test sequence there was no evidence for long-term facilitation from the
long build-up sequence. This suggests the originally reported crossover in the test sequence re-
sulted from the coding error in the experiment file. At least qualitatively, the present results are
highly in accordance with the predictions of the computational model put forward by Martini
(2010) as depicted in Figure 3.1.
As facilitation effects in these data are predominantly short-lived,this raises the question whether
a successful description of priming of pop-out requires the inclusion of a longer timescale at
all. Of note, the original formulation of this model successfully captured a range of priming
phenomena with just one exponential term (Maljkovic & Martini, 2005). Here, we explore to
what extent our data might similarly support this single time scale model, or might require both
a fast and a slow component.
In the model, memory kernels describe the amount of facilitation through priming that each
trial will exert on subsequent trials of the same color. This value gradually dissipates via a
pattern that can be described by a function with either one or two exponential terms, each
with a particular gain (wi) and timescale (τi). To estimate this function (termed the ‘memory
kernel’), Martini z-scored response times and cross-correlated these with a binary input time
series that reflected trials of a particular color. Because this approach assumes that the input
reflects uncorrelated noise this procedure can not be replicated here, since trial colors varied
systematically in the present experiments.
Instead, we used simulations of our experiments, and optimized the parameters of the model
with two exponentials to capture the data pattern of each participant. We then used Bayesian
parameter estimation procedures to recover the parameters of the kernel underlying priming of
pop-out, and to explore whether priming was best described by a function with two exponential
terms (M2) or one (M1). We constructed a hierarchical Bayesian graphical model in line with
M2, and computed joint posterior distributions for its parameters through Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) sampling (using the rjags package; Plummer, 2014), separately for the datasets
of both experiments. More detail regarding these analyses is provided in the supplementary
material at the end of this chapter.
Figure 3.3 depicts the resulting priming kernel estimates for up to 15 trials, constructed from
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the posterior distributions of the population parameters. The 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are
rather wide due to the small sample sizes, but note that in all cases priming effects have largely
faded after ≈8 trials. This matches well with the qualitative estimate given in the earliest study
of priming of pop-out (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) and several studies since (see Kristja´nsson
& Campana, 2010a for a review). To inspect whether long-term effects like the effect explored
in our experiments could ever arise from such memory kernels, the sum of the predicted kernel
values at indices 8–100 was computed, reflecting the cumulative priming effect that a lengthy
sequence of repetitions that lasted from 100 to 8 trials in the past would have. For both datasets,
this sum was 0.02 on average, and the CIs were never higher than 0.12 (Experiment 1: CI =
[0.00, 0.06]; Experiment 2: CI = [0.00, 0.12]). Since the the unit of this number is z, this can be
interpreted as a very small effect. For comparison, the predicted priming effect at index 2 alone
(i.e. priming from 2 trials back) far outweighs this cumulative sum (for Experiment 1: M =
0.27, CI = [0.07, 0.44]; for Experiment 2: M = 0.16, CI = [0.01, 0.34] in Experiment 2 ). Similar
outcomes are predicted when the original parameters of Martini are assumed (0.19 at index 2,
versus 0.098 for trials 8–100).
In order to determine to what extent our data support a model with multiple time scales,
note that model M2 is equivalent to model M1 when both timescales τi have the same value.
Therefore, we expressed the posterior estimate of the difference between both time scale as
an effect size (δ), and the posterior distribution of this effect size allowed us to compute a
Bayes factor comparing both models (see Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal & Grasman, 2010).
For both datasets, a slight preference for M1 was observed. (Experiment 1: BF1,2 = 2.00,
Experiment 2: BF1,2 = 2.53). These results do not rule out a potential contribution of a
second exponential. Nevertheless, it is striking that although the priming kernels were produced
by optimizing the model with two time scales, a model with a single time scale described the
present data at least as well.
3.4 Discussion
In this study, we have explored whether prolonged repetition of one target type in a singleton
search task would yield long-term facilitation effects, as reported by Brascamp et al. (2011). In
two experiments we failed to find such facilitation. Instead, the results were largely in accordance
with a mathematical model put forward by Martini (2010), which describes priming of pop-out
as subject to swift decay, with only a minor contribution of longer-lasting priming. In fact,
the present data are well explained by a simple model of the decay of priming with a single
timescale, without a longer-term component.
How can these findings be reconciled with those reported by Brascamp et al. (2011)? As noted
above, we uncovered a coding error in the original experiment file when we re-examined the
original workflow as part of the present project. This error might provide an explanation for
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Figure 3.3: The memory kernels of priming in both experiments. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals
inferred from the posterior predictive distributions. Note the similarity to the memory kernel inferred by
Martini (2010), despite the vastly different approach used to infer the kernel and differing experimental
designs. The predicted time course of priming effects is limited to the short term: for both datasets, priming
effects drop to baseline over the course of approximately eight trials.
the reported results of that original experiment, and is described in more detail in an erratum
to the original paper, submitted in combination with the present study (Brascamp, Pels &
Kristja´nsson, 2015).
These results indicate that, at least in simple pop-out tasks like the one studied here, priming
can be explained as an effect of short-term feature weighting (Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a;
Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Lee et al., 2009; Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Kruijne & Meeter,
2015). According to this account, selecting a singleton target among distractors on one trial
alters ‘attentional weights’ to favor the target feature(s) over those of the distractor on the
next trial. These weight changes are short-lived: priming has been shown to fade after several
(five to eight) interfering trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010). Additionally,
priming effects subside over time in the absence of any intervening trials, albeit more slowly
than in the presence of intervening trials (≈90s, Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000). Results from a
recent thorough exploration (Thomson & Milliken, 2012b) revealed that both passive decay over
time and interference from other trials attenuate priming effects. Discussing their results, they
proposed that decay and interference potentially operate on dissociable time scales, referring
to Martini’s fast component reflecting decay and slow component reflecting interference. They
noted the short- and long-term effects initially reported by Brascamp et al. (2011) might have
reflected this dissociation. The results of this study do not speak to whether decay or interference
underlies the decrease in priming, but it does suggest that this decrease cannot be divided into
two processes with very different time courses.
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In light of present findings, what is the memory mechanism producing priming of pop-out? We
propose that a simple, straightforward mechanism may suffice: after completing a trial, activity
(or excitability) of neuronal populations that represented the target features will be briefly
sustained. Neurophysiological evidence that sustained intertrial activity in feature-selective
areas is involved in priming has been found in MEG-, fMRI-, and TMS-studies (de Lange,
Rahnev, Donner & Lau, 2013; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson & Cohen, 2006; Campana, Cowey,
Casco, Oudsen & Walsh, 2007; Kristja´nsson et al., 2007). Circumstantial evidence for this view
can also be found in studies of recordings in macaque frontal eye fields (Bichot & Schall, 2002;
Fecteau & Munoz, 2003) and in human eye movements (Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013): both
showed that the previous trial affects visual signals, before they reach the oculomotor system,
suggesting that the previous trial leaves a lingering trace affecting its bottom-up processing.
Sustained intertrial activity as the cause of intertrial priming would be subject to both temporal
decay as well as interference from intermediate trials, in line with the conclusions of Thomson
& Milliken (2012b). However, these processes would be intertwined, and would both contribute
to rapid decay in conventional priming of pop-out tasks. This is illustrated in the experiments
here, where only a few intervening trials were sufficient to abolish accumulated repetition effects
from the build-up sequence. Note that the view outlined above predicts that interference might
be limited when intervening trials have very different features, a manipulation that has been
shown to produce longer-lasting priming effects (Thomson & Milliken, 2012a, but see Thomson
& Milliken, 2013 for a different account).
3.5 Conclusion
The data from these experiments contradict earlier findings from Brascamp et al. (2011): in
the present experiments there was no evidence of appreciable long-term priming effects, and
the priming effects decreased over the course of 5 to 8 trials as has been consistently found
before. We conclude that such swift decay supports the view that priming of pop-out results
from sustained intertrial activity that decays both over time and over interfering trials.
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Supplemental Material
3.A Optimization, Graphical models and MCMC sampling
To optimize the memory kernels for each participant, we initially assumed the kernels were
best described by a function with two timescales. For every participant, we optimized these
parameters on simulations of our experiments, minimizing the error between the predicted and
observed zRTs – that is, each participants’ build-up, intervening and test-sequence zRTs. All
analyses outlined in the main text and below have been repeated using memory kernel estimates
that were optimized on the test-sequence alone. We do not report the outcomes of these test-
sequence-only analyses because they were were virtually identical. Five optimizations were ran,
each with the mean parameters reported in Martini (2010) with a small random variation as
starting values. The five resulting kernels were averaged par participant.
The hierarchical model that was used to obtain a predictive estimate of the kernel is depicted in
in Figure 3.A.1. Distributions for the gain parameters (wi) and timescale parameters (τ1,∆τ)
are truncated to be positive (T (0,∞)), This reflects the hypothesis that a short and a longer
process both contribute to facilitated response times. The population parameter distributions
are truncated Normal distributions, with priors chosen to be relatively flat and unbiased. Note
that the gaussian distribution is parameterized by mean µ and precision λ = 1/σ2
The critical parameter to the Bayes Factor is δ, which corresponds to µ∆τ expressed as an effect
size. µ∆τ reflects the difference between the two time scales, and thus gives insight into whether
there are two time scales (large difference) or just one (zero or negligable difference). δ and µ∆τ
are related via µ∆τ = δ × σ = δ ×
√
1/λ. δ Has a half-Cauchy prior constrained to positive
values.
All reported results are based on samples from five MCMC chains of 50,000 samples each, with
a thinning interval of 25.
3.B Posterior distributions
Figure 3.B.1A depicts the posterior distribution of δ. We also plot the logspline nonparametric
density estimates that were used to compute the Bayes Factors. Figure 3.B.1B depicts the
posterior distribution of µ∆τ , which can be readily compared to the difference assumed by
Martini (2010, dashed line) .
Because µ∆τ was heavily skewed towards zero, the marginal distributions of w1 and w2 can not
be readily interpreted: as noted in the main text, when δτ ≈ 0, both gain parameters are free
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t ∈ [1− 40]
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δ
∀ participants
δ ∼Cauchy(0, 1)T (0,∞)
µ∆τ ← δ ×
√
1/λ∆τ
for x ∈ {w1, w2, τ1,∆τ} :
µx ∼ Gaussian(0, 0.01)T (0,∞)
λx ∼ Gamma(0.001, 0.001)
x ∼ Gaussian(µx, λx)T (0,∞)
τ2 ←τ1 + ∆τ
P
′
t ←w1e
−t/τ1 + w2e−t/τ2
Pt ∼Gaussian(P ′t, λp)
λp ∼Gamma(0.001, 0.001)
Figure 3.A.1: Hierarchical Bayesian Graphical model for priming with two time scales. The shaded node reflects
the observed value of the estimated memory kernel; the diamond nodes are deterministic and fully determined
by their parent nodes.
to vary and interchangeable. To still offer some insight in the characteristics of the priming
gains in these experiments, we have plotted the posterior distribution of the sum of both gain
parameters (Figure 3.B.2). On average, these gains summed to w = 0.89 with the average decay
rate τ = 1.68 in Experiment 1; and w = 0.54 with an average τ = 1.73 in Experiment 2. For
comparison, the average values reported by Martini (2010) were w1 = 1.33, w2 = 0.14, τ1 =
0.79, τ2 = 4.2.
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Figure 3.B.1: Density histograms illustrating posterior distributions of the difference between the timescales in
the two-component model (M2). Both distributions are clearly skewed towards zero, which is evidence that
priming is best described with a single time scale. A Density of the effect size δ. The solid line indicates the
logspline nonparameteric density estimate that was used in the computation of the Bayes Factor. B Density
of the difference µ∆τ . The dashed vertical line indicates the difference inferred in (Martini, 2010)
Figure 3.B.2: Density histograms illustrating posterior distributions of the sum of both gains in the two-
component model.
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Memory affects visual search, as is particularly evident from findings that when target
features are repeated from one trial to the next, selection is faster. Two views have
emerged on the nature of the memory representations and mechanisms that cause
these intertrial priming effects: independent feature weighting versus episodic retrieval
of previous trials. Previous research has attempted to disentangle these views focusing
on short term effects. Here, we illustrate that the episodic retrieval models make
the unique prediction of long-term priming: biasing one target type will result in
priming of this target type for a much longer time, well after the bias has disappeared.
We demonstrate that such long-term priming is indeed found for the visual feature
of color, but only in conjunction search and not in singleton search. Two follow-up
experiments showed that it was the kind of search (conjunction versus singleton) and
not the difficulty, that determined whether long-term priming occurred. Long term
priming persisted unaltered for at least 200 trials, and could not be explained as the
result of explicit strategy. We propose that episodic memory may affect search more
consistently than previously thought, and that the mechanisms for intertrial priming
may be qualitatively different for singleton and conjunction search.
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4.1 Introduction
A powerful factor determining where we look and what we attend is where we have looked and
what we have attended before. The effects of our previous overt and covert shifts of attention
on our current ones are often investigated by comparing visual search in which targets must
be found with either the same features as on previous trials, or with different features. When
compared to feature switch trials, feature repetitions have been found to shorten response times
(RT) and decrease the amount of errors (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). In addition, repetitions
cause shorter saccade latencies (Becker, 2008; McPeek et al., 1999) and bias target selection
(Brascamp et al., 2011; Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013). Interestingly, such repetition effects
have been found to affect vision largely out of the observers control (Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994; Huang et al., 2004; Hillstrom, 2000). Collectively, these effects are called intertrial priming.
A wealth of priming research over the past decades (Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010b) has as of
yet failed to yield consensus on its underlying mechanisms. The primary dichotomy (Thomson
& Milliken, 2013) appears to be between the feature-weighting account of intertrial priming and
the episodic retrieval account. The feature-weighting account entails that the processing of a
trial enhances the activation of those visual features that identify the target, and in addition
may suppresses distractor features. This activation effectively changes how these features are
‘weighted’ on the next trial, which yields repetition benefits on subsequent trials that will decay
over time. The feature-weighting view is intuitive, and the idea that trials can produce ‘lingering’
activity that affects subsequent performance is supported by several neurophysiological findings
(Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a; Yeung et al., 2006; de Lange et al., 2013). Similarly, the idea
that such weighting is subject to decay is in line with the observation that facilitation effects
have been found to rapidly disappear over the course of some 5-8 trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994; Hillstrom, 2000), and that long intertrial intervals can attenuate or abolish priming effects
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000; Thomson & Milliken, 2012b). Note that different properties of a
search trial might independently contribute to priming effects: most notably, repetitions of the
response, position, and target-defining feature on a search trial might independently produce
repetition benefits or switch costs (Meeter & Olivers, 2006; Lamy et al., 2010; Tollner et al.,
2008; Gokce et al., 2014). A mathematical implementation of the feature weighting account has
been put forward by Maljkovic & Martini (2005), and updated in (Martini, 2010).
In contrast to the independent feature weighting view, the episodic retrieval account assumes
that every trial is stored as a bound episodic memory, and that automatic retrieval of these
memories affects performance on the current trial. Retrieval of matching trial traces facilitates
the current trial, whereas nonmatching traces do not. Evidence supporting episodic retrieval
over the feature weighting account came from the finding that repetitions of target features are
not independent, but interact with intertrial repetitions or switches of response-features or task-
irrelevant features, causing super- and under-additive priming effects respectively (Hillstrom,
2000; Huang et al., 2004). Evidence for this account is not limited to such interaction effects:
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recently, Thomson & Milliken (2013) reported that when trials were occasionally paired with a
different task, these ‘rare’ trials would prime the next rare trial, 16 trials into the future. Not
only does this ‘context dependence’ in priming contrast with independent feature weighting, but
the prolonged time course of this effect also highlights the link with associative retrieval from
memory.
Of note, these two views need not be mutually exclusive, and attempts to reconcile them through
hybrid accounts have been put forward. For example, Lamy, Zivony & Yashar (2011) found that
the critical interaction effects that gave rise to the episodic retrieval view were only found
when the task was difficult. To explain this finding, they emhpasized the dissociation between
perceptual- and response priming, and concluded that feature weighting always affected the
early perceptual stage – but that only when the task was difficult, observers would employ a
strategy involving retrieval, which affects the response stage. A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson (2011)
similarly found that the interaction between the target feature and irrelevant features in the
displays only appeared when search was difficult. They too proposed an account of priming
that involves multiple stages (cf. Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010b), and that episodic retrieval
of past trials affected ‘late’ stages, yielding these interactions.
These effects are thus explained within both hybrid and episodic retrieval accounts by reference
to retrieval of past trial episodes. However, debate has focused very little on how these results
relate to the mechanisms of episodic retrieval. For example, an unexplored issue is whether
episodic retrieval – which is generally probed at large time scales – can be reconciled with
the observed time course of priming. To explore this issue, we have simulated priming exper-
iments with a mathematical model of episodic memory (SAM, Search of Associative Memory,
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988; Raaijmakers, 2003), which imple-
ments some very general associative memory principles: (a) memory for an item is acquired
by forming traces in which the item is associated with the temporal context active during ac-
quisition. (b) The activation of such traces by the context active at retrieval determines the
probability that an item is retrieved; and (c) context randomly changes over time, gradually
rendering items less accessible. We subjected SAM to sequences of items that reflected search
displays with alternating target colors. The details and results of these simulations are reported
as supplementary material; to summarize, SAM could to a surprising extent capture results
from multiple experiments exploring the time-course of priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994,
Experiment 5; Brascamp et al., 2011, Experiment 1). Its fits were comparable to those of a
descriptive feature-weighting model with only short-term facilitation (Martini, 2010).
Further simulations with SAM revealed a prediction unique to the episodic retrieval account:
as learning occurs on each presentation, more associated traces are formed for frequent than for
infrequent items. In visual search, this implies that if one kind of target occurred more often
than another, this results in easier retrieval of the associated trials, which results in stronger
priming. This difference in priming will then persist long after the trial imbalance has disap-
peared (Figure 4.1A). This prediction of long-term priming found with SAM can be generalized
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Figure 4.1: Prediction of priming effects by an episodic retrieval model (SAM, A) contrasted with the short-term
feature weighting model of Martini (2010, B). Both panels show the results of one simulation of an experiment
similar to the ones presented in this paper. Data points indicate the facilitation through priming predicted by
both models (down indicates stronger priming) for either of the two colors in each block. Shading indicates
the distribution of target colors in each block: in the bias block (2), one target color predominates, but in
the neutral blocks both appear equally often. In both models, intertrial repetitions result in priming, but
where the descriptive model predicts no differences between colors in all Neutral blocks, SAM predicts that
bias blocks lead to durably faster responses for targets with the biased color.
to any episodic retrieval account, as it results from instance-based learning, a mechanism shared
by most models and theories on memory retrieval, which would probably make a similar predic-
tion (for example Grossberg, 2013; Friston, 2005; Anderson, 2007, as well as applied to visual
search: Navalpakkam & Itti, 2005; Logan, 2002; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
In contrast, feature weighting accounts of priming as currently defined would not predict such
long-term effects, as feature weighting is explicitly or implicitly assumed to be short-lived or
subject to decay (Lee et al., 2009; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000; Chun & Nakayama, 2000;
Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010b). Although feature weighing accounts predict that a biased
feature presentation results in cumulating priming effects Maljkovic & Martini (2005), simula-
tions using the model of Martini (2010) showed that these effects would not persist after the
bias has disappeared (Figure 4.1B).
In this study, we present experiments to directly test these contrasting predictions: If feature
biases yield robust facilitation that persists once the bias is long gone, this is in line with
the predictions of memory retrieval, and thereby agree with an episodic retrieval account of
priming. However if no long-term priming effects are found, this supports the idea that priming
merely relies on a short lived facilitation mechanism. We first explore this question using the
traditional priming of pop-out paradigm (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). Additionally, since
previous research has described that episodic retrieval only affect search when it is difficult
and RTs are high, we also investigated the long-term priming prediction in a more difficult
conjunction search task. We hypothesized that if retrieval is indeed heuristically recruited when
search is difficult, possible long-term effects would be more pronounced in this task.
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To preview the results: both tasks displayed comparable short-term priming effects. Long-term
effects were absent in the simple singleton search task. In the conjunction search task, however,
strong and persistent effects of the bias block propagated into the neutral blocks, producing
long-term priming.
4.2 Experiment 1A and 1B
4.2.1 Method
Materials and Stimuli Stimuli were presented on a 21in. LCD monitor at 120Hz, in a dimly
lit room at 70cm viewing distance controlled by a chinrest. Each trial started with a central
white (56.6cd/m2) fixation dot on a black (0.5cd/m2) background for 1200–1700ms (randomly
determined for each trial). Fixation was followed by a search display on the same background.
In Experiment 1A, the search display (Figure 4.2A) contained three diamonds (sized 2.4◦×2.4◦)
at locations randomly chosen from 12 equidistant positions at 4.05◦eccentricity, none adjacent
to another. Search displays contained two red (12.8cd/m2) and one green (13.3cd/m2) diamond
or vice versa. All diamonds were missing a corner at the top or at the bottom (cut off at one-
eighth of their height). Participants indicated which corner of the singleton colored diamond
was missing.
In Experiment 1B (Figure 4.2B), stimuli were distributed randomly over a 7× 7 grid spanning
17.1◦ × 17.1◦ excluding the center 3 × 3 positions (4.8◦ × 4.8◦). Stimuli were diamonds (as in
1A) or distractor shapes: triangles pointing up or down, rectangles, or circles, all with similar
surface areas. Stimuli were colored red, green (as in 1A), or blue (13.1cd/m2). The target was
a red or green diamond, and the 21 distractors were: twice all combinations of the three colors
and distractor shapes, two blue diamonds, and one distractor item with a randomly chosen
shape, colored red or green opposite to the target color. Features in all dimensions were thus
approximately balanced in each display. Participants were instructed to search for the red or
green diamond and respond to the missing corner.
In both experiments, participants responded by pressing ‘U’ or ‘D’ on a keyboard to indicate
whether the missing corner was at the top (Up) or bottom (Down) of the target diamond. After
the response the display was cleared and the next trial started. Error responses were followed
by a 90ms tone.
Design and Procedure Both experiments started with 10 practice trials with random target
colors, followed by alternating ‘Neutral’ and ‘Bias’ blocks, 200 trials each (see Figure 4.2F). In
Neutral blocks, targets were randomly red or green on 50% of the trials. Repetition- and switch-
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Figure 4.2: Stimuli and Design of the experiments. A,B An illustrative singleton search display from Experiment
1A and a conjunction search display from Experiment 1B, respectively. Note that in the experiments, the
background was black rather than grey. C,D,E Exemplary illustrations of the stimuli used in Experiments
1A; 1&2B; 2A, respectively. In each, the target is the green(er) diamond in the top row. F General design,
with alternating Neutral and Biased blocks. To explore the evolution of long-term effects, we divided neutral
blocks of interest into sequential sub-blocks (I, II and III). Experiment 1A had two more blocks that continued
this pattern. Participant breaks were distributed to not coincide with block boundaries.
trials were balanced per block, one occurring at most 5% more often than the other. In Bias
blocks, 80% of the trials had the bias color as the target (red or green, counterbalanced across
participants). Experiment 1A had seven blocks, Experiment 1B had five to compensate for
longer search durations. Both experiments took about one hour.
Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible while maintaining high accuracy
(≈ 90%). Every 125 trials, participants had a break and received feedback regarding their
accuracy and average RT. These breaks did not overlap with the transitions from bias to neutral
blocks, to prevent that these transitions were conspicuous.
To explore potential long-term priming effects on a finer timescale than whole blocks of 200
trials, we also split each Neutral block following a bias block into three sequential sub-blocks
(I,II and III), each 66 or 67 trials. This allowed us to explore whether, for example, a long term
priming effect was present, but only immediately after the bias, or whether it would not decay
at all throughout the neutral blocks. Additionally, we were interested in participants’ subjective
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experience of the bias manipulation, and to what extent this could underly any observed long-
term effects. We inquired about participants’ experience immediately after completing the
experiment, and asked them to indicate on a line what they thought the distribution of red and
green target trials had been. We rescaled these estimates to a [−1, 1] domain, where positive
numbers indicate estimates in the direction of the bias, and -1 and 1 reflect having observed
only one target color.
Participants Participants in all experiments were students from the Vrije Universiteit Ams-
terdam. All reported normal color vision, and otherwise normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
They were naive with respect to the purpose of the experiment or the trial imbalance manip-
ulation. Participants received course credits or monetary compensation. Informed consent was
obtained prior to the experiment, in accordance with the guidelines of the Helsinki declaration.
Data were collected until the stopping criterion was met (discussed below). Participants were
excluded from analysis beforehand if they were incorrect on over 15% of all trials in the exper-
iment (none in these two experiments), or if their average RT was more than 3SD away from
the group mean (one in Experiment 1A). In Experiment 1A data from 31 students was included
(26 female, ages 18–28, M = 21.4, SD = 3.1). Experiment 1B had 26 participants (16 female,
ages 17–30, M = 20.7, SD = 3.3).
Trial inclusion and color-correction For the analyses, only the data from neutral blocks
were considered. We discarded trials immediately following breaks, error trials and outlier
trials (RTs over 2.5SD away from the participant mean). These criteria discarded 7.7% of 800
Neutral trials in Experiment 1A (on average per participant 4.3% errors and 2.7% outliers). In
Experiment 1B this was 6.1% of 600 Neutral trials (2.9% errors and 2.7% outliers).
Our goal was to investigate whether bias blocks facilitated search on subsequent trials with the
bias color in subsequent neutral blocks. To obtain a measure isolating this effect, we attempted
to correct for performance differences for both colors that participants might have a priori.
Such differences would be reflected in the data from the first (Neutral) block. We attempted
to correct for these color differences while taking into account the learning effect over blocks.
First, we standardized RTs separately per block via a z-transform (zRT = RT−MSD ). In the first
block, we then computed the difference in zRT of bias- and other- color trials compared to the
mean. We adjusted for this a priori difference in the z-scores of both trial types in all blocks.
The resulting color-corrected zRTs are used in the analyses outlined below.
The zRTs do not convey information on overall RTs per task. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we therefore
plot values after they have been transformed back to RTs via an inverse z-transform, again using
the mean and standard deviation per block. Similar figures of uncorrected RTs are provided as
supplementary material.
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Statistical Analysis To quantify the evidence for a long-term priming effect as well as evi-
dence against it, we analyzed our data with Bayes Factors (BF ). These quantify the relative
evidence for statistical models; for example, BFA,B = 3 implies the data are three times more
likely under model MA than under model MB (which inversely implies BFB,A = 13 ). We used
the ‘BayesFactor’ R-package to compute BF s for repeated measures analysis of variance-designs
through Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling (Morey & Rouder, 2014; Rouder et al.,
2009; Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder, Morey, Speckman & Province, 2012).
We collapsed data across post-bias neutral blocks, and computed the BF among four models,
explaining zRT based on factors ‘repetition type’ (feature repetition- or switch trials), ‘target
type’ (bias-colored trials and other-colored trials) and ‘sub-block’ (I, II, III):
 M1 : repetition type;
 M2 : M1 + target type;
 M3 : M1 + target type × sub-block; and
 M4 : M1 + target type + target type × sub-block.
All models included ‘participant’ as a random factor. The four models reflect different hypotheses
on long-term priming effects: all models include the simplest model (M1) that assumes only
(short-term) repetition effects of the preceding trial . Of primary interest was whether the data
support an additional main effect of target type, indicating persistent long-term priming (M2).
A third hypothesis explores whether the bias might have a long-lasting facilitating effect, but
that this dissipates over the neutral block, modeled by an interaction effect of target type ×
sub-block (M3). Model M4 explored evidence for both the main effect (from M2) and the
interaction from (M3). A definition of and motivation for the priors placed on all effects in
these models can be found in (Rouder & Morey, 2012). All reported standardized effect sizes
and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) are estimated from a posterior distribution based on 105
MCMC samples.
For both experiments data were collected until either one of M2,3,4 was preferred over M1, or
M1 over all models, with BF > 10.0 – provided that the underlying model parameters were in
line with the hypothesis they reflected. For example, if the best fit of M2 would attribute a
long-term priming effect to the other color rather than the bias color, it would not be in line with
the long-term priming hypothesis. In such cases one-sided Bayesian t-tests were used, collapsing
the data over all conditions to contrast bias- with other-colored trials, to reject or accept the
models, again at BF > 10.0. In the results, only the BF between the two best-fitting models is
given, unless otherwise indicated. Note than unlike significance testing using p-values, Bayesian
inference does not depend on the assumption of a predefined sample size. As a result, collecting
data until preset criteria on the relative evidence for statistical models are met is not only a valid
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Figure 4.3: (Caption on the next page)
way of hypothesis testing, but arguably a preferable one (Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers,
Wetzels, Borsboom, Maas & Kievit, 2012).
Due to the instructions and inclusion criteria, accuracy in this task was expected to be high,
and no particular effects were expected due to ceiling performance. Accuracies were analyzed
with the same models as RTs, but including a model that assumed no effects other than random
variation across participants (Mnull). Any further analyses will be introduced below as they are
employed.
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Figure 4.3: Color corrected RTs in Experiments 1A (left) and 1B (right). Shaded bars indicate relative target
color proportions in each block. Error bars reflect 95% Cousineau-Morey confidence intervals (Baguley, 2011).
The insets depict the evolution of the priming effect within neutral blocks, i.e. in sub-blocks I, II and III. A
In singleton search, the color bias speeds responses to the bias color, but only during the bias blocks. B In
conjunction search, the RT difference transfers to the neutral blocks, and does not decay within the neutral
block itself. C,D In both tasks, repetition and switch trials reveal short term priming, both before and after
the bias. In conjunction search an additional long-term priming effect is found after the bias.
4.2.2 Results
Experiment 1A
Long- and short-term priming following a bias RTs for both target colors over the
different blocks in Experiment 1A are depicted in Figure 4.3A . The plot reveals an overall
learning effect over blocks, as well as clear differences in performance for both colors in the
bias-blocks. Critically, the plot reveals no clear differences between both colors in the neutral
blocks, suggesting that the color bias had no long-lasting effect. The inset of Figure 4.3A shows
RTs for the different colors over sub-blocks. This plot shows that even early in the block (in
sub-block I), no difference is found. This again argues against a long-lasting priming effect.
In line with these observations, modelM1, including only short-term repetition effects, was best
supported by the data, with BF1,2 = 12.0. This argues against long-lasting effects induced by
the bias blocks. In accordance with past findings in similar tasks, we did find strong evidence
for short-term repetition effects: excluding them from the best fitting model (yielding M1−rep,
effectively Mnull) resulted in a BF1,1−rep > 1000. Repetition had strong benefits on RT, indi-
cated by the distribution of the difference of repetition versus switch effects (M = 0.44, CI =
[0.40, 0.49]). Figure 4.3C illustrates these repetition effects, and suggests that they are similar
before and after the bias manipulation.
Accuracy As expected, overall accuracies were high (M = 95.7%, SD = 2.5%). The best model
to predict accuracies was M1, suggesting performance on repetition trials was slightly better
than on switch trials (effect size M = 0.008, CI = [0.002, 0.015]). However, with BF1,null = 2.3,
evidence for this repetition effect was not convincing.
Target Color distribution estimates Although no bias effects were found, participants
subjective experience was in general in line with their feature bias, judging by their distribution
estimates (M = 0.09, SD = 0.15). One sided Bayesian t-tests revealed strong evidence that
scores were overall higher than 0 (BF+,0 = 34.9). We explored whether participants’ experience
of the bias could serve as a predictor for their long-term priming effect (the difference between
bias color zRTs and other color zRTs), but a Bayesian regression analysis (testing β 6= 0) showed
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evidence for the absence of a correlation, both when effects are collapsed over all neutral blocks
(BF0,β = 5.2) as when only the last block was considered (BF0,β = 5.2).
Experiment 1B
Long- and short-term priming following a bias The pattern of RT results of Experiment
1B is shown in Figure 4.3B. Again, performance increased over blocks, and differences between
colors during the bias blocks are clear. Critically, this color difference now appears to persist in
subsequent neutral blocks, suggesting a robust long-term priming effect. Moreover, the difference
between colors is consistent across sub-blocks, as depicted in the inset, which indicated that the
long-term priming effect did not dissipate over the course of a neutral block.
The analysis for Experiment 1B was in line with these observations, as modelM2, which includes
main effects of repetition- and target type, vastly outperformed the other models. The BF2,1 >
1000 suggested very strong evidence for a main effect of target type in this task. M2 was also
preferred overM4 with BF2,4 = 27.5, so the model allowing different levels of long-term priming
in different sub blocks is inferior to one with a constant long-term priming effect throughout the
neutral blocks. Thus, long-term priming was thus robust and did not decay when the feature bias
was removed. The posterior distribution ofM2 was in line with the assumption that short-term
intertrial priming effects arose in this task (difference repetition- and switch effects: M = 0.20,
CI = [0.15, 0.26]). Omitting repetition effects from M2 (yielding model M2−rep) resulted in
BF2,2−rep > 1000.
Repetition effects were found both before and after the bias, and are shown in Figure 4.3D. Note
that the size of the long-term priming effects is comparable to the size of the short-term priming
effect. This is similarly indicated by the posterior of M2 (difference bias- and other effects:
M= 0.16, CI = [0.11, 0.22]). We conducted a post-hoc exploration to investigate whether short-
and long-term priming interacted. To this end, model M2 was extended with an interaction
term for repetition and target color (M2+rep×tar). The relative BF2,2+rep×tar = 13.8, thus
strongly supporting the absence of an interaction.
Accuracy In Experiment 1B, overall accuracies were again very high (M = 97.2%, SD =
2.3%). The same analysis as for Experiment 1A yielded strong support for the absence of any
accuracy effects, with BFnull,1 = 15.1.
Target Color distribution estimates Participants in Experiment 1B did, in general take
note of the bias manipulation judging by their distribution estimates (M = 0.12, SD = 0.10;
One-sided t-test: BF+,0 > 1000). Nevertheless, subjective experience of the trial distribution
did not predict their resulting long-term priming effect. A Bayesian regression analysis, again,
revealed no evidence for a correlation between distribution estimates and the long-term priming
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effect (BF0,β = 4.4 considering all blocks, and BF0,β = 4.8 considering only the last block).
This suggested that long-term priming resulted from implicit memory, rather than an explicit
strategy to prioritize search for either color.
4.2.3 Discussion
In both Experiments 1A and B, we found strong effects of target repetition on search per-
formance, with repetition of the target color resulting in shorter response times. However, in
Experiment 1B, we additionally found strongly speeded responses to colors that had been biased.
This long-term priming effect did not decay throughout a Neutral block of 200 trials, and did
not appear to correlate with the extent to which participants subjectively experienced the bias.
These two findings suggest the robust facilitation was not due to strategic prioritizing of either
color. The findings from Experiment 1B correspond to the prediction from SAM (Figure 4.1A),
strongly suggesting that memory retrieval affected search as proposed by the episodic retrieval
view. Surprisingly, however, in singleton search (Experiment 1A) there was no long-lasting
memory influence; immediately after a bias block ended, the performance difference between
both colors disappeared, in line with the (short-term) feature-weighting view (Figure 4.1B).
What underlies this discrepancy? One possibility is that this finding extends the findings sup-
porting hybrid accounts of priming, where it is proposed that episodic retrieval is a heuristic
recruited when search is difficult (Lamy et al., 2011; A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011). However,
the different nature of the two search tasks may warrant a different explanation. In singleton
search, targets are defined by deviating from the distractors, and can be found through ‘bottom-
up’ feature guidance, regardless of the actual color of the target. In conjunction search, targets
are never defined by merely deviating in a single dimension: the conjunction of features – in
this case, being red or green, and diamond-shaped – is crucial to the task. Under these circum-
stances, ‘top-down’ attention is needed to identify the target. It might very well be that only
when this exact identity of the target is relevant to the search process, memory traces that are
laid down during the search process will differ for both target colors. If no differentiable memory
traces are formed, as might be the case in singleton search, automatic retrieval of previous trial
episodes would not facilitate the search for either color over the other, and thus not evoke a
long-term priming effect.
Experiments 2A and B sought to disentangle which of these explanations could best account for
the difference in the presence and absence of long-term priming effects observed here. Experi-
ment 2A involved a variation of singleton search, which was rendered inefficient by using highly
reduced color contrast and many more distractors than in Experiment 1A. Note that with such
low color contrast targets will not ‘pop-out’ and search was expected to be inefficient. This
would yield high RTs, but nevertheless the target’s identity was task-irrelevant. Experiment
2B was an easier variant of Experiment 1B, with less distractors more densely distributed over
the display. In both experiments, the number of distractors was varied to produce a broad,
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overlapping range of RTs, as well as to explore the search efficiency in both tasks.
The results favored the view that the type of search, and not its difficulty, determined whether
long-term priming was found: again, no long-term priming effects were found in singleton search,
whereas they were present and persistent in the conjunction search task.
4.3 Experiment 2A and 2B
4.3.1 Method
Materials and Stimuli Displays for Experiment 2A, inefficient singleton search, were mod-
eled after Experiment 1B (conjunction search), but differed in set size and stimulus colors. Set
size was either 11 (three of each distractor shape, one distractor diamond and one target di-
amond) or 21 (six of each shape, two distractor diamonds and one target). In both set size
conditions, the target was a singleton only in the color dimension. All distractors were of one
color, and the target was a diamond with a deviant color. Two colors with low contrast (Figure
4.2E) were determined by expressing ‘red’ and ‘green’ from Experiment 1 in HSI color space (0,
255, 161 and 120, 255, 101 respectively), equalizing intensity and reducing hue distance to 10%,
i.e. (54, 255, 101) for ‘red’ and (65, 255, 101) for ‘green’ (on a 0–255 scale).
In Experiment 2B, efficient conjunction search, displays were composed of the same stimuli as in
Experiment 1B, with set sizes at either six or nine items. Specifically, each display contained the
target diamond, one blue distractor diamond and four or seven non-diamond shapes, dependent
on the set size. Every display thus contained two diamonds, all colors were balanced on each
trial and each shape occured at least once (in the six-item condition) or twice (in the nine-item
condition). Stimuli were randomly distributed over twenty-four equidistant locations on a circle
at 11.23◦ eccentricity, with no stimulus immediately adjacent to another.
Participants again indicated whether the singleton colored diamond (in 2A) or the red or green
diamond (2B) had a notch at the top or bottom. After the experiment, we again inquired about
their experience of the bias manipulation.
Design and Procedure The design of both experiments was identical to that of Experiments
1A and 1B. As an additional consideration, the number of distractors (low or high) was coun-
terbalanced across target colors within each block. Experiments 2A had five blocks, 2B had
seven.
Participants In Experiment 2A, data from 41 new participants were included (38 female,
aged 18-27, M = 21.0, SD = 2.6, three participants discarded due to low accuracy), and 25 new
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participants were included in Experiment 2B (19 Female, aged 17-25, M = 20.9, SD = 2.5),
excluding none. All participants were recruited from the same pool as those for Experiments
1A and B, and were given identical treatment.
Trial inclusion and color correction Exclusion criteria for participants and trials were
identical to those in Experiment 1A and B. This led to discarding 7.7% of 600 trials in 2A (4.6%
errors and 2.5% outliers) and 6.3% in 2B (3.3% errors and 2.4% outliers). Analyses were again
based on color-corrected standardized RTs.
Statistical Analysis The statistical models considered were the same as M1−4 used for
Experiment 1A&B, but included an additional factor to explain the effect of the number of
distractors (with levels low or high). For the accuracy-analyses we additionally included models
Mnull,Mrep,Mdist,Mrep+dist to model the absence of effects, effects of repetition, the number
of distractors or their combination, respectively. The same stopping criteria for data collection
was used as in experiments 1A and B.
4.3.2 Results
Experiment 2A
Long- and Short-term priming effects following a bias Figure 4.4A illustrates the RTs
for both target colors over the different blocks in Experiment 2A. The pattern of results is similar
to that in Experiment 1A, in that the RT-benefits of the bias color seem restricted to the bias
block, and do not carry over to the subsequent Neutral blocks. Similarly, the sub-block data
shown in the inset does not support a persistent or slowly decaying facilitation within these
Neutral blocks.
The analysis for Experiment 2A is in line with these observations: the two best fitting models
wereM1 andM2, with BF2,1 = 2.5 which suggests neither model to be highly preferred over the
other. However, the posterior distribution forM2 suggests that zRTs were higher on bias-colored
trials than on other-colored trials (difference bias- and other- effects, M = −0.04), contrary to the
long-term priming hypothesis. One sided Bayesian t-tests on a facilitatory effect of the bias color
(Mbias) versus a facilitatory effect of the other color (Mother) versus no effect (M0), suggested a
null-effect and argued against a long-term priming effect (BF0,bias = 21.2, BF0,other = 4.4). The
posterior distribution of model M1 was furthermore in line with the assumed effects of short
term priming, as repetition trials and low-distractor trials resulted in lower RTs (difference low
and high number of distractor-effects: M= 0.13, CI= [0.09, 0.17]; difference repetition- and
switch effects: M= 0.30, CI= [0.26, 0.33]). Omitting either effect from M1 yielded an M1−x
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Figure 4.4: (Caption on the next page)
with BF1,1−x > 1000 for both factors. Repetition effects before and after the bias are illustrated
in Figure 4.4C.
Accuracy Overall accuracies in experiment 2A were comparable to those in Experiment 1A&B
(M = 95.7%, SD = 3.4%). The analysis on accuracies indicated that the best-fitting model
was Mdist, with BFdist,rep+dist = 14.0, suggesting that only the number of distractors had an
effect on accuracy. The posterior for Mdist was used to explore the effect size, and suggested
participants performed slightly more accurate when the number of distractors was lower: (effect
size: M = 0.013, CI = [0.006, 0.019]).
Target Color distribution estimates In Experiment 2A, there was no clear evidence whether
participants overall took note of the bias manipulation (M = 0.03, SD = 0.18): a one-sided
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Figure 4.4: Results for Experiments 2A (left) and 2B (right), as in Figure 4.3. Although the overall RTs in both
experiments overlap, the bias color had no effect in subsequent neutral blocks in difficult singleton search (A)
but was persistent in easy conjunction search (B). The insets reveal that again, long-term priming did not
change or decay within neutral blocks. C Again, singleton search shows strong intertrial priming effects on
both colors, unaffected by the bias block. D In conjunction search these effects are found both before and
after the bias blocks, but after the bias, in addition a long-term priming effect is found.
Bayesian t-test whether scores were greater than 0 yielded only limited evidence supporting
overall awareness, with BF0,+ = 2.4. More importantly, and in line with Experiments 1A and
1B, distribution estimates did not predict the resulting long-term priming effect (BF0,β = 5.7
considering all blocks, and BF0,β = 5.6 considering only the last block).
Experiment 2B
Long- and Short-term priming effects following a bias For Experiment 2B, again the
RTs for both target colors are plotted over blocks, in Figure 4.4B. Despite a large overall decrease
in reaction times, the pattern of results is largely similar to those of Experiment 1B, and the
bias color shows persistent RT-benefits throughout the neutral blocks. Across the sub-blocks,
again depicted in the inset, the average RTs-difference between both colors is largely consistent,
although it might have slightly decreased in sub-block C.
In the analysis, the best fitting model is M2, highly preferred over all other models. This
includes the second-best fitting model M4, with BF2,4 = 68.1 and, critically over model M1
with BF2,1 > 1000. In other words, the data offered strong support for the hypothesis of a
long-term priming effect that again is persistent throughout the neutral blocks. The size of
this long-term priming effect was indicated by the posterior (difference bias- and other- effects:
M= 0.09, CI = [0.06, 0.13]). The hypothesized effects of short term repetition and distractor
number were again supported as repetition trials and trials with fewer distractors produced
lower RTs (difference low and high number of distractor-effects: 95% CI= [0.33, 0.41], M= 0.37;
difference repetition- and switch effects: 95% CI= [0.27, 0.34], M= 0.31). Omitting either factor
from model M2 yields a BF2,0 > 1000 for both these factors.
Short-term priming effects are depicted in Figure 4.4D. Again, we explored whether long-term
priming interacted with short term priming, or whether they were additive. Model M2 was
extended with a term to express an interaction with repetition and target color (M2+rep×tar).
The BF2,2+rep×tar = 6.9 offered fairly strong evidence that again, no interaction took place.
Accuracy Overall accuracies in Experiment 2B were higher than in all other experiments,
(M = 96.7%, SD = 2.3%). The analysis on accuracies supported an absence of any effects on
accuracy, with BFnull,dist = 3.4, and BFnull,rep = 21.5, and higher BFs for comparisons with all
105
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing Chapter 4
other models.
Target Color distribution estimates Participants post-experiment distribution estimates
in Experiment 2B were in general in line with the bias manipulation (M = 0.14, SD = 0.11),
which was supported by the t-test (BF+,0 > 1000). The regression analysis again did not
support the presence of a positive correlation between these scores and the resulting bias effects:
(considering all blocks yielded minimal evidence for a negative slope. BFβ,0 = 2.5,Mβ=-0.88, CI
=[−1.7,−0.2]; considering only the last block did not yield conclusive evidence: BF0,β = 2.3).
Task difficulty and task types
Experiments 1A and 1B revealed a large discrepancy regarding the presence or absence of a long
term priming effect. Experiments 2A and 2B sought to further investigate this discrepancy, and
disentangle whether it could be attributed to the difference in task (singleton versus conjunction
search) or due to differences in task difficulty or overall RTs. Experiments 2A and 2B involved
a more difficult, inefficient search task and an easier conjunction search task. Both resulted in
highly similar overall RTs, and yet long-term priming was only observed in conjunction search,
not singleton search. Here, we present post-hoc analyses to further relate our findings to hybrid
accounts of priming.
Episodic short-term priming effects To explore whether our experiments yielded ‘episodic
priming’ effects as they have been previously reported (Huang et al., 2004; Hillstrom, 2000;
Lamy et al., 2011) we analyzed evidence for motor response repetition effects and interactions
between motor response- and target repetition. For each experiment, we used the ‘best’ model
found above as basis (Mb), and extended it with terms for motor response repetition (m),
an interaction between feature- and motor response repetition (f×m) or both (m+f×m), to
yield modelsMm,Mf×m,Mm+f×m. Again we only report comparisons between the best fitting
models.
The results of Experiment 1A strongly supported the presence of an interaction (BFf×m,b >
1000), yet not for a main effect of response repetition (BFf×m,m+f×m = 5.9). In line with
episodic priming effects, the interaction implied that feature repetition caused less facilitation
when they were paired with response switch than a repetition, and vice versa (effect size 95%
CI= [0.07, 0.14], M= 0.10). In Experiment 1B, no conclusive evidence on main effects of motor
response repetition were found, (BFb,m = 1.2), with inMm somewhat faster responses to motor
repetition trials (95% CI= [0.01, 0.10], M= 0.056). The interaction was absent (BFb,f×m =
11.5). In Experiment 2A, there was inconclusive evidence for a small main effect (BFm,b > 2.1,
effect size 95% CI= [0.02, 0.09], M= 0.05), but there was strong evidence that there was no
interaction BFm,m+f×m = 13.8 In Experiment 2B, there was very strong evidence for a main
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effect of response repetition 95% CI= [0.07, 0.14], M= 0.10), but again not for an interaction
(BFm,m+f×m = 121.5). Surprisingly, these results are not in line with the predicted role of
difficulty in these interactions: of these experiments, the singleton search task (1A) is clearly
the easiest, and yet it is the only experiment that yielded interaction effects. In the other
experiments, effects of motor response repetition were inconclusive or small, and independent
from feature repetition.
Long-term priming effects and difficulty: response times We further assessed to what
extent difficulty affected the long-term priming effects found in this study. Of note, different
definitions for ‘difficulty’ have been used in the literature: Lamy et al. (2011) noted the over-
all difficulty of the task expressed by RT determined whether participants utilized a strategy
involving memory retrieval;, whereas A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson (2011) suggested that within
experiments, only trials with high RTs yielded episodic priming effects implying episodic re-
trieval.
To test whether long-term priming was sensitive to the overall level of difficulty of the search
task we compared effect sizes from both conjunction search experiments 1B and 2B, where long-
term priming was found. We collapsed data from every neutral block following a bias for every
participant, and computed the overall color-corrected zRT difference between the target colors
after a bias to quantify the effect size. Unfortunately, the data could not confirm nor reject
whether the experiments differed in overall effect size (Bayesian one-sided t-test BF0,+ = 1.48).
Next, we explored whether RT differences within experiments affected long-term priming. Data
from all neutral blocks following a bias block were collapsed and divided into five quantiles
based on their RT. This was done separately for all four experiments. We then computed
the zRT-difference to both target colors in each bin. The results are plotted in Figure 4.5.
This figure again illustrates the qualitative difference between conjunction search and singleton
search: in both singleton search tasks, the difference between both target colors appears to
remain constant across bins; in both conjunction search tasks, long-term priming is small when
responses are quick, and gradually increases as RTs are slower. To quantify these trends, linear
models were constructed, testing whether average RTs in each bin could predict effect sizes
(Mβ versus M0). Indeed, both singleton search tasks showed evidence for the absence of
a correlation (BF0,β = 6.2 and 4.4 for Experiment 1A and 2A, respectively, BF0,β = 9.3
when both experiments are taken together). Both conjunction search tasks, on the other hand,
displayed evidence for such a correlation ((BFβ,0 = 4.0 for 1B and BFβ,0 = 120.5 for 2B,
BFβ,0 = 445.1 taken together). The slope coefficient β, estimated from the posteriors, differs
between both experiments (CI: [1.9, 11.7]× 10−5 for 1B and [8.9, 27.6]× 10−5 for 2B), for which
the straightforward reason might be that the slope of the curve in Figure 4.5 appears to flatten
for the highest RTs, which are much more common in Experiment 1B than 2B.
To summarize, the data from these four experiments do not directly support the view that
difficulty determines strategic or heuristic involvement of memory affecting search. The quantile
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Figure 4.5: The effect of response time on the long-term priming effect. For each participant in each experiment,
data was divided over five RT-bins. Data points reflect mean RTs in these bins and mean long-term priming
effects in these bins. Shading indicates Cousineau-Morey 95% confidence intervals in both dimensions, com-
puted separately per experiment. Long term priming effects are stronger with higher RTs, but only in the
conjunction search tasks.
analysis again emphasized the clear difference between the conjunction- and singleton- search
tasks: the latter showed no evidence for long-term priming effects, irrespective of the RT in each
trial. The analysis did reveal that where long-term priming effects were found, they appeared to
be larger with larger RTs. Nevertheless, further investigation would be necessary to determine
whether this warrants an explanation based on difficulty: it could very well be that each overt
and covert shift of attention in a trial was affected by long-term priming, and therefore trials
that require more shifts show an amplified long-term priming effect.
Long-term priming effects and difficulty: efficiency Another way to quantify search
difficulty is through the search slope, or search efficiency. The posterior distributions for Exper-
iments 2A and B suggest that adding more distractors had a much smaller effect on (z)RTs in
the singleton search task (2A) than the conjunction search task (2B). We conducted two analyses
to explore whether search efficiency would determine long-term priming. First, we conducted
two bayesian regression analyses exploring the correlation between search slope and effect size
for each participant (Mβ orM0) in Experiments 2A and 2B. These gave moderate evidence for
the absence of a correlation in both (BF0,β = 6.0 and 3.1, respectively).
Second, for Experiment 2A, we explored whether those participants who did engage in ‘true’
serial search – that is those who had a search slope of at least 10ms per item – would reveal any
evidence of long term priming. We conducted the same model comparison as in our primary
analyses on these participants. This did not lead to different conclusions: model M1 – with
only short term repetition and the number of distractors as factors – was still strongly preferred
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over any model including an effect of target type (BF1,2−4 > 15.6). So although the sample size
was relatively small (N=9) the data still confirmed the absence of a long-term priming effect.
Together, these analyses strongly suggest that when exploring search efficiency, again difficulty
of the task does not affect long-term priming effects, as was similarly concluded for the analyses
on overall RTs. Rather, the type of search task determines whether long-term priming effects
are found.
4.4 General discussion
Research has given rise to two very distinct views on how intertrial priming effects arise in visual
search: short-term feature weighting or episodic retrieval of previous trials. Previous research on
these accounts has mainly focused on whether features are primed independently or not. Here,
we have investigated the different predictions both accounts make regarding the time course of
priming. Using two computational models we derived differing predictions: only the episodic
retrieval view predicts that when one target feature occurs more frequently for a number of
trials, this can result in long lasting facilitation of this feature that persists throughout the
experiment.
The four visual search experiments presented here directly tested these predictions. In each
experiment, one of two possible target colors occurred on 80% of trials during Bias blocks,
while colors were equally likely in Neutral blocks. We found strong short-term intertrial priming
effects in all experiments. Long-term priming was not evident in a typical singleton search
task (Experiment 1A), but was clearly present in a conjunction search task (Experiment 1B):
Bias color trials were faster than those of the other color. This effect did not decrease over
the course of a 200-trial neutral block, suggesting a robust and persistent effect originating
from long term memory. Our results argue against a view of this effect originating from an
explicit strategy developed by participants, as we found evidence against a correlation between
subjectively estimated bias and the resulting effect size. The effects were subsequently replicated
with a more difficult singleton search task (Experiment 2A) and an easier conjunction search task
(Experiment 2B). Although previous research has suggested that episodic retrieval of previous
trials operates as a heuristic when search is ‘difficult’, this explanation alone could not account
for our findings. Rather, the type of search (singleton or conjunction search) seems crucial to
whether long term priming effects are found.
To our knowledge, this is the first time such a long lasting effect of a feature bias has been
explored. Effects of spatial biases have been reported as statistical learning (Geng & Behrmann,
2005), but it has rarely been explored whether these effects persist after the bias is taken away:
indeed, some have claimed statistical learning is at least partially, if not fully, the result of
immediate, short term repetitions (Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006; Kabata & Matsumoto, 2012).
Earlier explorations of the effects of feature biases on intertrial priming have focused on whether
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the predictability of repetitions and switch trials would modulate immediate repetition effects
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 2000; Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Geyer & Mu¨ller, 2009). Many of
these studies reported that increasing predictability had little to no effect on intertrial priming,
supporting the short term independent feature weighting account. Geyer & Mu¨ller (2009) did
find stronger immediate repetition priming when repetition of a feature was expected, and
interpreted this as top-down modulation of feature weighting. The long term priming effect
reported here, however, seems at odds with short-term independent feature weighting. However,
it was readily predicted by episodic memory models: the feature bias establishes a bias in long
term memory representations, which results in a persistent effect on search performance.
4.4.1 Memory retrieval and Long-term effects in different types of
search
A surprising aspect of our findings is that the long-term priming effect was limited to conjunction
search, suggesting the effects of memory are qualitatively different for these two search types.
Other evidence for this divergence is found in the literature: in the studies of Bichot, Schall &
others (1999); Bichot & Schall (1999), macaques performed conjunction search for targets that
were constant over a session. During those sessions, frontal eye field-neurons showed elevated
responses to targets, as well as to distractors that shared features with the target. Eye movement
patterns mirrored this neuronal selectivity. Crucially, similarly enhanced responses were also
found to stimuli that shared features with the target from the previous session – which had
been a day earlier. These results, mirroring our findings of long-term priming, were not found
in identical experiments with a singleton search task; only short-term priming, up to 10 trials
(Bichot et al., 1999).
What may underlie this divergence? As we have highlighted above, singleton search is generally
thought to be driven by local comparisons between the target and the distractors, and relies on
‘bottom-up’ contrasts rather than the search for a particular target identity. From an episodic
memory perspective, it could thus very well be that the memory traces that are formed in
such bottom-up searches do not include a selection process based on a particular feature. For
conjunction search tasks on the other hand, local feature comparisons are not sufficient – by
definition some distractors will share features with the target. Rather, the target is defined by
its identity (either a red or green diamond), and only an absolute match can lead to a successful
search. In these tasks, search is driven by top-down guidance for either of the two targets. As a
result, search with different target types may in this case lead to memory traces that include the
target feature and affect future searches. The task thus shapes what is encoded in the memory
traces. Such a view has also been advocated by Hommel (2004), Turk-Browne et al. (2005), and
by Thomson & Milliken (2013).
This hypothesis would agree with studies that did report long term effects in bottom-up singleton
search experiments. For example, Thomson & Milliken (2013) reported long-term contextual
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effects in singleton search, but only when a spatial configuration (the context) signaled that a
different task was to be performed; when the spatial configuration was irrelevant to the task, no
persistent effects were found (see also Thomson & Milliken, 2010). Another recent study (Becker
et al., 2014) showed that if observers initially search for a specific color among heterogeneous
distractors, this resulted in a persistent bias to attend stimuli with this color during a subsequent
singleton search task. If, however, the first task was to search for this color among homogeneous
distractors (i.e. singleton search), such long-term effects are not found. Thus, the target feature
was encoded in memory traces when it was key to finding the target (in heterogeneous displays),
but not when feature contrast alone was sufficient (in homogeneous displays). Note that the
second task was always singleton search, suggesting that the task parameters at encoding – and
not during retrieval – determined whether memory affected search. Leber et al. (2009) described
a similar finding as the acquisition of an ‘attentional set’ to search for singleton features in
general, versus searching for a particular unique feature.
Another effect that has been explained through associative retrieval of memory traces of previous
trials, is the contextual cueing effect (Chun & Jiang, 1998, 2003). There, repetition of the spatial
configurations of previously presented displays is found to facilitate search, through a bias for
the target location. Typically, the contextual cueing effect is only reported with a conjunction
search task. One study did find contextual cueing effects in singleton search (Geyer et al., 2010).
Note, however, that in this study participants were pre-cued with the spatial configuration of
the display 700ms before the stimuli appeared. Likely, this promoted the encoding of spatial
information – producing contextual cueing – whereas in traditional singleton search, parallel
local comparisons are sufficient.
These effects illustrate that visual search and attention are affected by long term memory, even
when search tasks are driven by highly efficient bottom-up visual processing. Past history thus
seems to persistently shape future deployments of attention, and thereby affects visual search.
This perspective on search has interesting parallels with predictive coding theories of cognition
and the brain (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005). These theories
propose the brain continuously seeks to predict what stimuli it will encounter, and that these
predictions adjust perception and action – both at the behavioral and on the neuronal level.
We argue that the formation and automatic retrieval of memory traces offers a mechanism to
produce such predictions.
One particular finding supporting predictive coding theories is the Repetition Suppression (RS)
effect found in fMRI-studies. RS entails that when a stimulus is repeated, the BOLD-response is
found to be attenuated (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). A predictive coding view on this phenomenon
states that our experience with a relatively static world leads the brain to expect stimuli to
remain constant, i.e. to repeat. Subsequently, when this prediction of a repetition is met, this
yields more effective processing of repeating stimuli relative to non-repeating ones (Summerfield
et al., 2008; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). To support this view, Summerfield et al. (2008) had
participants attend to sequences of face stimuli, and manipulated the probability of repetitions in
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this sequence. They found that in blocks in which repetitions were frequent (and thus predicted
more easily), the RS effect was larger than when stimuli mostly switched. A follow-up study by
Larsson & Smith (2012) revealed that when the faces were not attended, clear RS was found
both when repetitions were frequent as well as when they were infrequent. These findings have
interesting parallels with the present study: First, it is the experience over the course of an
entire block laid down in memory (the experienced ratios of repetitions and switches) that leads
to these predictions. Second, how stimuli were processed during a trial –in their study whether
they were attended or not; in the present study whether they required top-down guidance to
be found – had a large effect on whether predictions were formed and whether traces laid down
during search affected search in later trials.
4.4.2 Automatic memory trace retrieval and intertrial effects
In short, episodic memory traces that affect visual search offer a way to account for when long
term effects in visual search are found, and when they are not. But how does this relate to
short-term intertrial priming? A role for episodic retrieval in intertrial priming was originally
proposed to account for ‘episodic’ effects that a simple feature weighting account could not
explain. Long-term priming, as reported here, would seem another one of such effects that
cannot be explained by simple feature weighting, subject to swift passive decay (cf. Martini,
2010; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000). One could propose that there exists an additional long-
term feature weighting mechanism. Such a proposal would require further elaboration on how
such long-term feature weighting relates to short-term feature weighting, or why a discrepancy
was found between singleton and conjunction search.
Nevertheless, although the findings from this study are readily explained by the episodic retrieval
view, they do not invalidate a short term feature weighting mechanism. A parsimonious episodic
retrieval account (as provided by the SAM model) explains both short- and long-term priming
in one mechanism. However, in such a framework it is difficult to explain why in singleton search
there are short-term but not long-term priming effects. Much like previous work that has favored
a hybrid account of priming (A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011; Lamy et al., 2011; Thomson &
Milliken, 2013), we therefore feel both mechanisms may contribute to priming. Nevertheless,
our results indicate that influences from episodic memory traces may be more prominent than
previously thought, rather than that they are limited to late stages of difficult tasks.
Instead, we propose that the search task as a whole determines which priming mechanism
dominates. In singleton search tasks, memory traces may not reflect a selection process based
on particular features, and thus yield no priming effects on the long- or short term. There,
priming effects largely result from short term feature weighting. In conjunction search tasks,
however, the effects of feature weighting may be limited, as this will also render distractors that
share features with the target more conspicuous. In these tasks retrieval of episodic memory
traces may affect the search process and thereby evoke intertrial priming effects. Although
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the resulting intertrial effects in both tasks thus appear qualitatively similar, the underlying
mechanism may very well be different.
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have found short-term feature priming effects in both singleton- and conjunction
search, but additional long-term priming effects only in conjunction search. Such durable long-
term priming effects on top of short term priming are directly predicted by episodic memory
models. We conclude that the the effects of episodic memory traces on visual search may be
more consistent than previously thought, and that priming in conjunction search and singleton
search may result in a large part from different mechanisms.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Lyduine E. Collij for her help in data collection, and would like to thank
Dr. Jeroen G. Raaijmakers, Dr. Jeremy Wolfe and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this work.
113
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing Chapter 4
Supplemental Material
4.A SAM as a model of visual priming
the SAM theory and model “Search of Associative Memory”, or SAM in short, is a theory
of encoding and retrieval of items in memory. The SAM theory (presented in Raaijmakers &
Shiffrin, 1981) aims to explain memory performance in a variety of experiments. We primarily
based ourselves on the implementation of the theory that studied the dynamics of interference
and forgetting (Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988, 1989). This model was designed to simulate
findings from paired-associates list learning experiments, in which participants have to study
word pairs (a - b). Later, in the test phase, participants are cued with one half of this pair,
and have to recall the other (e.g. a - ? ). The model produces probabilities that an associate
is recalled correctly, given one or several lists to be studied, maintenance intervals, and test
lists of cues. The principles of SAM have successfully been applied to simulate free recall and
recognition (for an overview Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 2002).
SAM assumes that during encoding, stimulus information is associated and stored in long term
memory as ‘memory images’, and partial information from an image can be used as a retrieval
cue for the memorandum. For example the cue a - ? is a retrieval cue for the memorandum
a − b. A critical assumption in SAM is that the memory image includes associations with a
pool of contextual elements. In this pool, a limited subset of units is active at the same time,
reflecting an ‘episode’ in memory. A subset of the elements active at the time of study is
incorporated in the memory image, and contextual activity can thereby serve as a retrieval cue
for a memorandum. The activity in the pool is subject to random drift: some of the active units
become inactive over time and vice versa. These assumptions have two important implications
that are also relevant for an episodic retrieval account of priming:
 (short-term) forgetting occurs gradually over time due to random drift of the context (as
fewer and fewer of the units active at learning will be part of the context at retrieval.
 the more an item is studied, the more units will be associated with it. This increases the
probability that it is retrieved, also at long retention intervals;
SAM as a model of visual priming by episodic retrieval We used SAM as described
in (Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988; Raaijmakers, 2003) and applied it to a typical visual search
priming study. However, there are differences between the tasks that SAM was designed for
(‘memory tasks’) and the way episodic retrieval may underly visual priming, which we took into
consideration for our simulations. For example, memory tasks tend to have separate study and
test phases which have participants actively study the items and ‘search’ for them in memory,
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respectively – two processes which can be assumed to be absent – or at least mostly implicit and
passive – during a visual search task. Secondly, memory tasks involve a multitude of memoranda
that can be easily individuated, and are recalled separately (e.g. in the paired associates task,
the cue a−? has only one correct associate b). In the priming tasks simulated here, there are
only two trial types (here: ‘red’ and ‘green’ trials). Without a well-defined individuating cue, so
the retrieval of both trial types may simultaneously be probed throughout the trial 1. Retrieval
of memory traces laid down by any one of these two trial types will similarly have only one
of two effects: the priming of either red or green targets. Finally, memory tasks challenge the
participant to retrieve many different memoranda after a long delay. In priming in visual search,
it is unlikely that participants will not be able to remember only two frequently presented target
types. Therefore, it seems that for priming, the relative memory strength or ease of retrieval of
the target types is crucial.
To simulate priming in visual search, we used the SAM model as outlined in (Raaijmakers, 2003;
Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988) while accounting for these considerations:
 all parameters (Table 4.A.1) were given values adopted from previous SAM papers except
one: since learning was no longer embedded in a study phase, we decreased the learning
rate (w).
 we simulated the memory strengths of only two items, representing the two trial types
(‘red’ or ‘green’) which were associated with the fluctuating context whenever they were
presented. This allowed us to simulate priming for either trial type through the respective
memory strengths.
 As a measure for priming effects caused by retrieval of memory traces, we computed
the probability of retrieval for both memory images. Then we defined the amount of
facilitation by a memory item (F i), as its recall probability divided by the sum of both
recall probabilities. Since there are no explicit retrieval cues, this probability of recall
is determined by the contextual cues, and priming is thereby determined by the bias in
memory. Note that this measure is very similar to ‘global familiarity’ as was introduced
to simulate recognition tasks with SAM (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984).
 We had no explicit hypothesis how memory retrieval influences RTs throughout the search
trial. We assumed that this influence could be task- and participant-specific, and that the
influence would saturate at a certain level. Therefore we fitted the following function to
1One could argue that the onset of a trial constitutes a retrieval cue, or that other aspects of a trial probe
retrieval, for example the stimulus layout. The latter certainly seems to be the case with the contextual cueing
effect (Chun & Jiang, 1998, ,discussed in the main article discussion). Similarly, the episodic retrieval account
explains ‘episodic priming’ effects through better retrieval when all visual features match the previous trias
compared to when they do not (Huang et al., 2004; Hillstrom, 2000). For the present simulations, however, we
focus on priming of pop-out tasks (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) where trials only differ in their color, and all
other aspects of the tasks are balanced.
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experiment data:
RT = c+ ge−τF
i
Where c reflects a baseline RT when priming is maximally effective, assuming that memory
influence can not facilitate RTs below a asymptotic minimum; g scales the priming effect,
and the exponential term describes how fast priming saturates (τ). Note that Figure 1 in
the article depicts F i rather than simulated RTs.
We simulated data from three experiments:
 Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994, Figure 7, bottom): Maljkovic & Nakayama reported the
average RTs of each trial on which the target had the same versus a different color N trials
in the past. The data is from one naive participant, and illustrates how priming gradually
decays over the course of multiple trials. The simulations reveal the same pattern, although
priming decays somewhat faster.
 Brascamp et al. (2011, Figure 1D): the time course of priming was probed by exploring
how facilitation ‘accumulates’ over multiple repetitions of same-colored build-up trials,
then ‘breaks down’ over intervening trials of the other color. measured by the RT on one
final trial of the build-up color. Data comes from from six participants. Especially with
few intervening trials, different build-up conditions show different priming.
 Martini (2010, Figure 5, left): Martini formalized short-term decay in priming, combin-
ing z-scored RTs from 50 participants, and computing the average contribution of trials
matching in color N trials back. The facilitation (through priming) of each trial in the past
again decays over several trials. The SAM simulations very closely match the empirical
data, illustrating that both models are comparable under these conditions where target
types are balanced.
All simulated experiments were repeated 25 times to reflect multiple participants, and all runs
were preceded by a ‘training phase’ where 20 trials – 10 of each type – were presented in
random order. The simulations of the data from Maljkovic & Nakayama; Martini were then
followed by 500 trials, balanced for both colors, in random order. For the data of Brascamp
et al., each combination of buildup and intervening trials was ran, separately. The plots of the
experiment data and the SAM-simulation data are given in Figure 4.A.1. All three experiments
were simulated very well by the model.
4.B Raw Response Times
The plots in the paper all reflect color corrected response times. Here, we visualize the average
raw RTs, in Figure 4.B.1.
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Parameter Value Description
α 0.08 Drift rate parameter
s 0.2 Ratio of active/inactive units in the LTS
a 5.0 Scaling constant for context association strength
w 0.75 learning rate, is 1.0 in most SAM simulations
Z 3.0 Interference from other memory traces at retrieval
tp 1.5 Duration of stimulus presentation/encoding (seconds)
Table 4.A.1: Parameters used in SAM simulations of priming experiments
Figure 4.A.1: Experiment data and SAM simulations of three experiments probing the timecourse of intertrial
priming (see text for details) A the average RT of trials that have the same target color as the target on 1
– 15 trials back (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). B the average RT of trials of one particular color after a
specified number of ‘buildup’ trials of the same color and a number of ‘intervening’ trials of the opposing
color (Brascamp et al., 2011). C the facilitative effect evoked by a trial repetition from n trials in the past,
computed from z-scored response times from 50 participants (Martini, 2010).
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Figure 4.B.1: Data from the four experiments without correcting for observers’ a priori color differences. The
odd-numbered block indices reflect the neutral blocks. Bars reflect 95% Cousineau-Morey confidence intervals
A Experiment 1A. B Experiment 1B. C Experiment 2A. D Experiment 1B.
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Short- and Long-Term Memory
Direct Our Gaze During Search
Adapted from
Kruijne, W. & Meeter, M.
Implicit short- and long-term memory direct our gaze in visual search
Attention, Perception & Psychophysics (in press)
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Visual attention is strongly affected by the past: both by recent experience and by
long-term regularities in the environment that are encoded in and retrieved from mem-
ory. In visual search, intertrial repetition of targets causes speeded response times.
Similarly, targets that are presented more often than others may facilitate search, even
after that bias is no longer present and went unnoticed by the participant. In this
study, we investigate whether such short-term priming and long-term priming depend
on dissociable mechanisms. By recording eye movements while participants searched
for one of two conjunction targets, we explored at what stages of visual search different
forms of priming manifest. We found both long- and short- term priming effects that
both affected the same stages of the task. Long-term priming was found even in par-
ticipants who were unaware of a color bias, and priming effects persisted long after the
bias was no longer present. Both short- and long-term priming biased eye movements
towards targets with the primed color, already starting with the first eye movement.
Neither form of priming affect the response phase of a trial, but response repetition
did. The results imply that both long- and short-term memory exert strong implicit
modulations of bottom-up visual processing.
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5.1 Introduction
Since the visual environment is too rich for our visual apparatus to fully process, we are con-
stantly confronted with the problem of which parts of a visual scene we must select for further
processing, at the expense of other information. The mechanisms and processes by which such
selection takes place are collectively known as visual attention. Research on visual attention
has traditionally subdivided influences on attention into two classes: attention can be driven
‘bottom-up’ by the physical properties of the visual input and ‘top-down’ by factors such as our
current goals and intentions The main focus of the study of visual attention has long been the
interplay between these two classes, and the question to what extent one can overrule the other
(Chun et al., 2011; Van der Stigchel et al., 2009).
However, this extensively studied dichotomy does not seem to cover all factors that affect visual
information processing. For example, whether we are navigating a busy street or taking a calm
walk in the forest, it is rarely clear-cut what the top-down goal is of ongoing visual processing.
Nevertheless, continuously allocating attention to – and only to – conspicuous features in the
scene might not be the safest, most effective or most relaxing strategy (see Anderson et al.,
2015, on the limits of salience effects in scene viewing). Recently, researchers have began to
emphasize that attention for a large part may not be driven by our ‘top-down’ goals or the
‘bottom-up’ visual input, but is guided automatically and implicitly by our memories of past,
similar experiences (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; Awh et al., 2012; Peelen & Kastner,
2014).
An example from experimental psychology illustrating how memory affects visual attention is
formed by intertrial priming, a phenomenon that was first thoroughly explored by Maljkovic
& Nakayama (1994). In their experiments, participants searched for a red or green singleton
diamond among two diamonds of the opposite color, and responded to an orthogonal feature.
Repeating target- and distractor colors evoked shorter response times (RTs) compared to color
switches. Perhaps one of the most interesting characteristics of priming that was found by
Maljkovic & Nakayama was that priming is also observed when a color switch is fully predictable
or when participants are informed of the upcoming target color before trial onset. This illustrates
intertrial priming is not top-down controlled (see also Huang et al., 2004; Hillstrom, 2000;
Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2011; Theeuwes, 2013).
Priming has been found to manifest so early that it can modulate visual signals before they
reach the oculomotor system (Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013; Bichot & Schall, 2002). On the
other hand, priming seems to similarly affect later stages of a search task, such as the selection
of a response (Lamy et al., 2010; Tollner et al., 2008; Meeter & Olivers, 2006; Kristja´nsson,
Ingvarsdo¨ttir & Teitsdo¨ttir, 2008). Perhaps because of these diverse findings, research has not
pinpointed a single mechanism to account for priming in visual search. Rather, two mechanisms
have been proposed to contribute to these effects: (1) short-lived changes in the abstract
‘weights’ of target- and distractor features (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Maljkovic & Martini,
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2005; Lee et al., 2009), and (2) automatic and implicit retrieval of memory traces of past trials,
facilitating search when they match present experience (Hillstrom, 2000; Huang et al., 2004)
Most recent accounts of priming acknowledge a contribution of both these mechanisms, but
argue that priming of low-level perception is dominated by the weighting of features, and that
the retrieval of memory traces comes into play at later stages (Huang et al., 2004; Lamy et al.,
2010). Additionally, it has been argued that the effects of retrieval are limited to difficult tasks
(Lamy et al., 2011; A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011).
Regardless of its underlying mechanisms, priming is commonly viewed as a short-term memory
effect (Martini, 2010; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000; Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a; Lee et al.,
2009; Hillstrom, 2000), as the effects of a single trial subside over the course of five to eight trials
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Martini, 2010). In pop-out search, color repetitions further back
do not seem to affect priming, however many that may be (Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Kruijne &
Meeter, 2015; Kruijne et al., in press; although see Geyer & Mu¨ller, 2009). Even in the absence
of intervening trials, priming attenuates with time, seemingly fading over ≈90 s; (Maljkovic
& Nakayama, 2000; Thomson & Milliken, 2012b). However, note that this assessment – that
intertrial priming is only a short-lived effect – would set priming apart from most other effects
of memory on visual attention found in the literature (Turk-Browne et al., 2010; Chun & Jiang,
1999; Leber et al., 2009), which are often acquired and assessed over the time course of entire
experiments. Also note that if priming is indeed to some extent driven by retrieved memory
traces of past trials, there is little reason to assume that this would be limited to retrieving only
recent experience.
In recent experiments, we investigated whether priming could similarly manifest itself over longer
time ranges (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015). In a set of visual search experiments, two possible target
colors randomly alternated across trials, which resulted in intertrial priming. Critically, one
target type was presented more often than the other in some blocks. This resulted in long-term
priming : a prolonged facilitation of RTs for this biased color (Figure 5.1A). This effect robustly
persisted for at least 200 trials after the bias was removed, and was similar in participants who
were and who not aware that there had been a color bias.
However, long-term priming was only found when participants searched for a conjunction target.
The same manipulation in singleton search tasks did not yield any long-lasting effects , even when
search was rendered inefficient. Because of this strong dissociation, we proposed that different
priming mechanisms dominate in both types of search: whereas priming in pop-out search may
be dominated by short-lived feature weighting as described by Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994),
priming in conjunction search would be largely driven by the retrieval of memory traces – in
particular by those formed recently or frequently, resulting in short- and long-term priming.
Note that in this proposal short- and long-term priming in conjunction search are both caused
by the same mechanism. This would imply that they would both affect the same stage of
visual search search. However, by using only response time measures, we were unable to show
whether this was indeed the case. By recording eye movements, Becker & Horstmann (2009)
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demonstrated that in conjunction search, short-term priming affects the search process early on
and biases the color of the first fixated item. However, the dual-stage or multistage hypothesis
of priming would suggest that the effect of memory retrieval is limited to the production of
a response (Lamy et al., 2010, 2011; Huang et al., 2004), or at least limited to a later stage
(A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011). In light of these findings, it is entirely possible that short-
term priming influences the initial deployment of attention, whereas long-term priming only
affects the production of a response, after the target has been found.
In the present work, we scrutinize long- and short-term priming in visual search by exploring
eye movements at different stages of the task and RTs. Specifically, we look at how intertrial
target relations and a bias in trial types affect search behavior at the very first eye movement
in the trial, throughout the duration of the search, and in the production of the response after
the target has been found. If both forms of priming are caused by the same mechanism, they
are expected to affect the same phases of a search trial; if they are qualitatively dissimilar, in
line with multi-stage accounts, we would predict short term priming to affect the search process
early on, and long-term priming to affect a later stage. For example, long-term priming would
not affect the search process, but could reduce the time taken to respond after the eyes have
landed on the target. Additionally, we explore how other biases affect search behavior, such as
response repetition, positional priming and idiosyncratic location biases.
5.2 Methods
Participants Participants were twenty-five students from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
(24 female, aged 18 – 29, M = 21.3, SD=3.1). All reported normal color vision, and otherwise
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were naive with respect to the purpose of the
experiment or the trial imbalance manipulation. Participants received course credits or monetary
compensation. Informed consent was obtained prior to the experiment, in accordance with the
guidelines of the Helsinki declaration. Because all participants performed well over 90% correct
and no participant had average RTs more than 3 standard deviations away from the group mean,
no participants were excluded from the analyses.
Materials Stimuli were presented on a 22 inch LCD monitor at 1680× 1050 resolution and a
refresh rate of 120Hz. Participants were seated at 70cm distance in a dimly lit room, and used
a chin rest to maintain their head in place. Their left eye was recorded using an Eyelink 1000
eye-tracker (SR-research) which has a 0.01◦resolution and 0.25◦ – 0.50◦accuracy; The sampling
rate was 1000Hz. The built-in methods of the Eyelink were used to identify fixations, blinks
and saccades (at 35◦/s velocity and 9500◦/s2 acceleration threshold)
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Figure 5.1: A The top schematic depicts the experimental design (up to block 3) of the experiments used to
investigate long-term priming. The colors indicate the trial type distribution in each block. This was equal
for both targets in Neutral blocks, but 80% of targets were ‘bias-colored’ during Biased blocks. Long-term
priming is defined as speeded RTs for biased-color targets during neutral blocks induced by this bias. Sub-
blocks I - III were defined to explore long-term priming at a finer time scale. The bottom graph depicts this
effect (not real data). B Schematic illustration of a search display as used in this study. The task is to search
for a red or green diamond (see Methods for further detail).
Stimuli and Procedure The experiment was programmed using OpenSesame with the Psy-
choPy back-end (Mathoˆt et al., 2012; Peirce, 2007). Stimuli and procedure were virtually iden-
tical to that used in Kruijne & Meeter, 2015, Experiment 2B, the only difference being that set
size was not varied but fixed at nine items. All items were red, green or blue (approximately
matched in luminance: 12.8, 13.3 and 13.1cd/m2, respectively) and had one of four primitive
shapes: diamonds pointing up or down, circles, squares and triangles. Every display contained
one red or green diamond, (the target), one blue distractor diamond, two blue non-target shapes
and five red or green non-target shapes, all randomly assigned but chosen to balance the colors
and shapes in the display. Each diamond spanned 1.33◦ of visual angle, and was missing a corner
at the top or the bottom by covering up 1/8 of the diamond height. The other shapes were sized
to match the diamond in surface area. An example display is depicted in Figure 5.1B .
Twenty-four possible stimulus locations were identified at equidistant locations on an imaginary
circle at 5.4◦ eccentricity. On each trial, the nine stimuli were randomly distributed over these
locations, though never immediately adjacent to another.
Every trial started with a small fixation cross that participants were to fixate and press space bar
for drift correction. This cross was then followed by a fixation dot for 1200-1700ms, after which
the search display appeared. Participants were instructed to search for the red or green diamond
in the display, and indicate on a keyboard which of its corners was missing, by pressing ‘U’ for
up and ‘D’ for down. They were encouraged to respond as fast as possible while maintaining
over 90% accuracy.
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The experiment started with 10 practice trials, and then consisted of of five blocks, with (three)
Neutral and (two) Biased blocks alternating. In Neutral blocks, both red and green were the
target color equally often, and the number of intertrial repetitions and switches was closely
matched (< 5% difference). In both Biased blocks, the same color was the target on 80% of the
trials (red and green counterbalanced across participants). To the participant, the experiment
consisted of eight segments of 125 trials, separated by self-timed breaks. This produced an asyn-
chrony between breaks and block-limits to prevent participants from easily identifying neutral
and bias blocks and use a different strategy in them. To assess the evolution of the long-term
priming effect during a neutral block, we divided each neutral block into three sub-blocks (I, II,
III) of 66 or 67 trials.
At the end of the experiment, participants’ subjective experience of the color bias was assessed.
They indicated on a scale what they would estimate their target color distribution had been.
Possible estimates ranged from ‘only red targets’ through ‘equal amounts of red and green
targets’ to ‘only green targets’.
Data processing and dependent measures Trials with incorrect responses were excluded
from the analyses unless noted otherwise, as well as trials immediately following a break. To
identify outliers, we determined the mean and standard deviation of all trials in the neutral
blocks, and then excluded all trials from all blocks where RTs that were more than three standard
deviations away from the mean from further analyses. On average, this led to the exclusion of
4.3% of trials, of which 2.9% due to being incorrect and 1.4% outliers (total exclusion rate 1.2%
– 9.1% across participants).
Of primary interest were priming effects on response time (RT). As in our previous study, we
corrected for a priori differences in performance for both target colors, to isolate the effects
of priming. To correct for such biases while taking performance differences over the course of
the task into account, we first standardized RTs for each per block via a z-transform (zRT =
RT−M
SD ). The z-scores in all blocks were then adjusted for the difference between both colors
in the first block, which preceded the color bias. The same correction procedure was applied
to all dependent measures identified below, unless stated otherwise. Note that the figures will
depict raw, uncorrected measures in all blocks, to report the overall performance on the task.
Graphs of color-corrected values used in the statistical analyses are provided as supplementary
Figures 5.A.1–5.A.4.
Accuracy was analyzed for priming effects, but since participants were instructed to maintain
high accuracy, no effects were expected.
Two measures were derived from the fixation events (as identified by the eye tracker) to inves-
tigate how priming influences search: the average number of fixations detected in a trial, as a
measure of search efficiency, and the color of the item that was first fixated after display onset, to
measure priming effects early in visual search. Two other measures were derived to investigate
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how priming may affect response production, after the target is found: the time between the
last fixation on the target and the response, and the total duration of all fixations on the target
during a trial. For these analyses we define that the gaze was ‘on’ a stimulus when it was less
than 2◦ away from the center, and no item is closer.
To further explore search behavior at a more fine-grained temporal resolution we employed
an event-related design comparing gaze samples at time points relative to display onset and
response. Epochs were defined from -50ms to 600ms and -750ms to 0ms relative to display onset
and the response, respectively. In these epochs, at every millisecond the proportion of samples
on a particular item color were compared.
Analyses Most dependent measures were analyzed with a Bayesian analysis of variance (ANOVA)
using the BayesFactor package (Rouder et al., 2012; Rouder & Morey, 2012) in R.
The ANOVA included ‘participant ID’ as a random effect, and the following factorial terms:
short-term priming (S, immediate target repetition or switch); long term priming (L, target type,
bias colored target or other color); response priming (R, immediate target response repetition
or switch); and variation of effects across sub-blocks (B), a term primarily included to assess
whether long-term priming seemed to decay within a neutral block.
The statistic of interest in the Bayesian ANOVA is the Bayes Factor (BFx,y), that describes the
relative likelihood of two models (Mx and My) given the data. A BFx,y = 3 implies that the
observed data are three times more likely to have occurred underMx than underMy, and that
BFy,x =
1
3 . Exact Bayes Factors up to 1000 are reported.
Computing the BF across all possible models that arise in this 2×2×2×3 design is computation-
ally unwieldy. Therefore, results from a ‘top-down’ test are reported, which assesses how the full
model (with all main- and interaction effects) is affected by removing any term. Bayes Factors
for this analysis are reported as ‘BFf = x’, with f denoting the term under consideration, and
x the evidence against removing a term from the full model. Only those terms with a BF > 1
are reported. For these terms, we also report the mean (M) and 95% confidence interval (CI)
of effect sizes. These are computed from the posterior distribution estimate of the differences
between factor levels, derived from 5× 104 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples.
Because we primarily sought to compare the factors underlying long- and short-term priming
effects, we planned to test participants until the top-down analysis showed strong evidence for
– or against – these terms on response times at BF > 10.0 (see Wagenmakers et al., 2012, 2010,
for justifications of this approach). This criterion was already met after data were collected from
a first cohort of 25 participants.
For the multivariate analysis of the gaze-proportion time series, the difference between the pro-
portion of samples on the target color and the number of samples on the non-target color was
assessed. This difference was separately analyzed for intertrial relations (target repetition or
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Figure 5.2: Average response time (RT) as a function of experiment block, separately computed for target type
(Bias or Other) and its relation with the previous trial (Repeat or Switch). In each block, shorter response
times are found for target repetitions than for switches (short-term priming). After the bias blocks, indicated
by shaded areas, bias-color targets also yield faster response times than other-colored targets (long-term
priming). In these and all subsequent graphs, error bars (or shaded error-ribbons) reflect Cousineau-Morey
95% confidence intervals (Baguley, 2011).
switch) and target types (bias or other color), by computing the t-statistic comparing these
variables across participants. These t-values over time are used in a nonparametric permuta-
tion test (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) based on 1000 permutations, with threshold-free cluster
enhancement (TFCE, Smith & Nichols, 2009) applied to every permutation.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Behavioral results
Response Time Figure 5.2 shows clear long- and short term priming effects on RTs. Through-
out the experiment target color repetition resulted in faster RTs than switches. In the biased
blocks (2 and 4), bias-color trials were processed faster than other-color trials. Bias-color tri-
als remained faster than other-color trials in the neutral blcoks 3 and 5, suggesting long-term
priming of the bias color.
The statistical analyses using top-down model comparison confirmed short- and long-term prim-
ing and provided moderate evidence for an effect of response priming (BFS > 1000, BFL >
1000, BFR = 6.12, respectively). As in our previous experiments, long-term priming did not
attenuate over the course of a neutral block, which was supported by strong evidence against
an interaction between long-term priming and sub-blocks ( 1/BFL:B = 37.8 ). We did not find
strong evidence to either infer or reject a possible interaction between short-term priming and
response repetition (1/BFS:R = 1.37).
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The posterior inferred from the full model revealed similar effect sizes for short- and long-term
priming (M = 0.26, CI = [0.22, 0.31] ;M = 0.25, CI = [0.21, 0.30], respectively), and a smaller
effect of response priming (M = 0.06, CI = [0.02, 0.11]).
Subjective bias experience Like in our original study, werescaled subjective target bias
estimates to a scale from -1 (only experienced other color trials) to 1 (only experienced bias
color trials), and subjected these estimates to a one-sided Bayesian t-test. This test provided
moderate evidence that overall, participants correctly estimated that there had been a bias
manipulation (BFδ+ = 3.9). However, there was reasonable variability across participants
(M=0.13, SD=0.28), who were almost evenly distributed between those who were aware of
the bias (with estimates higher than zero, N=13) and those who were not (N=12). We therefore
added an interaction term A : L to the full model that could account for a modulation of the long-
term priming effect based on whether or not a participant was aware of the bias. The extended
full model was not supported in favor of the model without this term, with 1/BFA:L = 37.8.
Moreover, even when accounting for any variation in long-term priming across people who were
aware and people who were not, the extended model still showed overwhelming evidence for a
main effect of long-term priming with BFL > 1000. Despite the smaller power of this analysis,
it shows that the effect of the bias is not related to awareness of it, suggesting that long-term
priming is not strategic in nature.
Accuracy As was expected, no compelling evidence was found for any effects on accuracy.
None of the terms in the top-down test were convincingly supported, each with 1/BFx > 2.9. Of
note, we confirmed from the posterior that the estimated mean effects of short- and long-term
priming were both facilitatory (M = −0.005 and M = −0.001 respectively ), and that these
forms of priming thus did not reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off. In these analyses, accuracy was
not corrected for a priori color biases because it is at the trial-level a discrete, factorial variable.
5.3.2 Fixation results
Search efficiency Figure 5.3 depicts how the average number of fixations per trial changed
over the course of the experiment, with respect to target repetition and target type. Overall,
the number of fixations per trial decreased, indicating that participants became more efficient
throughout the experiment. The pattern is qualitatively very similar to the evolution of RTs
during the experiment. Critically, less fixations per trial were needed when the target repeated,
illustrating how priming modulated the efficiency of the search process. In blocks 3 and 5, the
clear difference between bias- and other color targets suggest that long-term priming modulated
efficiency in the same way.
The statistical analysis was in line with these observations, as again compelling evidence for
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Figure 5.3: Number of fixations recorded from the onset of the search display to the manual response, as a
function of bias/other color and repetition/switch relative to the previous trial. Again a difference was found
between repetition and switch trials (short-term priming), and between bias color trials and other color trials
(long-term priming). Note the similarity between these data and the pattern of results for RT (Figure 5.2)
short- and long-term priming effects was found, both with a BF > 1000. Additionally, we
found strong evidence for an interaction between them (BFS:L = 16.8). The main effect
sizes were, again, very similar (M = 0.22, CI = [0.17, 0.26] for short- term priming; M =
0.22, CI = [0.17, 0.26] for long-term priming; their mean posterior difference differed less than
0.005). Their interaction was under-additive: long-term priming effects were larger on switch
trials than on repetition trials. (modulation of long-term priming effect on color repetition trials:
M = 0.06, CI = [0.02, 0.11]; the model interaction terms sum to zero, so the inverse held on
switch trials). A practical explanation for this interaction could be a floor effect in the number
of fixations: even on the fastest trials, there would usually be at least two fixations: a central
one at trial onset, and one at or near the target.
Early color biases The analysis of the number of fixations strongly suggested that both long-
and short term priming modulated the search process. We investigated whether these priming
effects would be reflected in what color the item had that was fixated first during search. To that
end, we analyzed the proportion of trials where the first fixated color matched the target color.
Like accuracy, this is at the trial level a factorial variable, and no a priori color correction was
performed. A graph depicting this proportion over the course of the neutral blocks is provided
in Figure 5.4A.
The top-down test again confirmed effects of short- and long-term priming (both with a BF >
1000), and no other effects were found. In the statistical model, both terms again had strongly
overlapping effect sizes (M = 0.07, CI = [0.05, 0.09] for short-term priming; M = 0.06, CI =
[0.04, 0.08] for long-term priming).
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Figure 5.4: A The percentage of first fixations in each neutral block (1, 3, 5) that fall on the target color, as a
function of whether the target color is the biased/other color, as well as a repetition/switch. Both short-term
priming and long-term priming affect the first fixated color in a trial. B Average time between the onset
of the final target fixation on a trial and the response, as measure of the response phase. This phase is not
affected by either short- or long-term feature priming effects (although this latency is affected by the response
repetition, described in the text).
Response phase effects The analyses presented so far suggest that short- and long-term
priming similarly affected visual search, by modulating the search process as early as on the
first eye movement. Next, we analyzed whether either form of priming would affect the response
phase of the search. To this end, we analyzed the time from the final target fixation onset to
the response. This measure is comparable to target fixation duration as was, for example, used
by Becker & Horstmann (2009), but it takes into account that the eyes might have shifted away
from the target before a response key press was made. A graph for this measure is depicted in
Figure 5.4B.
The only term with positive evidence was response priming (BFR = 9.5,M = 0.07, CI =
[0.02, 0.11]). No other terms were supported (all 1/BFx > 3.5). Short- or long term feature
priming did not affect the response phase (1/BFS = 9.6; 1/BFL = 7.9).
It can be argued that the total duration of target fixation constitutes a better measure of the
‘response phase’. This duration can be interpreted as indicative of the amount of time that
evidence for either response could be accumulated. An analysis using this measure did not yield
different outcomes. A clear response repetition effect was found, but other priming effects were
not supported: (BFR > 1000, 1/BFL = 3.5. 1/BFS = 5.5)
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5.3.3 Gaze results
The results from the analyses of fixation events revealed no differences between short- and long-
term priming. Both seem to affect the search process early on, and have little to no effect on
the response phase. To scrutinize these effects even further, we investigated how they developed
over time, with respect to the display onset, and to the response time.
The time series with respect to the display onset are depicted in Figure 5.5A comparing target
repetition- and switch trials, and Figure 5.5B comparing bias-colored targets to other-colored
targets. From these graphs it seems that participants made rather fast eye movements, as the
proportion of fixations on either red and green stimuli began rising steeply at approximately
190ms after display onset. Participants’ gaze is then subsequently drawn towards the target,
illustrated by the steadily increasing proportion of fixations on the target color, and the gradual
decrease of fixations on the distractor color. Critically, this is modulated by priming: Figure 5.5A
shows that in all blocks, participants’ gaze was biased towards the color that had been the target
on the previous trial; Figure 5.5B illustrates a similar search bias through long-term priming
after the first block with a color bias.
These observations were corroborated by the statistical assessment of this time series. The
one-sided permutation t-test showed that short-term priming caused a significant (p < 0.05)
bias for the repeated target color as early as 185ms (average onset of significance in all three
blocks). For long-term priming, a similar difference onset was found, after 187ms (average of
blocks 3 and 5). Note that for both forms of priming this difference persisted throughout the
entire epoch investigated here, up to 600ms after display onset. A coarse estimate based on the
time course of the first saccades suggests that for at least three gaze shifts priming affected the
search process. Figure 5.3 suggests that this is the majority of the entire search process.
The time-series analysis of the moments leading up to the response illustrates the lack of color
priming effects on the response phase. This is depicted in Figure 5.6. It is clear that in the time
leading up to the response, the proportion of gaze samples that was on the target color increased.
However, an effect on the response phase would imply that this curve would be leading for the
unprimed color, as the time between landing on the target and generating a response would
be shorter for the primed color. Such an effect was not found by the statistical analysis. The
one-sided t-test did not reveal any differences for short-term priming, nor for long-term priming.
Two very brief moments with a spurious significant difference between the biased and unbiased
color were identified in block 1 (between -196 and -94ms), but this cannot be interpreted as a
form of color priming.
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Figure 5.5: (Caption on the next page)
5.3.4 Effects of Position
Although not of immediate interest, we also explored whether target position priming affected
search in this experiment. The analysis is discussed in more detail in the supplementary material,
but we found strong evidence for positional priming, as shorter intertrial target distances led to
shorter RTs. Like long- and short- term feature priming, positional priming effects appeared to
manifest early on during the search, as we found strong evidence that the first eye movement
tended to land close to the previous target location (Supplementary Figure 5.B.1). Of note, we
also found position biases of saccades that are unrelated to intertrial priming. Most participants
showed a strong tendency to start searching each display at approximately the same location
(Supplementary Figure 5.C.1).
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Figure 5.5: Long- and short-term priming throughout the search, within an epoch of 600 ms following display
onset. A Throughout the experiment, the eyes fixate items sharing their color with the previous target
color more than items with the other potential target color (here: distractor color). This difference arises
at the first eye movement and persists at least throughout the entire epoch B Long-term priming similarly
biases participants’ gaze to items with the bias-target color from the first eye movement onwards. Black
bars under the graphs mark timepoints with significant differences between the two colors, determined by
the permutation test with TFCE.
5.4 Discussion
In this study we have investigated what phases of visual search are affected by short- and
long-term priming, and whether short- and long-term priming effects in visual search can be
dissociated using eye movement recordings. We replicated the basic long-term priming results
(Kruijne & Meeter, 2015), finding that a bias block in which one target color is more frequent
than another yielded strong, robust and implicit facilitation of the search for the biased color.
Here, we found that this effect was not dissociable from immediate intertrial repetition effects:
both forms of priming modulate visual search through a bias of eye movements to the primed
color. These modulations already affect the very first eye movements, from approximately 190
ms following stimuus onset onward Conversely, short- and long-term priming were dissociated
from response repetition priming. Crucially, only response priming, and response priming alone
was found to affect the decision stage after the search was completed.
Research on priming in pop-out visual search has yielded strong, convergent evidence that short-
term priming alters the bottom-up processing of a visual scene (Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013;
Bichot & Schall, 2002; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). Earlier research on priming in conjunction
visual search (Becker & Horstmann, 2009) has similarly suggested that intertrial priming changes
the ‘attention-driving capacity’ of individual features, which similarly alludes to a modulation
of the bottom-up visual signal. The results of the present study reveal that the same holds for
long-term priming effects in visual search, as both forms of priming manifest very early on in
visual search.
Results from other studies support this hypothesis that long-term learning during visual tasks
can alter the bottom up visual signal. For example, participants can be trained to alter their
attentional set by having them search for a target of one specific color among heterogeneously
colored distractors. This will increase attentional capture by this particular color in a subsequent
task that can be solved by simple singleton detection, rather than by attending specific features
(Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Leber et al., 2009; for a comparable observation, see Becker et al., 2014).
Neurophysiological support for long-lasting modulations of visual signals was found in macaques
by Bichot et al. (1999), who reported long-lasting enhancement of responses in the Frontal Eye
Fields for distractor stimli that shared features with what had been the target of a conjunction
search the previous day. Similar response enhancements in Frontal Eye Fields were observed
in a priming of (color) pop-out task, which was interpreted to reflect intertrial modulations of
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Figure 5.6: (Caption on the next page)
color signals in the ventral stream (Bichot & Schall, 2002).
Given that both short-term priming of pop-out and long-term priming appear to affect visual
processing in such a similar fashion, it may seem tempting to suggest that they are essentially
equivalent. However, a clear empirical difference between the two speaks against such a general-
ization: Long-term priming and similar effects are only found in conjunction- or feature search
tasks. Although short-term priming is readily observed in singleton search tasks, such tasks do
not yield long-term priming, even after prolonged ‘training’. That is: even when a singleton
target remains constant or is heavily biased throughout an experimental block or even a session,
little to no long-lasting effects are observed (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015; Leber et al., 2009; Becker
et al., 2014; Bichot et al., 1999; Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Kruijne et al., in press).
Previously, we proposed the following explanation for this dissociation between singleton search
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Figure 5.6: Data as in Figure 5.5, but during a 650 ms epoch locked to the response. Long- and short term
priming do not seem to affect the response phase of a trial. If either form of priming were to affect the
response phase, this would have been reflected by the ‘Switch’ curve (in A) and the ‘Other’ curve (in B)
leading with respect to their counterparts. However, these curves follow identical time courses.
versus feature- and conjunction search (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015). Since singleton search can
be performed by simple bottom-up local comparisons, the absolute features may differ from
trial to trial but beyond the low-level comparison these features do not matter for the further
processing of the search display. In conjunction- and feature search, on the other hand, local
contrast is insufficient to complete the task. Instead, the absolute features of the target must
be processed to determine whether a selected stimulus is a target. We proposed that only when
task-relevant, these features are embedded in the memory traces that may later affect selection.
This distinction relates to several theories that proposed that task-irrelevant features will not
be encoded in memory and do not guide future attention (Turk-Browne et al., 2005; Hommel,
2004; Thomson & Milliken, 2013; Logan, 2002).
A naive interpretation of guidance by memory traces would be that perception of the search
display engenders retrieval of similar search trials. However, the apparent immediacy of the long-
term priming effect found in this study suggests that this can not be the case. Retrieval takes
time; for example, electrophysiological markers of memory retrieval are typically found only
after at least 300 ms (Johnson Jr., Kreiter, Russo & Zhu, 1998) after onset of the memory probe
(see Geyer et al., 2010, for a similar argument regarding contextual cueing). Note, however, that
memory retrieval may already occur in preparation of the trial, affecting future visual processing
before its onset. Recent studies have began to uncover how visual processing is modulated by
memory retrieval, mediated by the hippocampus and the mediotemporal lobe (Hindy & Turk-
Browne, 2015; Turk-Browne et al., 2010), even when no visual information is present (Bosch
et al., 2014). Recently, it was found that explicit mental imagery of search for a particular target
can exert strong effects on subsequent visual search (Reinhart, McClenahan & Woodman, 2015).
It seems that implicit retrieval of past experience could bias attention in a similar fashion.
5.5 Conclusion
The retrieval of past experience from long-term memory can help us guide our behavior when the
future is uncertain. In the context of intertrial priming in visual search, it has been suggested
that the effects of retrieval are limited to late, post-selectional processes (Huang et al., 2004;
Lamy et al., 2010; A´sgeirsson & Kristja´nsson, 2011). Here, we found that long- and short-
term priming have identical effects on visual search: they affect visual selection implicitly and
immediately. This strongly argues that retrieval of previous trials while anticipating the next
one influences visual search. This provides a new perspective on how memory retrieval actually
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affects visual search.
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Supplemental Material
5.A Graphs of normalized measures
The graphs presented in the manuscript depict raw measures that are not corrected for any a
priori color biases. Here, for completeness, we plot the color corrected measures that have been
used in the analyses in the manuscript. (Figures 5.A.1–5.A.4)
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Figure 5.A.1: Behavioral priming data: the effect of short-, long- and response priming on color-corrected
z-scored RTs (cf. Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.A.2: Long-term priming does not rely on whether participants had been aware of the bias. The effect
is as prominent in participants who afterwards correctly estimated the direction of the bias (’aware’) as in
those that did not (’unaware’)
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Figure 5.A.3: Priming effects on search efficiency: the effect of short-, long- and response priming on the
color-corrected z-scored number of fixations per trial (cf. Figure 5.3).
5.B Positional Priming
We explored whether our task gave rise to intertrial position priming effects. This was inves-
tigated by exploring the effect of intertrial target distance and response times. A Bayesian
regression analysis revealed strong evidence for such an effect (BFβ > 1000), which is also
evident from Figure 5.B.1A.
Like long- and short-term feature priming, positional priming affects the first eye movement. We
computed the distance from the first fixated location in a display to the target distance on the
last trial. This was compared to the distance to the target ten trials ago, which was interpreted
as a baseline with the assumption that positional priming effects should have long wained after
ten trials (Martini, 2010). Indeed, a one-sided bayesian t-test indicated strong evidence that
this distance was shorter than baseline (BFδ<0 > 1000), as is also illustrated by the density plot
of these distances in Figure 5.B.1B.
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Figure 5.A.4: A Fixation biases induced by priming: the proportion of first fixations on an item with the target
color, as modulated by short-, long- and response priming.
B Priming effects on target fixation duration: the effect of short-, long- and response priming on the z-scored,
color-corrected time from fixating the target to making a response. (cf. Figure 5.4).
5.C Idiosyncratic position biases
The results in this experiment show that the direction of the first saccade in a display is strongly
affected by short- and long-term feature priming (as discussed in the main text), as well as by
positional priming. Of note, we additionally observed a systematic bias in our data for the
location of the first saccade, which we illustrate for each participant in Figure 5.C.1. We present
no statistical analyses of this phenomenon because it is not of immediate interest for priming.
However, this graph illustrates that most participants have a strong tendency to start their
search of the display at the same location on most trials. Such an idiosyncratic location bias
is apparent in most, but not all participants. Across individuals, this preferred appears to vary
widely. It seems that such idiosyncratic biases would attenuate any effects on the direction of
the first eye movement, and that they therefore form a factor to be considered in any study of
visual search.
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Figure 5.B.1: A Shorter intertrial target distances yield shorter RTs, signaling intertrial position priming. The
blue dashed line is a quadratic fit to the data. B Density estimates of the distance from the first fixated
location to the target on trial n− 1 and to the target on trial n− 10 (collapsed across all participants). The
distribution is clearly skewed to lower distances for target n − 1. The blue markers indicate the possible
intertrial target distances, for reference.
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Figure 5.C.1: All landing positions of the first saccade made after display onset, separately plotted per partici-
pant
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Studies on intertrial priming have shown that in visual search experiments, the pre-
ceding trial automatically affects search performance: facilitating it when the target
features repeat, and giving rise to switch costs when they change. These effects also
occur at longer time scales: when one of two possible target colors is more frequent
during an experiment block, this results in a prolonged and persistent facilitation for
the color that was biased, long after the frequency bias is gone. In this study, we
explore the robustness of such long-term priming. In Experiment 1, long-term priming
was built up in one experimental session, and was then assessed in a second session a
week later. Long-term priming persisted across this week, emphasizing that long-term
priming is truly a phenomenon of long-term memory. In Experiment 2, participants
were fully informed of the bias and instructed to prioritize the other, unbiased color.
Nevertheless, long-term priming of the biased color persisted in this block. The re-
sults support the view that priming results from the automatic and implicit retrieval
of memory traces of past trials.
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6.1 Introduction
Repetition is ubiquitous in our daily lives. A major proportion of stimuli we encounter during
our waking hours closely resemble stimuli we have experienced before, and we interact with them
as we have done before. For example, the morning rituals of many of us will involve stimuli that
we have to locate every day, such as the tube of toothpaste or a box of cereal. We can make use
of our previous experiences searching for these items when we fail to immediately spot them in
their cabinets.
In experiments on visual search, it has been shown that visual attention makes good use of
regularities like the ones we encounter in our daily lives. For example, when a subset of search
displays is repeated throughout an experiment, participants’ performance on these displays
will improve compared to performance on similar, unrepeated displays (Chun & Jiang, 1999,
2003). Surprisingly, such contextual cueing occurs without any explicit recognition memory for
these displays, suggesting that this guidance of attention by memory is automatic and occurs
implicitly. Similar automatic and implicit adaptation to the environment, often referred to as
statistical learning, occurs for example when a stimulus is biased to occur at a particular location
(Geng & Behrmann, 2005; Umemoto et al., 2010), when sequences of visual stimuli are repeated
(Turk-Browne et al., 2010), or when the target frequency changes throughout a present-absent
search (Wolfe & Van Wert, 2010).
Another example of how memory affects the deployment of visual attention automatically and
implicitly is intertrial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). This refers to the effect that in a
search task with different possible targets, the trial-to-trial repetition of a target will facilitate the
search. Priming evoked by a single trial has been shown to decay over the course of approximately
5–8 trials Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994); Martini (2010); Kruijne et al. (2015), or over 90s when
there are no interfering trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000). Possibly in part because of
this short duration, intertrial priming is often interpreted to result from a short-term memory
mechanism (Maljkovic & Martini, 2005; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Chun & Nakayama, 2000;
Kristja´nsson & Campana, 2010a; McPeek et al., 1999).
However, recent findings suggest that intertrial priming can persist for much longer intervals
under certain conditions (Thomson & Milliken, 2013, 2012a). In recent experiments (Kruijne
& Meeter, 2015), we have investigated long-term feature priming on the time scale of an entire
experiment. In these experiments, Neutral blocks, in which two target colors were equally likely
to occur alternated with Biased blocks in which the target had one of the two colors on 80% of the
trials. Such Bias blocks resulted in persistent facilitation for the biased target color throughout
the Neutral block. Of note, this long-term priming effect was limited to our conjunction search
experiments: in singleton search tasks with the same manipulation, bias effects immediately
disappeared once the Bias block ended.
We have interpreted these results as an effect of the automatic retrieval of memory traces
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of past trials from long-term memory, which resulted in a persistent attentional bias. This
view was supported by secondary analyses that showed that (1) long-term priming did not
attenuate throughout a neutral block but remained as pronounced after 200 Neutral trials as it
was immediately after the Bias block; (2) participants’ overall awareness of the bias manipulation
was not predictive of the magnitude of the long-term priming: participants who were unaware
that there had been a bias were primed to a similar extent as those who had noticed.
However, because these were post-hoc analyses, many questions regarding the robustness and
automaticity of long-term priming remain. For example, it may seem premature to conclude
that long-term priming originates from long-term memory based on its persistence throughout a
200-trial Neutral block alone. After all, bias targets are still presented throughout that block. As
a result, what we have called ‘long-term priming’ might merely reflect a constant reinstatement
of the bias, and the effect does therefore not necessarily rely on storage in long-term memory.
Likewise, one could argue that the participant’s post-hoc estimate of the bias is at best a coarse
measure of their strategies and awareness during the experiment. For example, participants
could have used a strategy to search for the biased color, without linking it consciously to the
experienced target frequencies. This would not fit our interpretation that long-term priming is
an automatic, implicit attentional bias.
In the present study we directly address these concerns by means of two variations on the long-
term priming paradigm. In Experiment 1, we test the hypothesis that long-term priming relies
on long-term memory. Similar to previous studies on long-term effects in visual search (Leber
et al., 2009; Chun & Jiang, 2003), we asked observers to participate in two sessions, separated
by a week. The results of this experiment suggest that long-term priming indeed emanates from
long-term memory: it was still found a week later. Experiment 2 addressed the automaticity of
long-term priming by explicitly informing participants of the bias that they had observed right
after a Biased block. They were subsequently informed that this bias would reverse. Despite
this information, participants still showed robust long-term facilitation for the color that had
been biased.
6.2 Experiment 1
6.2.1 Method
The stimuli and displays of Experiment 1 were almost identical to those in Kruijne & Meeter
(2015, Experiment 1B). The experimental procedure is summarized in Figure 6.1, which also
shows an example search display.
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Figure 6.1: The design of both experiments, and an example search display. Bars indicate the amount of
trials in a block that had either target color. Experiment 1 consisted of two sessions, separated by a week.
In Experiment 2, participants were informed of the bias immediately after it had been presented, which is
indicated by the red line. For both Experiments, the critical block is highlighted with a more saturated color.
See the text for further details.
Participants In both Experiments, participants were students from VU University Amster-
dam who either participated for course credits or monetary compensation. All were naive
regarding the experimental manipulations, had normal color vision, and otherwise normal or
corrected to normal vision. All experimental procedures were conducted in accordance with the
Helsinki declaration and the guidelines of the VU faculty of psychology and educations local
ethics board. Participants were to be excluded if their overall accuracy was below 85% or their
mean response time (RT) on correct trials was more than than 3 SD away from the group mean.
In Experiment 1, 22 participants (17 female) completed the task and none were excluded. They
were aged 20–31 (M=22.4, SD = 2.9 ).
Stimuli and Trial procedure Participants were seated in a dimly lit room with their head
on a chinrest. At 70cm viewing distance was a 21 inch LCD monitor with 120Hz refresh rate.
Stimuli were presented on this screen on a black background (0.5cd/m2). A white fixation
dot (56.6cd/m2) in the center of the screen marked the start of a trial, and was presented for
1200-1700ms, randomly jittered between trials.
At fixation offset, the search display was presented containing 22 red (12.8cd/m2) , green
(13.3cd/m2) and blue (13.1cd/m2) geometric shape stimuli (circles, triangles, squares and di-
amonds). Among them was one red or green diamond, which was the target. Other shapes
and colors were approximately counterbalanced, in such a way that the display contained no
additional information of the current target’s color or the response. Distractor diamonds (with
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a blue color) and distractor triangles could randomly point up or down. Stimuli were randomly
positioned on a 7 × 7 grid spanning 17.1◦ horizontally and vertically, excluding the center 9
locations.
All diamonds in the experiment had either the top or the bottom corner cut off. Participants
were to search for the target diamond and indicate which of its corners it was missing, by pressing
either ‘U’ (Up) or ‘D’ (down) on a keyboard using their right and left hand, respectively. Error
responses were signaled by a 90ms tone. Participants were instructed to speed their response
times as much as they could, whilst maintaining over 90% accurate.
Experiment design The experiment consisted of two sessions, separated by at least a week
(one participant started session two after eight days). The two sessions could start at different
times of the day, and both were preceded by 15 practice trials. The experiment trials were
divided into blocks of 200 trials with varying trial distributions – as depicted in Figure 6.1, top.
The first session had four blocks that alternated between Neutral – where both possible target
colors were distributed evenly across trials – and Biased, where the ‘bias color’ was the target
on 80% of the trials, and the ‘other color’ on 20%. The ‘bias’ color was either red or green,
counterbalanced across participants. The first session ended immediately after the second bias
block.
The second session was scheduled a week later and began with the critical Neutral block. This
block was followed by a block with an inverse bias (20% bias-trials and 80% other-trials), and
ended with two more neutral blocks. The bias reversal was introduced to explore the whether
long-term priming could be reversed by means of a new and recent biases.
To prevent the biases from becoming highly conspicuous to the participant, their breaks did
not coincide with the block transitions,but occurred every 125 trials (counted from the start of
either session). For the analyses, we split each block into three consecutive ‘epochs’ of 66 or 67
trials (I, II, III), to explore long-term priming effects at a finer time scale.
Data inclusion and color correction We excluded trials immediately following a break,
trials with incorrect responses and those with outlier RTs (over 3 SD away from a participants’
mean RT in the same block). Unless noted otherwise, we only considered the data from Neutral
blocks in the analyses. In Experiment 1, we excluded on average 1.8% of trials due to erroneous
responses (SD: 1.4%), and of the remaining trials 1.7% were considered outliers (SD: 0.2%).
As in our previous studies on long-term priming, our analyses did not use RT as dependent
measure directly, but rather the change in RT caused by the bias manipulation. To this end,
RTs were first z-scored separately per block to correct for the overall practice effect throughout
the experiment (via zRT = RT−MSD ). Then, any performance difference in zRT between the
both colors in the first block was subtracted from all zRTs of individual trials throughout the
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experiment. Although our analyses use zRT, the graphs will depict raw RTs to give more insight
into the overall performance on the task. Graphs of color-corrected values corresponding to the
main analyses are provided as supplementary material.
Since participants were instructed to maintain high accuracy, no effects were expected. Nonethe-
less, accuracy was analyzed for priming effects, which could additionally assess whether any
observed RT effects could be ascribed to a speed-accuracy tradeoff rather than priming.
Statistical Analysis All primary analyses were Bayesian analyses of variance (ANOVA) as
implemented in the BayesFactor package (Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder et al., 2012) in
R. The ANOVA included ‘participant ID’ as a random effect; the factorial terms T (target
type: bias/other) to assess the main effect of long-term priming; E (Epoch: (I/II/III) and its
interaction with long-term priming T : E , which could be used to assess whether long-term
priming would decay within a block.
We assessed the evidence for or against any of these terms by means of ‘top-down’ model
comparison. The top-down assessment procedure entails to first construct a model with all main-
and interaction effects, and then one by one taking out terms and comparing the resulting models
against the full model. In Bayesian inference, the statistic of interest in model comparison is
the Bayes Factor (BF). It describes how much more likely one model is over the other, given
the data (with BF = 5.0 implying that one model under consideration is five times more likely
than the model it is compared to). The top-down procedure yields a BFk for each term k in
the model.
Note that a BF simultaneously quantifies the evidence refuting a hypothesis, rather than sup-
porting it. That is, if 1/BFk > 1 the exclusion of the term k is preferred. If BFk ≈ 1/BFk ≈ 1,
neither model is preferred and the evidence is considered inconclusive. We will report the exact
BFs for all effects up to 1000, with evidence supporting any term k denoted as (BFk > 1), and
evidence refuting k as 1/BFk > 1. For terms with positive evidence, we also report the mean (M)
and 95% confidence interval (CI) of effect sizes. These were computed from a posterior distri-
bution estimate of the differences between factor levels, determined from 5× 104 Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples. Effect sizes are based on standardized, sum-to-zero parameter
estimates, of which the difference between bias- and other-terms is reported and positive values
suggest relative facilitation of the bias color.
Because Bayesian statistics is not susceptible to the dangers of optional stopping that permeate
frequentist statistics (Wagenmakers et al., 2012, 2010), we used an adaptive sampling procedure.
We chose to stop data collection once compelling evidence (BF > 10) was found either for or
against a long-term priming effect in block 5, the critical block immediately after the week’s
delay. As mentioned, this resulted in data being collected from 22 participants in Experiment
1.
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Figure 6.2: Response times for bias- and other-colored targets In Experiment 1. Shaded regions mark blocks
with a target color bias, and the color indicates which of the two colors was biased. The gap between blocks
4 and 5 reflects the week in between the two sessions. The inset illustrates the z-scored RT’s in Block 5.
6.2.2 Results
Response Times The mean RT per block, separately aggregated for the bias and the other
color, is depicted in Figure 6.2. Shaded areas in the plot mark the three blocks with a bias,
and the color of these regions indicates which color was biased. The bias blocks resulted in
facilitated processing of the biased color. In Block 3, this appears to have produced a subtle
benefit for targets with the biased color. In the critical Block 5, after the intervening week, a
similar benefit is found, suggesting that long-term priming persisted throughout this time.
Our statistical assessment of zRTs in Block 5 indeed yielded very strong evidence that long-term
priming had persisted throughout the week delay, with BFT = 66.7 (effect size: M = 0.13, CI =
[0.22, 0.31]). Both a main effect of Epoch and its interaction with Long-term priming were not
supported by the data (1/BFE = 9.4; 1/BFT :E = 5.3). As in our previous work, long-term priming
thus did not appear to decrease over the course of a block (see inset of Figure 6.2).
Accuracy Accuracy in block 5 was analyzed with the same ANOVA as RTs, and no compelling
evidence for any effects on accuracy were found (maximum and only positive evidence BFE =
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1.52: Effect size of accuracy in Epoch II compared to I M = 7×10−3, CI = [−3.4× 10−3, 0.02];
Epoch III compared to 1 M = 1.3× 10−2, CI = [2.0× 10−3, 2.5× 10−2] )
Long-term priming throughout the experiment The ANOVA that was used to analyze
the critical block was also applied to the other neutral blocks . The zRTs in all neutral blocks are
depicted in the supplementary material. In Block 3, some evidence for an interaction between
target-type and epoch was found, although this was not conclusive (BFT :E = 2.2). This interac-
tion would have implied that the effect was largest in Epoch II, which does not suggest a system-
atic increase or decrease of the effect over the course of the neutral block (long-term priming ef-
fect in Epoch I: M = −0.08, CI = [−0.17,−0.1× 10−2]; Epoch II: M = 0.09, CI = [0.01, 0.17];
Epoch III: M = −0.45× 10−2, CI = [−0.08, 0.07].
Evidence for a main effect of target type was inconclusive (1/BFT = 1.3), though its estimated
effect size would be in line with a long-term priming effect (M = 0.04, CI = [−0.02, 0.11]). In
both Block 7 and Block 8, moderate to strong evidence for the absence of either a main effect
or an interaction was found (all 1/BFk > 2.5). Thus, the reversed bias in Block 6 was able to
counteract the long-term priming from the bias blocks in the first session.
Long-term priming effects correlate across neutral blocks The critical observation that
long-term priming persists in Block 5 after an intervening week is in line with the underlying
mechanism we have proposed: that this form of priming is due to retrieval from long-term
memory. Next, we analyzed the inter-observer variability in long-term priming found in all
neutral blocks of the experiment. This includes Block 3 (the first neutral block following a bias),
Block 5 (the first bias block after a week) and Block 7 and 8 (two blocks following a reversed bias
block). According to hypothesis that long-term memory retrieval underlies these effects, the bias
acquired by participants during a biased block should affect search throughout the remainder
of the experiment, even after the bias has reversed. This would predict a positive correlation
between the effect size of the facilitation for the bias color in Block 3 and all subsequent blocks.
Alternatively, long-term priming could be due to an ability of observers to pick up on the
regularities of the environment and adapt their behavior accordingly.In that case, one might
expect that participants who show strong long-term priming after the first bias block should
quickly adjust their behavior in response to the inversed bias block. This should yield a negative
correlation between the amount of bias color-facilitation in Block 3 and in Blocks 7 and 8.
To address these hypotheses, we performed correlation analyses, comparing how the long-term
priming effect evolved in the neutral blocks across participants. For all of these blocks long-term
priming was expressed as the their difference in color-corrected zRT of the initial bias color and
the other color.
Across Block 5, 7 and 8, positive correlations with Block 3 were found: participants with stronger
long-term priming in Block 3 had stronger benefits for this color throughout the experiment
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(Figure 6.3). For the neutral blocks 7 and 8, this means that participants who show a strong long-
term priming effect in Block 3 are the least primed in the reverse direction after the inversed bias
block. This was supported by Bayesian regression analyses: the effect in block 3 was predictive of
the effect all subsequent blocks (Block 5: BFβ = 98.4, r
2 = 0.61; Block 7: BFβ = 59.7, r
2 = 0.61
; Block 8: BFβ = 10.0, r
2 = 0.41 ).
Note that these correlations were determined on the basis of color-corrected zRTs (as is Fig-
ure 6.3). To ascertain that these positive correlations did not reflect an artifact of the color
correction, we computed the same correlations on uncorrected zRTs. Even stronger positive
correlations were found with these uncorrected measures (Block 5: BFβ = 210.3, r
2 = 0.66;
Block 7: BFβ = 56.0, r
2 = 0.57 ; Block 8: BFβ = 19.1, r
2 = 0.48 ).
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Figure 6.3: Long-term priming (facilitation for the bias color relative to the other color) in Block 3 – the
first neutral block after a bias block – as a predictor for long-term priming in all subsequent neutral blocks.
Priming observed in Block 3 (x-axis) is highly predictive long-term priming in subsequent blocks even though
these took place a week later. In Block 7 and Block 8, after the inverse bias, RTs were no longer consistently
facilitated for targets with the original bias color compared to the other color. Nonetheless, the correlation
analysis suggests that search in these blocks was still affected by the memory for this bias acquired in the
previous session of the experiment.
6.3 Experiment 2
6.3.1 Method
The overall design and structure of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1. Here,
we highlight any differences.
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Participants Data from 48 participants (33 female) were included in the analysis of Experi-
ment 2, based on the same criteria as for Experiment 1 (four participants were excluded due to
low accuracy). Participants were 18-33 years old (M=21.5, SD=3.1) and all reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and Trial Procedure To make the experiment less straining on the participants,
the background was chosen to be gray (12.1 cd/m2). This reduced the luminance contrast on
the screen. In this experiment, the search displays contained 20 (instead of 22) stimuli.
Experimental design The procedure for Experiment 2 is summarized in Figure 6.1. The
experiment started with a 100-trial neutral block, followed by a 300-trial bias block.
After this, participants were asked about the target color distribution they had experienced.
Using the mouse, they indicated their distribution estimate with a slider on a scale ranging
from “Only red targets” through “Equal red and green targets” to “Only green targets”. These
estimates were rescaled to [−1, 1], with positive values for indications of having seen more bias-
colored targets. Next, they were informed of the exact bias distribution (72.5%), and were
instructed that for the remainder of the experiment the majority of targets would have the
opposite color, without detailing how much more.
The experiment then continued with a short reverse-bias block of 20 trials of which 18 had the
‘other’ color. This short block was introduced to convince participants that the bias had indeed
shifted to the other color, and to further incentivize them to prioritize this color. After that,
the critical last block followed, which consisted of 200 trials with an equal number of ‘bias’- and
‘other’-trials.
After that block, participants were presented with another slider, to again give a trial estimate,
about the part of the experiment since the previous inquiry. These estimates were again rescaled
to [−1, 1], with positive values indicating an estimated surplus of bias-colored targets.
Participants’ breaks were distributed identically to those in Experiment 1 (every 125 trials).
Also, again smaller epochs within each block were defined (I,II, and III).
Data inclusion and color correction As in Experiment 1, trials immediately following
a break, trials with incorrect responses and outlier responses were excluded. On average, we
excluded 3.1% of trials according to error responses (SD: 2.8%) and 1.8% outliers (SD: 0.4%)
RTs on remaining trials were again z-scored and corrected for prior color biases, estimated from
the observed color difference in Block 1.
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Statistical Analysis The critical block in Experiment 2 was Block 4, after participants had
been incentivized to prioritize the ‘other’ color, but the ‘bias’ color was assumed to be strongest
in memory. As a primary analysis, this block was analyzed via the same T ×E (2 Target types
× 3 Epochs) Bayesian ANOVA as used in Experiment 1. We intended to stop data collection
after strong evidence was found to either support or refute long-term priming in this block.
Although the evidence for a main long-term priming effect was found rather quickly, the BF
on its possible interaction with Epoch remained unclear (BF ≈ 1.00). We therefore chose to
continue collecting data. Unfortunately, the BF regarding this model term remained indecisive
even after having tested 52 participants, and we stopped data collection (Edwards, Lindman &
Savage, 1963).
In addition to this primary analyses, additional analyses were performed to investigate partici-
pants’ bias estimates and the relation of these biases to the long-term priming effect.
6.3.2 Results
Overall RTs throughout Experiment 2 are depicted in Figure 6.4. In the bias block (2), there
are strong RT-benefits for the biased color. After this block, participants were fully informed
of the bias and incentivized to search for the ‘other’ color by instructions and a brief surplus of
other-colored target trials (block 3). Nonetheless, in Block 4 search for bias-color targets was
still faster than for other-color targets.
This was supported by the ANOVA, which revealed strong evidence for a long-term priming
effect BFT = 36.8 (M = 0.08, CI = [0.03, 0.13]). As noted above, no clear evidence either
supporting or refuting an interaction effect between target type and epoch was found (BFT :E =
0.8). Note though, that this potential interaction effect did not reflect attenuation of long-term
priming throughout the neutral block. Instead, it seemed that long-term priming effects may
have gradually increased throughout the neutral block, as the incentive to prioritize the other
color became less recent (interaction long-term priming effect in Epoch I: M = −067, CI =[−0.13,−0.26× 102]; Epoch II: M = 0.01, CI = [−0.05, 0.07]; Epoch III: M = 0.06, CI =
[−0.01, 0.13]. A main effect of epoch was not supported 1/BFE = 25.9
Accuracy No evidence for any effects on accuracy were found (1/BFT = 1.7, and all other
model terms had less support). Furthermore arguing against a speed-accuracy tradeoff, the
estimated effect size of long-term priming was in line with facilitation of bias targets compared
to other targets (M = 6.2× 10−3, CI = [−8.5× 10−4, 1.3× 10−2]).
Long-term priming and subjective experience The main effect of long-term priming in
highlights that even though participants were fully informed of the bias and encouraged to use
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Figure 6.4: Average RT in response to both target colors throughout Experiment 2. Block 2 was a long bias
block, marked by the shaded region. After this block (vertical red line) participants were informed of the bias
and told that in the rest of the experiment more ‘other’-colored targets would occur. This was followed by a
brief (20 trials) opposing bias block, of which the data is not shown. The final block is the critical neutral
block. The data reveal that despite the instructions, the bias colored target still results in shorter RTs than
the other-colored target.
that information, their long-term priming effect was still driven by the bias they had experienced
previously. The following analyses further explore the interplay of implicit guidance and explicit
knowledge in this task.
The distribution estimates are depicted in Figure 6.5A. From the first distribution estimate,
immediately following the first bias block of 300 trials, participants overall correctly estimated
that there had been a bias. A one-sided Bayesian t-test yielded very strong evidence that
distribution estimates were larger than zero (BFδ+,0 > 1000 ). The second set of distribution
estimates seemed to be centered around zero, although the evidence was inconclusive whether it
was perhaps lower than zero (BFδ−,0 = 1.2). Note, however, that the second set of distribution
estimates was marked by various extreme outliers in either direction, but in particular towards
negative values (“more other-colored targets”).
As in previous work, we assessed whether particpants’ experience of the bias was predictive of
the long-term priming effect. Adding a term for the interaction between distribution estimate
and target type (D : T ) to the full model yielded a strongly preferred model, indicating that
estimates were predictive of the long-term priming effect (BFD:T = 204.6). However, even with
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Figure 6.5: Long-term priming and the contribution of participants’ experience of the bias. A Violin plots
(density estimates rotated sideways, then mirrorred) of participants target distribution estimates immediately
after the bias block (left) and after the last block (right). Positive values indicate estimates of having
experienced more bias-colored targets. B Participants’ estimates of the distribution during the critical block
correlates with the magnitude of long-term priming during that block. Note, however, that this is in addition
to a main long-term priming effect.
this linear predictor term, a main long-term priming effect was still strongly supported by these
data (BFT = 53.0).
6.4 Discussion
In previous work (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015) we evoked long-term priming by presenting one of two
possible targets more often than the other for the duration of a block of 200 trials. This yielded
long-lasting facilitation of the search for this biased color. Here, we explored the robustness of
long-term priming with two variations on this paradigm. In Experiment 1, long-term priming
was evoked by a bias block in one experimental session, and tested for in a second session a
week later. Long-term priming was still found after this long delay, supporting the idea that
long-term priming originates in long-term memory. Subsequent analyses suggested that priming
that was present in the early phase of the experiment kept affecting performance throughout
the session a week later, even after a block with an inversed bias was presented.
In Experiment 2, participants were fully informed of the target color bias that had occurred
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in the first half of the experiment, and were incentivized to prioritize the opposite color for
the remainder of the experiment. Despite these instructions, long-term priming for the initially
biased color was still found. Subsequent analyses indicated that participants’ estimate of the
target color distribution was predictive of the magnitude of their long-term priming effect. This
suggests that long-term priming was affected by top-down strategy based on the subjective expe-
rience of a color bias. Note, however, that a reverse causation is also possible: that participants
frequency estimates were modulated by the extent of the implicit memory bias that underlies
long-term priming. Regardless, the presence of a main effect of long-term priming even after
correcting for participants’ estimates, suggest that it is at least partly implicit.
The long-term priming paradigm was devised to test the hypothesis that priming is caused by the
retrieval of episodic memory traces of preceding trials (as proposed by Logan, 1990; Hillstrom,
2000; Huang et al., 2004; Lamy et al., 2010; Los, Kruijne & Meeter, 2014; Thomson & Milliken,
2010). Recently, Thomson & Milliken (2013, 2012a) focused on the prediction that episodic
memory traces affect search for much longer than the typically observed decay of priming effects
over a few trials. In their experiments, they found that priming for task-relevant, rare features
that occurred only on a subset of trials could prime the next occurrence, even when spaced by
up to 14 trials.
Our previous work on long-term priming extends this by showing priming over the course of en-
tire blocks or experiments, much like various statistical learning paradigms (Geng & Behrmann,
2005; Cosman & Vecera, 2014; Turk-Browne et al., 2005). In this study, this was expanded even
further by showing the effect is still found after an intervening week.
Typically, intertrial priming has been explained in terms of features being weighted differently
after a visual trial, with more weight being given to the features that characterize a target
(Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Becker & Horstmann, 2009; Lee et al., 2009) Such an explanation
would imply that participants’ perception would somehow have been altered during the whole
intervening week: their attention would have been drawn to objects with the color that had
been biased. We have no straightforward way to assess whether this was the case. A memory
retrieval explanation would make a very different prediction. Presumably, retrieval would only
be triggered – and hence only modulate visual behavior – in the context in which the original
memories were acquired, namely in the setting of the experiment (Mensink & Raaijmakers,
1989; Howard & Kahana, 2002; Godden & Baddeley, 1975). Differentiating between the two
explanations would be an interesting venture for future research on long-term priming.
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) investigated priming of pop-out in conditions in which it was
clear to the participant what the upcoming target would be (see also Huang et al., 2004). If
priming were the result of a ‘top-down’ strategy, such conditions should eliminate the costs of
intertrial feature changes – but they did not. In similar vein, in Experiment 2 participants were
made aware of the bias and instructed to overcome it. Nonetheless, long-term priming persisted ,
which indicates that these effects are not under the control of the participant. Thus, the current
work supports the conclusion that long-term priming, as its intertrial counterpart, is an implicit
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memory phenomenon.
Previous work on attentional capture by irrelevant distractor stimuli has suggested that after
prolonged training to prioritize a particular stimulus, attentional capture by this stimulus is
enhanced (Leber & Egeth, 2006b; Leber et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2014). These findings have
been interpreted to show that ‘bottom-up’ capture by this stimulus can in fact be governed
by ‘top-down’ control. The present findings, however, question this interpretation by showing
that even when participants are made aware of such training, this does not necessitate that
the resulting effects are within a participants’ control. Recent reviews have highlighted how in
many studies, the effects of top-down control are confounded with intertrial repetition effects
(Lamy & Kristjansson, 2013; Theeuwes, 2013), and urge future work to heed this confound. The
present study highlights that similar care should be taken regarding priming effects at longer
time scales, as it seems they, similarly, can not be overridden by top-down control.
6.5 Conclusion
The present work has highlighted that long-term priming is a robust effect that most likely
originates from long-term memory, and is not readily overcome by top-down strategies against
it. These findings highlight how the brain can adapt to regularities in the visual world, and uses
this to adapt our behavior extending far into the future – even in spite of our intentions to act
otherwise.
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Supplemental Material
6.A Graphs of normalized measures
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Figure 6.A.1: Color-corrected zRTs in all neutral blocks of Experiment 1. Note that Block 1 is not preceded
by a color bias, and that Blocks 5-8 occur in the second session a week later. Blocks 7 and 8 were completed
right after an inversed bias block.
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Figure 6.A.2: The color-corrected zRTs for the bias- and other color in the critical Block 4 of Experiment 2.
These data were used in the the primary analysis of Experiment 2
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Our memory of previous experience can implicitly guide our behavior. This also holds
for the deployments of visual attention, as is evident from contextual cueing exper-
iments. In these experiments participants engage in visual search, while throughout
the experiment the stimulus layout is repeated on a subset of trials. Participants’
search times are lower on those ‘old’ trials compared to trials with new, nonrepeated
layouts. Here, we investigated whether contextual cueing is an effect caused by the
retrieval of past memory traces. Memory models suggest that retrieval is mediated
both by cues that are presented and the temporal context in which a memorandum
is encoded. These models predict that a large change of context impairs retrieval of
memories acquired in a different context. We test this prediction for contextual cueing
by repeating the same layouts throughout a visual search experiment, but changing
the task halfway. Contextual cueing was found to facilitate search in both tasks. How-
ever, immediately after the change in temporal context the effect was attenuated, after
which it was reacquired. These results support the hypothesis that contextual cueing
is caused by retrieval of past memory traces, which is contingent on temporal context,
and demonstrate that memory models offer new perspectives on the study of visual
attention.
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7.1 Introduction
A reasonable amount of our waking lives is spent determining where things are. Even before we
can leave the house in the morning on a regular working day, we will have to find our clothes,
breakfast utilities, toothbrush and keys. Luckily, in households that are somewhat organized
these things are usually in the same spot every day, and our memory of where we found them
before will help us find them in the future. Such regularity is not uncommon in the visual
world. Often objects or locations of interest can be found in the same location as we saw them
previously, or in the same location relative to other objects.
It is not hard to envision how explicit knowledge of where stimuli are can help us find them
and direct our attention there. However, guidance by memory does not have to be explicit and
under conscious, deterministic control. For example, research on visual search has shown that
participants will gradually get better at finding and attending targets that appear in one of
multiple locations, if targets appear at that location more often (Shaw & Shaw, 1977; Geng
& Behrmann, 2005; Umemoto et al., 2010; Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006; Kabata & Matsumoto,
2012). However, in many of these studies participants reported after the experiment that they
had not been aware of this location bias.
A striking example of such implicit visual guidance by previous experience is found in the
Contextual Cueing paradigm (Chun & Jiang, 1998). In this paradigm, a visual search task
consists of trials that are either ‘old’ or ‘new’. On old trials, the spatial layout of a visual
search display is a repetition of a layout observed previously, and the target appeared in the
same location. The set of possible old layouts can be relatively small (e.g. only 12 old layouts
repeated throughout an experiment of 720 trials, Chun & Jiang, 1998 ). Search performance
will quickly start to improve for repeated versus non-repeated layouts. This occurs even though
participants will generally not realize that layouts are repeated throughout the experiments and
will have no conscious recognition memory of these layouts when tested after the experiments.
Such contextual cueing has been found in conjunction search tasks in stationary displays, for
displays with dynamic stimuli whose movement pattern is repeated (Chun & Jiang, 1999) as well
as for real-world scenes (Brockmole & Henderson, 2006, although these effects may be driven
by explicit, rather than implicit memory). Additionally, they have been observed across two
sessions with an intervening week (Chun & Jiang, 2003). In pop-out search tasks, contextual
cueing can similarly facilitate search, if the spatial layout is presented somewhat before the
distractor- and target stimuli, so that it has time to be encoded (Geyer et al., 2010). Evidence
from event-related potential-research suggests that contextual cues elicit early biases in visual
attention (Johnson, Woodman, Braun & Luck, 2007, but see Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz &
Wolfe, 2007).
The mechanism that is commonly assumed to cause contextual cueing involves memory retrieval
(Logan, 1990; Chun & Jiang, 1998; Chun & Nakayama, 2000). Although the participant does
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not seem to have explicit recognition memory of a repeated layout, it is assumed that the
layout triggers retrieval of previous trials with the same layout. The retrieved target location
associated with the layout then gives rise to a bias in visual attention, or may otherwise cause
the participant to prioritize that location in the scene (for similar proposals to explain long- and
short-term priming, as well as temporal preparation effects, see Los et al., 2014; Huang et al.,
2004; Hillstrom, 2000; Kruijne & Meeter, 2015).
The ease by which memories are retrieved is contingent on more than just the retrieval cue
that is presented to an observer. Most theories and models of memory retrieval suggest that
to a large extent, retrieval is mediated by the temporal context (Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1989;
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Sederberg, Howard & Kahana, 2008; Howard & Kahana, 2002;
Bar, 2009). The temporal context in these models is assumed to reflect both events that were
presented in the recent past, as well as randomly fluctuating ‘background activity’. The context
serves as a retrieval cue for memoranda, and the retrieval of a memorandum can inversely
reinstate the associated temporal context (this has been dubbed ‘mental time-travel’ Tulving,
1985). Temporal context models can successfully account for a variety of memory effects: state-
dependent learning effects (Godden & Baddeley, 1975), temporal contiguity effects in cued
recall (Howard & Kahana, 2002), and false memories in repeated contexts (Smith, Hasinski
& Sederberg, 2013). Neurophysiological evidence for fluctuating temporal context mediating
retrieval has been found in (intracranial) electro-encephalography studies (Howard, Viskontas,
Shankar & Fried, 2012; Polyn & Sederberg, 2014; Howard & Eichenbaum, 2013).
Models of memory retrieval based on temporal context make one specific prediction for contex-
tual cueing, which is tested in the present experiment. If the present ‘state’ of the fluctuating
context does not match that of encoding, participants are less likely to retrieve the memories
of past trials 1. As a result, facilitation by repeated layouts should be attenuated for search
immediately after the state has changed.
We have tested this prediction in an experiment with two visual search tasks with stimuli of
different shapes and different colors. One task was presented in the first half of the experiment,
the other in the second half. Each search display was preceded by homogeneous placeholders
that indicated the stimulus layout of the upcoming trial (cf. Geyer et al., 2010). This way,
the repeated layouts remained the same across tasks, hence yielding the same retrieval cue.
Despite the consistency of this cue, we found that facilitation for repeated layouts was strongly
attenuated when the tasks switched.
1The present study unfortunately relies on both the notion of a spatial context as defined in contextual cueing
as well as that of a temporal context as defined in models of memory retrieval. To avoid confusion, we will refer
to spatial context as layout, and to the temporal context as the state (consistent with the term ‘state-dependent
learning’)
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7.2 Methods
Participants Participants were students at the VU University Amsterdam who participated
either for monetary compensation or for course credits. All reported normal or corrected-to
normal vision and no participants were colorblind. All were naive regarding the purpose of the
experiment and none were familiar with the contextual cueing paradigm. Informed consent was
obtained prior to experimentation and all were treated in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki. One participant was excluded for low accuracy ( < 85% correct in the experiment.)
The final dataset included data from 39 participants (33 female), aged 18–33, (M=20.8, SD=3.0).
Stimuli and displays Participants sat in a dimly lit room with their head at 70cm from
a computer screen on a chin rest. Stimuli were presented on a 21 inch LCD monitor with
120Hz refresh rate, on a gray background (7.9cd/m2) Participants engaged in two visual search
tasks: the diamond task and the vertical bar task. The order of the tasks was approximately
counterbalanced across participants (19 participants engaged in diamond search first).
Example stimulus displays are depicted in Figure 7.1. In the diamond task (modified from Krui-
jne & Meeter, 2015), participants were presented with search displays that contained squares,
triangles and diamonds of equal surface area (spanning ≈ 1.3◦ of visual angle), colored red
(12.8cd/m2) , green (13.3cd/m2) and blue (13.1cd/m2). Displays contained twenty stimuli, of
which one was the target: a red or green diamond. Shapes and color combinations were closely
counterbalanced within a display in such a way that none of the shapes or colors could be in-
formative of the location or identity of the target. The target was never the only diamond in
the display, as two blue distractor diamonds were always present. Diamonds had either the left
or the right corner cut off, randomly determined. Participants were to search for the target
diamond and indicate as quick as they could which of the corners was missing by pressing the
corresponding key on a standard QWERTY keyboard: Z for ‘left’ or M for ‘right’.
In the vertical-bar task, search displays contained rectangular vertical bars that were 1.33◦ high
and had one of three possible widths: thin (span 0.11◦), medium (0.61◦) or thick (1.11◦) colored
yellow (15.6cd/m2), cyan (17.1cd/m2) or magenta (9.9cd/m2). Bars had a black, 0.02◦ border.
The target was either a yellow or a cyan medium-sized bar. The other nineteen stimuli were
counterbalanced as in the diamond task, and two magenta medium sized distractor bars were
always present. On the left or on the right of each stimulus, a small (0.13◦ diameter) black dot
was drawn. Participants responded to the direction of the dot next to the target stimulus by
pressing Z or M for ‘left’ and ‘right’.
In both experiments, stimuli were randomly positioned on an imaginary 7 × 7 grid spanning
21.3 × 21.3 degrees of visual angle, excluding the center nine positions. Preceding to every
search display, a layout display was presented for 1000ms. This display contained twenty black
open circle stimuli with the same spatial layout as the following search display. Circle stimuli
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spanned 1.33◦ in diameter, and had a 0.11◦ border. In the center of the layout display a fixation
asterix was drawn (1.33◦) from bars with the colors of the upcoming task.
Figure 7.1: Two example trial sequences. On the left, an example trial in the diamond task, where participants
searched for a red or green diamond (here green). On the right, a trial in the vertical-bar task, where
participants searched for a medium-sized vertical bar that was yellow or cyan. In both tasks, search displays
were preceded by a neutral trial-display.
Experiment Design Participants were instructed to respond as fast as they could, while
maintaining accuracy above 90% correct. The experiment was preceded by two small practice
blocks of 12 trials – one for each task. After these, participants were given the option for new
practice blocks if they did not feel they sufficiently mastered the task. None of the repeated
layouts were used in the practice blocks.
The experiment consisted of 500 search trials of of one task followed by 500 trials of the other.
Trials were presented in Epochs of 20 trials each, consisting of 10 predetermined ‘old’ layouts
and 10 randomly generated ‘new’ layouts. Note that in repeated layouts only the location of the
target and distractors was repeated, but their identity was free to vary across trials. The search
display itself thus did not offer more information than the preceding layout display regarding
the location of the target.
Every 125 trials, participants were given the opportunity for a self-timed break, and were given
feedback on their performance.
Although this experiment served to explore contextual cueing in relation to temporal context,
it simultaneously was a pilot study to compare the magnitude of long- and short- term prim-
ing (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015) across the diamond task and the vertical-bar task for future
experiments. This is why both search tasks had not one but two possible targets that varied
unpredictably across trials and could thus repeat or switch. Additionally, each task consisted
of a Neutral block of 100 trials where targets colors were presented equally often, followed by a
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200-trial Bias block where the target had one of the two colors on 80% of the trials (counterbal-
anced across participants), followed by a 200 trial Neutral block. These priming variables were
independent of the contextual cueing manipulation, and would not have affected the results.
The results on priming are not reported here.
Trial Inclusion and Statistical Analysis Trials were excluded if they had incorrect re-
sponses or were considered outliers (RT more than 3SD away from the mean within a block).
On average, 3.0% of trials was discarded due to an error(SD=2.4%), and 1.6% of the remaining
trials were considered outliers (SD=0.4%).
Data were analyzed with Bayesian analyses of variance (ANOVAs) using the BayesFactor pack-
age (Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder et al., 2012) in R. The terms used in these ANOVAs (fur-
ther discussed below) were: ‘participant ID’ as a random effect; the factorial terms T (task:
diamond/vertical-bar); F (which task came first?; diamond/vertical-bar) and L (layout type:
old/new), and their interactions.
All results reporting the evidence for or against a term in these models have been obtained using
a ‘top-down’ model comparison: that is, the full model including all terms was constructed and
was subsequently compared against models were iteratively one of the model terms was removed.
The comparison across these models gives the amount of evidence for or against that partcular
term. In the Bayesian ANOVA such evidence is quantified by the Bayes Factor. For example,
the bayes factor BFx describes how much more likely the model including term x is over a
model where that term is removed. Note that BFx = 1/5 implies that the model excluding the
term x is five times more likely given the data, i.e. 1/BFk = 5. When BFk ≈ 1/BFk ≈ 1 the
evidence is considered inconclusive. We will report the exact BFs for all effects up to 1000, with
evidence supporting any term k denoted as (BFk > 1), and evidence refuting k as 1/BFk > 1.
For terms with positive evidence, we also report the mean (M) and 95% confidence interval
(CI) of effect sizes. These are based on standardized, sum-to-zero parameter estimates (see
Rouder et al., 2012; Rouder & Morey, 2012, for details). Effect sizes were computed from an
estimated posterior distribution of the differences in model parameters between levels of a factor,
determined from 5× 104 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples.
We first sought to assess whether contextual cueing modulated RT in both tasks without any
assumptions as to whether this would be modulated by a change in state. To this end, we
compared RTs on trials with old versus new layouts, but only computed from the second half
of each task. This measure was used in a 2× 2 (T × L) ANOVA.
Because RTs were expected to gradually decrease across the performance of the task (nonspecific
to repeated layouts) and because the switch in task halfway would likely induce a large increase
in overall RT, we devised a way to correct for these tendencies before assessing contextual cueing
modulation across tasks.
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First, RTs were z-scored and de-trended by fitting RT to a second order polynomial of trial
index (Martini, 2010) and subtracting this trend. Subsequently, the average zRTs of old layouts
within each epoch were subtracted from the zRT of new layouts, to yield a measure for the
amount of contextual cueing. This measure were fitted to the epoch index by means of a a
linear model, separately fitted per task. The resulting linear models were used to predict what
the extent of each participants’ contextual cueing would have been on a hypothetical epoch
“25.5”; in between the last epoch of the first task and the first epoch of the second task. The
resulting measure was subjected to another 2× 2 (T ×F ) ANOVA. A modulation of contextual
cueing by the task switch would be marked by evidence for an interaction term in this model,
which suggests that contextual cueing at the moment of task switching would be higher for the
task that was performed first than the second.
7.3 Results
Figure 7.2 shows the average response times across epochs on old and new layouts, separately
plotted for participants who started with the Diamond task, and participants who started with
the vertical-bar task. All graphs of all tasks suggest contextual cueing, as RTs are lower for old
than for new layouts, especially near the end of a task. Additionally, these graphs are suggestive
of attenuation in contextual cueing when the task switches.
The statistical test to assess contextual cueing (the T×L ANOVA ) yielded very strong evidence
supporting facilitation on trials with old layouts (BFL > 1000, effect size: M = 134.8, CI =
[75.42, 177.26]). There was inconclusive evidence for a main effect of task (BFT = 1.0), and
the posterior suggested RTs may have been higher on the diamond task than on the vertical
bar-task (effect size M = 45.9, CI = [−1.4, 94.1]). No evidence for an interaction was found
(1/BFT :L = 4.2)
The subsequent analysis (the T × F ANOVA) indicated that after a task switch, contextual
cueing was attenuated. Strong evidence for an interaction term was found BFT :F = 109.8,
which suggested that at the moment of state transition, contextual cueing was stronger for the
task that was performed first (Effect size with diamond task first M = 0.10, CI = [0.04, 0.15];
these are sum-to-zero parameter estimates, so the same effect size held for vertical-bar task
first). No other terms were supported (1/BFx > 2.4).
In the final recognition test in which old layouts had to be discriminated from new layouts,
participants scored 52.5% correct on average. Although a one-sided Bayesian t-test on accuracy
suggested that accuracy was not greater than chance-level performance, the evidence against
higher-than-chance performance was inconclusive (1/BFδ+ = 1.03, posterior estimate of µ in the
one-sided model M = 2.6%, CI = [0.26%, 5.5%]). To strengthen the case that contextual cueing
in this experiment could be attributed to implicit memory, we recomputed both ANOVAs based
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Figure 7.2: Response times across epochs for all searches. Trend-lines are loess-spline fits to the average response
time in each epoch, to visualize the evolution of contextual cueing. Each task consisted of 25 epochs, after
which the new search task began. Within a task, old, repeated layouts yield faster responses than new
layouts. Contextual cueing was attenuated when the new task started, after which it was reacquired.
on a subset of the data, including only ‘old layout’-trials that were not recognized in the memory
test (i.e. judged as ‘new’ by the participant). The analysis of contextual cueing still yielded
very strong evidence for facilitation by implicit memory (BFL = 157.5). Similarly, contextual
cueing was still found to be attenuated after a switch in task BFT :F = 34.5.
7.4 Discussion
The present study investigated the hypothesis that contextual cueing relies on the retrieval of
memory traces of past trials. We evoked contextual cueing by repeating the spatial layout of
a predefined set of trials throughout the experiment, and found that search performance was
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facilitated on trials with ‘old’ layouts, compared to trials with ‘new’ layouts. Halfway into
the experiment, participants engaged in a new search task with different stimuli, but the same
spatial layouts were repeated. Upon the switch in task, contextual cueing was attenuated.
These findings support the hypothesis that contextual cueing results from the automatic and
implicit retrieval of past trials (Chun & Jiang, 1998). According to most models of memory
retrieval, such retrieval should be contingent not just on the spatial context on a trial (the
layout), but also the temporal context (the state) (Sederberg et al., 2008; Howard & Kahana,
2002; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1989). In the present experiment, we induced a large change in
temporal context in the middle of the experiment, by having participants switch search tasks,
while retaining the same spatial layouts as contextual cues. The change in context seemed to
impair the ability to readily retrieve memories that had been acquired in the previous context.
Alternative explanations to one based on temporal context could be devised for our findings. For
example, one could argue that since the stimuli differ across tasks, the repeated displays did not
match previous experiences, effectively suggesting that the spatial context did not match after a
task switch, rather than the temporal context. However, even within a task such a mismatch was
present: on trials with repeated layouts, the shapes and colors of stimuli at different locations
was not repeated. As a result, the contextual information offered by the stimulus display could
not have been much richer than the information already present in the preceding layout display.
Recent research has indicated that contextual cueing is strongest under conditions where the
stimuli that make up the cue have high homogeneity (Feldmann-Wu¨stefeld & Schubo¨, 2014).
This suggests that the contextual cueing effect that was observed in this experiment would be
driven by the homogeneous layout display more so than the highly variable stimulus displays,
rendering explanations based on spatial context untenable.
Alternatively, one could argue that the change in task induced a novelty response, which could
have caused participants to devote more attention to the novel items in the task (the ‘new’
stimuli) than to the contextual cues, which remained the same (Pavlov & Anrep, 1960; see
Schomaker & Meeter, 2015 for a review). However, the work of Geyer et al. (2010) and Johnson
et al. (2007) suggests that the spatial layout preceding the search display is sufficient to give rise
to early attentional biases. Therefore, we would expect that the effects of cueing would have
already been in place before the novel stimuli could capture attention. Moreover participants
had already practiced both tasks before the experiment began, so the sensation of ‘novelty’ and
its associated reorienting responses would have been limited.
A variety of studies and reviews have highlighted the role of automatic guidance of visual
attention and visual search by implicit memory (Logan, 1990; Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012;
Chun & Nakayama, 2000; Awh et al., 2012; Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007; Kruijne & Meeter,
2015). This form of implicit control of visual behavior from memory is difficult to characterize
using traditional theories and models of visual attention. Memory effects are by definition
not just dependent on the present ‘bottom-up’ visual input; yet, these effects greatly differ
from ‘top-down’ attentional effects such as a participants goals and intentions. Thus far, little
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work has explicitly related such attentional effects to theories and models of memory retrieval.
Recently we shown that a memory retrieval model that incorporates temporal context (SAM
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Raaijmakers, 2003) can successfully simulate intertrial priming
effects in visual search (Kruijne & Meeter, 2015). The present results further highlight that
taking these models into consideration yields fruitful and promising perspectives to study how
memory and experience guide visual attention.
7.5 Conclusion
Contextual cueing is one of the many ways in which memory and previous experience implicitly
guide attention and visual search. The present results show one characteristic of contextual
cueing that is in line with what is known of memory retrieval: that a change in temporal context
impairs retrieval of previous experiences, and as a result contextual cueing is attenuated. These
results illustrate that models of memory retrieval – temporal context models in particular – offer
a fruitful approach to study how previous experience guides visual search.
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The visual world is rich in information and as we dynamically move around in it and shift our
eyes to explore it, we constantly receive new input. This thesis studied some of the mechanisms
by which the brain learns to predict upcoming visual input, so that we can avert being surprised
by the things we will see. Specifically, the research is this thesis addresses how visual experience
changes future visual attention and behavior, with an emphasis on visual search tasks. This was
studied using a combination of computational modeling and empirical research, at time scales
ranging from dozens of milliseconds to the span of a week. The main conclusions of all studies
have been drawn in their respective chapters; three overarching conclusions are discussed here.
1. Computational models offer a level of detail that illustrates where verbal theories fall short.
2. Incoming visual input immediately causes the brain to adapt to it, which automatically
affects future processing.
3. Task-relevant aspects of visual experience are stored in long-term memory, and their re-
trieval can automatically and implicitly guide visual behavior.
Critical detail offered by computational modeling
Many chapters in this thesis rely heavily on computational modeling techniques. As was men-
tioned in the introduction, these techniques give rise to mechanistic explanations to phenomena
that are more detailed and explicit in their assumptions compared to verbal theories. As a result,
models may help to highlight aspects of verbal theories that are unspecified, infeasible or in-
consistent with other models, theories or findings. In particular, verbal theories may sometimes
be susceptible to certain ‘deus ex machina’-like explanations for certain phenomena. Several
chapters in this thesis are clear examples of the benefits of models.
The deus ex machina-problem is central to the work in Chapter 1 on saccade curvature away
from distractor stimuli. The predominantly assumed mechanism underlying such curvature was
spatially focused top-down inhibition in a ‘saccade map’(Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; McSorley
et al., 2004). Chapter 1 summarizes neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral evi-
dence challenging this assumption, but it is the attempt to model it that makes truly clear how
unfounded and unspecified the assumption of such inhibition is. Note that our model had been
preceded by a multitude of computational models of saccade generation (e.g. Arai et al., 1994;
Trappenberg et al., 2001; Walton, Sparks & Gandhi, 2005; Meeter et al., 2010; Wang et al.,
2012), but none of these models had successfully simulated curvature away from distractors.
If spatially focused inhibition were a feasible mechanism, one would expect successful imple-
mentations of this view would have arisen. By proposing a new mechanism accompanied by a
computational implementation of it we were able assert its feasibility at the outset, as well as
generate a novel prediction that was confirmed by an experiment.
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The model in Chapter 2 is similarly used to constrain the interpretations of experimental
findings. For over 20 years now, intertrial priming in singleton search has been attributed to
the weighting of target- and distractor features (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). The underlying
features that are weighted, as well as the mechanism by which is decided which of them are
weighted, have remained undefined in all this time. As a result of this ill definition, findings
of relational priming (Becker, 2008) and goal-dependent priming (Fecteau, 2007) had been in-
terpreted to contradict the feature weighting account. By combining a computational model of
bottom-up vision with a feature-weighting mechanism, we created the fAIM model that showed
how relational priming does not require a relational code and how effects attributed to goal-
dependent priming do not need a representation of goal. The model offers a new perspective on
feature-weighting, and what such an account of priming truly entails for visual processing.
The introduction section of Chapter 3 offers another example of the volatility of verbal theories.
A mathematical model by Martini (2010) had given rise to the idea that priming in singleton
search is governed by two time scales, suggesting a long- and a short- term mechanism to priming.
The results of Brascamp et al. (2011) were taken to empirically demonstrate these time scales
at play. However, we showed that the proposed interpretation could not be reconciled with the
quantitative predictions of the model. In other words, the empirical data did not correspond to
the computational model. The outcome of this conflict was that the empirical data had been
inaccurate where the model was correct: when reinvestigating the paradigm we uncovered a
coding mistake in the original experiment. Subsequently, we used computational methods to
quantify the (short-lived) time course of intertrial priming in singleton search.
Chapter 4 introduces the long-term priming paradigm as a means to dissociate two possible
mechanisms underlying priming: feature weighting versus episodic memory retrieval. Previously,
the episodic retrieval view on priming had been introduced without any regard for time course.
Using a computational model, we showed that both accounts of priming make very different
predictions for the long-term priming paradigm. Chapter 4 and the subsequent chapters showed
that this time course greatly differs for priming in singleton versus conjunction search (discussed
below), resulting in long term priming effects only for the latter.
Across the chapters of this thesis, we have demonstrated a multitude of ways in which compu-
tational methods can be conducive to scientific progress in situations where verbal theories fall
short. This argues that computational models are an indispensable tool in cognitive neuropsy-
chology and the study of visual attention.
Visual experience immediately causes the brain to adapt
In this thesis, the effects of visual experience has been studied at several different time scales.
The earlier chapters have shown that visual experience has an immediate effect on future visual
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processing. We have proposed various low-level mechanisms that can account for these effects.
One of these is neural accommodation; a reduction in neuronal responses in the brain to re-
peated stimulation. Accommodation can occur in single neurons within only a few milliseconds
of repeated stimulation, which, as Chapter 1 shows, may have immediate consequences for be-
havior. There we have proposed that such accommodation is, for example what makes saccades
curve away from irrelevant distractors.
Similar adaptive behavior in the brain has been observed at slightly larger scales in time and
space, which we have proposed plays a critical role in intertrial repetition effects. It has long
been known that repeated stimuli reduce a stimulus’ bottom-up salience (Itti & Baldi, 2009;
Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009), and yield reduced responses in the sensory cortices (Grill-Spector et al.,
2006; Kristja´nsson et al., 2007). We have proposed that this form of adaptation in response to
the repetition of distractor stimuli is a main contributor to priming of pop-out.
Repetition priming effects do not merely result from adaptation, but seem to result from a
combination of different distractor suppression and target facilitation mechanisms (Lamy et al.,
2008; Meeter & Van der Stigchel, 2013). We have proposed that target repetition results in
facilitation by means of synaptic strengthening: finding a target and completing a trial can
be considered inherently rewarding, and such reward should strengthen the synapses of the
representation of the attended stimulus (see,for example Rombouts, Bohte & Roelfsema, 2015;
Roelfsema et al., 2010). As various authors have suggested before (Martini, 2010; Maljkovic &
Nakayama, 2000; Chun & Nakayama, 2000), and as corroborated by Chapters 3 and 4, these
low-level changes in bottom-up visual processing are only short-lived, and can be quickly erased
by intervening stimuli.
The fAIM model that was introduced in Chapter 2 implements these ideas, and offers a straight-
forward account of a wide range of priming effects. However, the model serves an important
purpose beyond simulating priming: By explaining priming as a logical consequence of these
low-level mechanisms that modulate visual processing, the model explicitly connects priming of
pop-out to other repetition effects in the literature. For example, research on predictive coding
literature has often emphasized how low-level adaptation to visual input in early cortical areas is
short-lived, and serves to adapt to ad-hoc changes in visual stimulation (Todorovic & de Lange,
2012; Summerfield et al., 2008; Larsson & Smith, 2012; Kiebel et al., 2008).
Long-term learning from visual experience
From Chapter 4 onwards, this thesis focuses on long-term effects of visual experience, and
introduces the long-term priming paradigm. In this visual search paradigm, we repeated one of
two target items more often than the other, which leads to long-lasting facilitation of search for
the biased color long after this bias is no longer present.
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In Chapter 5 we showed that such long-term priming biases gaze shifts almost instantly after
display onset. This suggests that memory effects on visual search are not necessarily initiated
upon perception and recognition of a trial or the biased features, but instead may affect visual
search in preparation of the upcoming trial . It was shown that such long-term priming cannot be
explained as the result of intertrial feature weighting, which was further supported in Chapter
6 by an experiment that showed that long-term priming lasted after a week without engaging
in the task. Additional analyses and experiments (in Chapters 4–6) suggest that this long-term
modulation of search is not under the participants’ control, as they are usually not aware of
these biases nor can they readily overcome them.
The properties of long-term priming are similar to those of contextual cueing; a finding that
visual search is facilitated when spatial layouts are repeated. Previous work had already showed
that contextual cueing relies on long-term memory (Chun & Jiang, 2003) and can bias deploy-
ments of attention early on (Johnson et al., 2007). The study presented in Chapter 7 inves-
tigated whether contextual cueing is consistent with models of memory retrieval, and found
further support relating memory retrieval to long-term facilitation effects in visual search.
Perhaps the most surprising finding regarding long-term priming presented in this thesis, is that
it was only found for conjunction search tasks, and not for singleton search. This dissociation was
not determined by the difficulty of the search, but rather seemed to be driven by the difference
in the nature of the task, as singleton and conjunction searches with comparable difficulty still
showed the same distinction.
What underlies this distinction? In chapter 4, we proposed the task relevance of the target-
defining feature as one possible cause. In singleton search, the search is resolved by the local
contrast between target- and distractor stimuli – the actual color value is irrelevant to solve the
task. In conjunction search, however, the actual feature values are needed to solve the task, as
some of the distractors will, by definition, share features with the target.
The idea that only task-relevant features are learned and can modulate visual search and can
have long-term effects on visual processing has been proposed before (Turk-Browne et al., 2005;
Hommel, 2004; Larsson & Smith, 2012; Eger, Henson, Driver & Dolan, 2004). This distinction is
similarly in line with other research, as the conditions where long-term prioritization of certain
features in singleton search has and has not been observed (Leber & Egeth, 2006a; Becker et al.,
2014; Thomson & Milliken, 2013; Geyer et al., 2010; Kunar et al., 2007).
Interestingly, our simulations in Chapter 4 showed that an episodic retrieval account of priming
can account for both short- and long-term priming effects. Moreover, the analyses of eye move-
ment behavior in Chapter 5 showed essentially no differences between the ways long- and short-
term priming affected search. This raises the possibility that in conjunction search, both short-
and long-term priming are two consequences of the same mechanism, and primarily caused by
retrieved memory traces of past visual experience.
177
The Effects of Experience on Visual Processing
Of note though: regardless of whether priming in a particular task is primarily mediated by
low-level changes in bottom-up processing (as in singleton search) or by anticipatory modula-
tions of visual processing through the retrieval of memory traces (as in conjunction search),
priming appears to occur implicitly and out of the observers’ control. Even when they are given
instructions to help them overcome priming effects, participants can not override the effects
exerted by their visual experience (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Huang et al., 2004, Chapter
6)
Conclusion
Repetition is ubiquitous in our lives, and the visual system seems to make good use of such
repetition. The work in this thesis suggests that at the shortest time scales, the visual system
immediately adapts to the dynamics of the current environment to optimize perception and
search to our current needs. From the visual experiences that are acquired, it seems the brain
infers those bits of information that are relevant to the task at hand, and automatically retrieves
this information in the future to efficiently guide visual behavior. By these mechanisms, the
brain is constantly preparing itself for imminent stimuli, guarding us from a recurring sensation
of surprise whenever possible.
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